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This thesis focuses on the examination of available and emerging surveillance and 
biometric technologies for the purpose of improving homeland security, national defense, 
and creating a safer world.  It will reveal the broad spectrum of potential methods that 
may be used in the deterrence, detection, monitoring, and response actions against 
terrorism, crime, and other illicit behavior.  The technical, cultural, and legal issues of 
using surveillance and biometric technology within society will be exposed and 
addressed to provide balance to this challenging discussion.  The authors of this research 
contend that the key to a safer world lies in embracing this technology and the 
willingness for humanity to adapt to change.   
B. MOTIVATION 
The terrorist attacks against America on September 11th 2001 (9-11) killed more 
Americans (over 3,000 dead) than the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 
1941 (2403 dead) and brought us intimately closer to the realization that the unthinkable 
was now possible on our home soil—that civilians are not immune from becoming the 
brunt of conflict casualties.  The 9-11 attack on American marked a sober turning point in 
the way we live our lives, conduct business, operate public transportation, and employ 
law enforcement strategy and tactics.  It emphasizes the need for the United States and all 
civilized nations to collaborate and make ready the innovative and dramatic efforts by 
which we can prevent acts of violence and crimes against humanity.  As we witness 
societal changes, religious indifferences, cultural clashes, and the instability caused by 
erosion of standards and values, we must brace ourselves for more conflicts and prepare 
appropriate measures for managing the consequences of human misbehavior.  Human 
beings typically enjoy their privacy, yet as we hear the news reported daily from 
domestic and international sources—terrorism, crime, and brutal acts of hatred have 
civilized peoples asking questions on how we can protect ourselves.  This thesis is not the 
complete answer to the dilemma that we face today in detecting terrorist activity and 
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crime, but it plants the seeds of progress for which technology and innovative minds can 
devise effective solutions in leading us into a more secure future. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The primary research question addressed in this thesis is:  Can ubiquitous 
surveillance and biometric technologies provide the layered solutions to defend against 
terrorism, crime, and other illicit behaviors?   
Secondary research questions include the following: 
· Why have we arrived at this crossroad in society?  What are the historical 
catalysts that have brought us to seek surveillance and biometric 
technology as resources to manage conflict and world instability? 
· What is the national strategy for homeland security that provides basis for 
employment of such technology? 
· How does this technology work?  To what applications has this 
technology already been applied?  In what ways can it be deployed in the 
future? 
· Of the many biometric methods of surveillance, authentication, and 
detection—which seem to be the most promising in the near term?   
· What are the probable impacts of ubiquitous surveillance on society? 
· What are some of the critical success factors, which must be considered to 
implement ubiquitous surveillance from the concept stage to real world 
usability? 
D. SCOPE OF THESIS 
This thesis will encompass the present array of surveillance and biometric 
technologies; it will discuss areas of possible deployment and reveal its benefits to 
society as well as its present shortcomings, including technical and legal issues.  
Furthermore, it will suggest possible implementation strategies based on lessons- learned 
from past and present initiatives.  Special attention will be given to the United Kingdom, 
which notably has the greatest experience in this field and which at present has the largest 
concentration of surveillance infrastructure in the world.  The ultimate goal of this thesis 
is to suggest intelligent uses and strategies for using surveillance and biometric 
technology to improve homeland security.  The resulting recommendations are intended 
to provide a more effective concept model for defending against crime and terrorism for 
the future of civilization. 
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E. METHODOLOGY 
The methodology used in this thesis research will consist of the following steps: 
· Conducting a literature review of Internet sources, newspapers, magazine 
articles, books, and other information sources for material relevant to the 
study of surveillance and biometrics and the catalysts prompting the use of 
this technology. 
· Carrying out a review of present and evolving surveillance and biometrics 
initiatives, legislation, policies, and societal issues. 
· Collecting and analyzing reviews of various surveillance and biometric 
devices. 
· Aligning surveillance and biometric applications to the strategic goals of 
homeland security. 
· Developing a suggested concept for employing ubiquitous surveillance 
and biometrics in society. 
F. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY 
· Chapter II discusses the catalysts for surveillance and biometric 
technology in society.  It discusses the escalating conflict state, which has 
brought us to the culminating point in the war on terrorism.  It examines 
components of human activity and addresses specific areas of opportunity 
where surveillance and biometrics can have practical impact in crime 
prevention, security, and public safety. 
· Chapter III provides the reader with the background on the creation of the 
evolving Department of Homeland Security.  It discusses the organization, 
strategies, and objectives of homeland security as well as the role 
technology will play in shaping a safer world. 
· Chapter IV examines the classes of existing and emerging surveillance and 
biometrics technologies and compares the various capabilities.   
· Chapter V discusses the various existing and proposed applications of 
specific surveillance and biometrics technology.  
· Chapter VI provides an insight into the impacts and ethics of surveillance 
and biometric technology upon society.  It also provides an overview of 
current and emerging legislation and policies, which aim to balance the 
need for more effective protection against crime and terrorism while 
addressing the maintenance of civil liberties and personal privacy.   
· Chapter VII provides a conclusion, critical success factors, and 
recommendations based on best available information.  The concept for 
ubiquitous surveillance and biometrics is presented not as an instant cure 
for terrorism, crime, and societal dysfunction, but as an evolving and 
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layered approach to managing the friction, conflicts, and hazards in the 
new global environment in which we live, work, and play. 
 
 5
II. THE CATALYST FOR UBIQUITOUS SURVEILLANCE 
A. WHY WE ARE AT THIS CROSSROAD  
Why is surveillance capturing so much of the current headlines, and why is 
technology primed for responding?   
Although there are numerous specific reasons that can be attributed as catalysts 
for a surveillance society, this chapter will broadly discuss two major themes that attempt 
to examine why we are at this crossroad.  First is world conflict.  Managing economic, 
environmental, political, and social change in a world that is growing rapidly in 
population yet is dwindling in resources, produces increased potential for a wide range of 
conflicts.  Second, sophistication in computer and information technologies have reached 
such a level of maturity that modern societies feel compelled to utilize these resources to 
more efficiently monitor, sense, detect, and manage human activity for the greater good 
of a peaceful civilization. 
Expanding on the first catalyst, the world is becoming a more fragile and ever 
volatile place to live.  Scarcity of resources, overpopulation, crime, tribalism, ethnic 
discourse, religious fanaticism, and disease are producing waves of instability throughout 
the globe.  Managing this global trend is complex because of the numerous political, 
military, environmental, and socio-cultural variables.  There is now a blurring of 
separation between wars among nation states and organized criminal organizations, and 
the large-scale violations of human rights against the innocent (World Global Trends, 
2002).  Where there is disparity and inequity, conflicts, civil strife, and victimization 
abound.  The global trends and statistics are alarming. 
“In the next hour, global population will increase by 8,300 people; in 24 hours, 
there will be an additional 200,000 mouths to feed; as many as 73 million people 
are being added to our planet every year, while resources available to feed them 
are diminishing.” (Future Harvest, 8 May 2002). 
“If current trends continue, 2.7 billion people will not have enough water by 2025.  
Approximately 800 million people go hungry every day, 95 percent of them 
reside in the developing countries.” (Future Harvest, 8 May 2002). 
“To keep pace with current population growth, world subsistence resources must 
increase 50 percent by the year 2020.” (Future Harvest, 8 May 2002). 
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“More than 40 percent of the world’s fish stocks have been fished to their 
biological limit.” (Future Harvest, 8 May 2002). 
“Presently, more than 1.3 billion people in developing countries live in abject 
poverty, surviving on incomes of less than one dollar a day, while another 2 
billion people are only marginally better off.” (Future Harvest, 8 May 2002). 
“The poor of the world seldom have enough for a nourishing diet, education, 
family planning, or medical care; women and children are typically the most 
vulnerable.” (Future Harvest, 8 May 2002). 
“Over the last 20 years, violent conflicts have killed an estimated 20 million 
people worldwide—90 percent of the victims have been non-combatants, mostly 
women and children.” (Future Harvest, 8 May 2002). 
“By the mid-1990s, the annual costs of international peacekeeping and emergency 
humanitarian assistance due to wars reached 10 billion dollars.” (Future Harvest, 
8 May 2002). 
“War often destroys food crops, leaving people without a source of food or 
income and laying the groundwork for continued conflict.  In the past decade, 
armed conflict has killed more than 2 million children and has maimed another 6 
million children.” (Future Harvest, 8 May 2002). 
“Each year, approximately 26,000 civilians are killed or maimed by landmines.” 
(Future Harvest, 8 May 2002). 
“The human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), which causes AIDS, has brought 
about a global epidemic far more extensive than what was predicted even a 
decade ago.  Unless a large-scale anti-HIV/AIDS campaign is launched, experts 
fear 50 million people will be infected with HIV by 2005.” (World Global Trends, 
2002). 
“World oil production will begin declining by 2010.  The result will be higher 
energy prices and global economic disturbances, according to Princeton 
University geologist Kenneth S. Deffeyes.” (World Future Society, 2002). 
“The twentieth century has seen over 250 wars, including two world wars and a 
cold war, with more dead than in all previous wars over the past two millennia.” 
(World Global Trends, 2002). 
“Weapons proliferation experts project that at least 20 to 25 countries have 
developed or may be currently developing nuclear, biological, or chemical 
weapons; and that poorer and less technologically advanced countries may be 
seeking chemical and biological weapons.” (World Global Trends, 2002). 
 
Exacerbating the previously mentioned trends is the growth of international 
terrorism and crime organizations.  These factors contribute to increasing world conflict 
and instability, which further elevate concerns for public safety, protection of critical 
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infrastructure, weapons proliferation, and eroding natural resources.  These issues have 
become major concerns on the American public stage, but none more so than the current 
headline – “terrorism.”   
The Hart-Rudman Commission concluded in its final report that the United States 
will face a terrorist attack by an adversary within the next 20-30 years that will cause 
thousands of American causalities (Roxborough, Sep 2001).  The issues surrounding the 
Hart-Rudman Commission study revolve around world change and the impact of 
globalization on society.  Globalization has brought hope for the future prosperity of an 
integrated society, and along with it, a certainty of conflicts as a number of cultures reject 
concepts of modernity.  Globalization has produced byproducts of unpredictability and 
vulnerability.  It has increased our interdependence with world nations, yet 
simultaneously it has created more conflict, not less (World Global Trends, 2002).  The 
global separation between the societies that benefit in the coming era and those that 
flounder in the suffrage of economic and social inequity will likely create further 
conditions of instability that will trend toward regional or international conflicts.  This is 
not to imply that all changes brought on by globalization are bad for society, nor does it 
suggest that we avoid change in order to secure world stability.  It does put forth a 
cautionary footnote however, for the strong linkage between terrorism and the growing 
divide between struggling nations and the nations that prosper.  The threats to the 
civilized world have become all too real.  The implied obligation for the world 
superpowers to find a solution has never been greater.  Speculating on threat assessment 
and what specifically might cause the next conflict for America and other peace- loving 
nations can quickly become a philosophical debate with no end.  Yet if we use history as 
a benchmark—for example, terrorism during the last ten years—we tempt to predict the 
future U.S. threats and take an academic position based on empirical analysis.  This 
analysis can logically conclude that short and long-term threats from foreign and 
domestic sources are inevitable and unavoidable.  Global conflicts in general are on the 
rise, as is the accessibility of weapons of mass destruction.  As of 1 January 2001, the 
world was still grappling with a hodgepodge of problems left over from the 20th century.  
There are still more than three-dozen major active conflicts in the world (Figure 2.1) in 
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which over 1,000 or more casualties have been reported (Smith, 1 Jan 2001).  World 
conflict and terrorism are increasing in spite of our best efforts. 
 
 
Figure 2.1. Global Conflicts 1989-2000. (From: Smith, 1 Jan 2001). 
 
Terrorism, as it relates to global conflict, is also on the rise.  International terrorist 
attacks have shown to be increasing in scale and lethality.  The number of dead and 
wounded in terrorist attacks is on the rise as international terrorist organizations acquire 
more sophisticated methods of assault.  In 2000, 409 persons died in terrorist attacks 
while 796 were wounded.  In 2001, a total of 3,547 persons were killed in terrorist attacks 
while 1,080 were wounded (U.S. Department of State, May 2002).  Although the gross 
number of actual attacks has dropped from previous years to 348 in 2001, from 426 in 
2000 (Figure 2.2 and Figure 2.3), the trend is toward better-planned terrorist events that 
result in additional human carnage and greater perceived impact toward the terrorists’ 
cause.  In addition to the horrific casualties inflicted upon the United States in the 
September 11th 2001 terrorist attacks, violence in the Middle East and South Asia also 
accounted for the increase in casualty totals for 2001 (Figure 2.4, U.S. Department of 
State, May 2002).  Israeli-Palestinian violence significantly escalated in 2001, resulting in 




Figure 2.2. Patterns of Global Terrorism, Attacks 1981-2001. (From: U.S. Department 
of State, May 2002). 
 
 
Figure 2.3. Patterns of Global Terrorism, Type of Event 2001. (From: U.S. 
Department of State, May 2002). 
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Figure 2.4. Patterns of Global Terrorism, Total Casualties 2001. (From: U.S. 
Department of State, May 2002). 
 
Violence against America has previously shown to originate from state sponsored 
groups, non-state sponsored groups, individuals, and hybrids of these.  As we go forth, 
we need to be vigilant of aggression from all sides, yet not submit to paralysis, which can 
overtake caution.  The real danger that exists now is that U.S. policymakers may view 
any change as leading to instability, and therefore succumb to a stagnation effect, which 
would be counterproductive to improving global economic and social prosperity for all.  
Doing nothing is not an option.  America must have focus and build global coalition to 
manage the changes that lie ahead.  
Analysts predict that over the next 25 years, foreign crises will continue to be 
replete with atrocities and the deliberate terrorizing of civilian populations.  Numerous 
cross-border wars are forecast with the most violence erupting from conflicts internal to 
current territorial states (World Global Trends, 2002).  As many governments fail to 
adapt and modernize to the new economic and social realities, people’s desires for 
independence will proliferate, and minorities will be less likely to accept injurious 
government practices.  As a direct result of this friction, international conflict and 
violence will be exacerbated, springing newly created zones of autonomy, leaving major 
powers to struggle in developing effective institutional responses to such crises (World 
Global Trends, 2002).  If one can grasp in this research the appreciation for current global 
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fragility, you begin to understand that the stage is now being set for a new world where 
monitoring and sensing have become consequential yet necessary requisites for survival.  
It may be suggested that the intelligent U.S. approach to managing change in this 
complex world is to face the inevitable spheres of instability with a thoughtful strategy 
that adapts to the forces of global transformations that it cannot expect to have total 
control (Roxborough, Sep 2001).  Ubiquitous surveillance holds promise for just such a 
strategy, for if you cannot control the actions of others, you can at least monitor them and 
be prepared to respond with intelligent and deliberate countermeasures. 
The second reason we are at this crossroad is because our position in technology 
has matured to such a state that we are now poised at the eve of the third wave of 
computing – “ubiquitous computing” or “calm computing.”  The first wave in computing 
technology was mainframe computing, one processor serving many people.  The second 
wave in computing was dubbed “Personal Computing” or PC computing, one processor 
serving one person.  Now we enter into this third, most enveloping wave, called 
ubiquitous computing, many processors serving each person (Xerox PARC, 2001).  
Hence, the idea of “ubiquitous surveillance” comes from this broader concept of 
ubiquitous computing—a term coined by the “Father of Ubiquitous Computing,” Dr 
Mark Weiser (Xerox PARC, 2001).  The term “ubiquitous” means being or seeming to be 
everywhere at the same time.  Dr. Weiser proposes that the most powerful technologies 
are those that disappear into the background of daily living; they weave themselves into 
the fabric of everyday life until they are indistinguishable from it (Xerox PARC, 2001).  
The miniaturization of computing and the subsequent surge in processing efficiencies 
have transitioned humankind to a new era.  Surveillance and sensing technologies thus 
begin to be transparent around us, becoming smaller and more powerful at processing 
tasks.  Therefore, ubiquitous surveillance will become omnipresent.  In the future, 
surveillance will become so pervasive and efficient that we will cease to be aware we are 
being watched, screened, observed, and protected.  The key to success in the ubiquitous 
surveillance concept model is that the technology is complementary to our lives and 
unobtrusive to human daily activity.  The new world unfolding before us in the decades 
ahead is predicted to be a place in which we will co-exist harmoniously in sensor-rich 
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environments.  Small ubiquitous computing devices will monitor everything from who is 
knocking at your door, to where your child is at any moment in time, to what is inside 
that cargo shipping container transiting the ocean (Xerox PARC, 2001).  In the not too 
distant future, analysts predict that you will not need a password or PIN because in fact 
you will be the password or PIN (Rolwing, p. 11).  In biometric terms, a computing 
sensor will validate who you are based on your biological signature.  Your eyes, face, 
fingerprint, hand, or voice, will authenticate your identity.  The concept of biometrics is 
built upon the theory that authentication of who you are is a measurable and verifiable 
science.  One’s own biological signature of uniqueness is distinguishable and quantifiable 
using sensor-based technologies.  The technologies can be used toward numerous 
applications where security, safety, and personal identification are necessary 
requirements.  The increasing accuracy of biometrics technology has evolved to provide a 
natural partnership with surveillance technology, especially for the surveillance of human 
behavior. 
The need for ubiquitous surveillance has grown not of voyeuristic motives but one 
of securing public safety, prevention, detection of criminal activity, counter-terrorism, 
protection of national assets, and intelligence gathering for national defense.  Ubiquitous 
surveillance can alert authorities to take corrective actions to right a wrong, capture a 
perpetrator, intercept a disaster in the making, and save lives.   
Several credible polls suggest a majority of Americans welcome surveillance in 
society for their own protection, and there is growing public support for broadening the 
government's investigative powers for defense purposes (Thorsberg, 8 Oct 2001). 
A Harris Poll performed 19-24 Sep 2001, surveyed 1,012 adults and found that, 
· 86 percent support face-recognition technology to scan for suspected 
terrorists at various locations and events;  
· 81 percent wanted closer monitoring of banking and credit card 
transactions, and 68 percent favored a national identification system, and;   
· More than half of the respondents supported government monitoring of 
Internet discussions and chat rooms and increased monitoring of mobile 
communications and e-mail (Thorsberg, 8 Oct 2001).    
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In a BusinessWeek poll held in October 2001,  
· More than 60 percent of 1,334 respondents said a national ID card system 
was acceptable and that they would submit to a facial scanning system in 
connection with transit or large public events; 
· Slightly more than 50 percent expressing support for expanded scanning 
of email messages and phone conversations by the government; and  
· Nearly 50 percent supported additional wiretapping and email surveillance 
(Thorsberg, 8 Oct 2001).   
B. TERRORISM 
The morning of September 11, 2001 unfolded the worst act of terrorism in U.S. 
history and was without a doubt, the greatest awakening Americans have ever had that 
such deadly violence can be a domestic reality.  Osama bin Laden, Mohamed Atta, and 
the terrorist network “al Qaeda” are now names known throughout the world.  Prior to 
this horrific event, the last decade has been filled with major terrorist incidents that have 
given clue to impending dangers to come.  Here is a short chronology (Davis, Jan 2002):  
· On 26 Feb 1993, a car bomb in the World Trade Center killed six, injured 
1000, and caused over $600 million in damage;  
· On 20 Mar 1995, a Japanese extremist group launched a coordinated 
attack within the Tokyo subway system by releasing the nerve agent sarin 
on commuter trains at rush hour, killing 12 people and injured over 5,500 
others;  
· On 19 Apr 1995, a truck bomb exploded outside the Alfred P. Murrah 
Federal Building in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, killing 168 people, and 
injured hundreds;  
· On 25 Jun 1996, terrorists attacked a U.S. military barracks, the Al Khobar 
Towers in Saudi Arabia, killing 19 airmen;  
· On 7 Aug 1998, terrorists bombed the U.S. Embassies in Tanzania and 
Kenya, killing 224, including 12 Americans;  
· In May 2000, the “I Love You” computer virus attack caused over $15 
billion in damage to United States commercial and government agencies, 
and infected and forced off- line 70% of the computers in Scandinavia and 
Germany;  
· On 12 Oct 2000, a suicide bomber attacked the USS Cole while in the port 
of Aden, Yemen, killing 17 American sailors and injuring 39 others; 
· And finally, in the worst case of terrorism on U.S. soil, on 11 September 
2001, 19 terrorist hijacked four airliners, crashing them into the World 
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Trade Center twin towers, the Pentagon, and a field in Stony Creek 
Township, Pennsylvania, killing over 3,000 people and injuring hundreds 
(Davis, Jan 2002). 
Since 1968, there have been more than 10,000 recorded incidents of terrorism 
worldwide, yet until recently, the resulting fatality rates experienced have been anywhere 
from one, to just under 100 per event (Hoge and Rose, pp. 4-5).  Although the earlier 
causes of terrorism are believed to be entrenched in poverty and inferior living 
conditions, we are also seeing a more sinister terrorist movement evolving, spurred by 
religious ideology (World Future Society, 2002).  These modern terrorist factions have 
fewer moral qualms about mass murder, and still fewer concerns about what their 
constituents might think of their perpetrating murder on an even greater scale (Hoge and 
Rose, p. 5).  These religiously inspired terrorists welcome their own death with as much 
enthusiasm as they have in carrying out the deaths of their intended victims.  They 
murder with the belief that God’s cause will bring them rewards in the afterlife (Hoge 
and Rose, p. 5).  Because of this view, suicide has become the quintessential benchmark 
of religious devotion among terrorist “true believers” in the Middle East (Hoge and Rose, 
p. 7).  The Director of the FBI has stated unequivocally that it is inevitable the United 
States would one day see pedestrian suicide bombers on home soil and that terrorist 
attacks against the United States is a reality we will all have to face (CNN, 20 May 
2002).  What is most disconcerting is the possibility that weapons of mass destruction 
may get into the hands of terrorist organizations that would not hesitate to use them 
against civilian populations, potentially causing casualties in the tens of thousands or 
millions.  Experts believe terrorists may also resort to the use of dirty bombs, which can 
be used along with conventional explosives to spread contaminating nuclear material 
over a large area (Haddock, 28 Apr 2002).  Such a weapon could cause mass disruption 
and hysteria in a region or entire nation.  It is now common knowledge that the question 
is not if, terrorist will attack again, but when, and how. 
For years we have written off terrorism as something that largely happens 
overseas, that American soil was somehow immune from the reach of international 
religious fanaticism.  Although Israelis have lived with suicide terrorism for many years, 
the reality is something most Americans are not prepared accept.  The painful lessons of 
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9-11 have now propelled us to imagine the unimaginable.  The news reels of passenger 
planes crashing into the World Trade Center, the Pentagon burning, and the subsequent 
bioterrorist attacks of anthrax- laden mail (Sep-Oct 2001) send a cold realism into the 
American psyche, that we are vulnerable and must fight back vehemently to preserve our 
freedom and the freedoms of all civilized people.   
Ironically, it is partly because of the freedoms we cherish and openness we enjoy 
as an American society that we are so susceptible to terrorism.  Historically, we have 
associated violence against America as a remote possibility but not one that we viewed as 
a mortal threat to thousands of innocent non-combatants in a single terrorist act.  Before 
9-11, Americans have stereotypically been more concerned with the U.S. economy and 
employment rather than domestic security and safety.  Using airport security as an 
example our existing layers of security were mere window-dressing to make a flying 
public feel good about the appearance of airport security.  We now know that the 
privately run airport security system was a product of the lowest bidder; sound training 
and substantive security measures were simply not thought of as an economic investment 
worth making (Fish, 2002).  One GAO report revealed that the annual job turnover 
among airport screeners averaged 126 percent at the country’s 19 largest airports with 
five airports having a rate significantly higher: Saint Louis (416%), Atlanta (375%), 
Houston (237%), Boston (207%), and Chicago (200%) (Fish, 2002).   
The technological ability for terrorists to launch vicious attacks against civilian 
populations and critical infrastructure is spreading to larger numbers of terrorist 
organizations and individuals with each passing year.  The threat of terrorism is an 
inescapable reality and permanent condition of life in the 21st century (Whitehouse, 
2002).  America must never relax its resolve to defeat terrorist wherever they live.  Our 
Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, said of terrorism plainly: 
It would seem to me that if one thinks about it, a terrorist can attack at any 
time at any place, using any conceivable technique.  You and I know it’s 
impossible to defend in every single location at every moment of the day 
or night against every conceivable type of technique.  It can’t be done.  
That means that the only way you can deal with terrorists is to go after 
them.  The only defense against terrorism is offense.  It is preemption.  It 
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is finding them and rooting them out and stopping them.  And it’s dealing 
with the countries that harbor them. (Rumsfeld, 20 Feb 2002).  
C. THE IMPERFECT FENCES AND WORLD VULNERABILITIES 
One of the greatest assets of a terrorist is to remain anonymous, faceless, and 
nameless while exercising global mobility.   
As the expansion of the Internet has made much of our personal and business 
lives easier, so too has it made the increased growth of identity theft and document fraud 
all the more dramatic.  It has become apparent that identity theft is becoming one of the 
major stepping-stones for international crime groups, fraud rings, drug cartels, and 
terrorist organizations to accomplish their broader objectives.   
Security vulnerabilities in our airports, seaports, border-crossings, and other hubs 
of transportation and commerce are being used to gain illegal access to physical 
locations, such as airplanes, federal buildings, computer systems, and other restricted 
areas.  The potential damage that can be caused by terrorist organizations is so great that 
we can no longer afford to be reactive to the problems of personnel authentication and 
international security.  The international community needs to be proactive in pursuing all 
possible solutions and preemptive measures, both technological and procedural, in 
addressing the points of weakness in our systems.  
1. Borders and Ports 
Our borders are typically the first physical lines of defense against terrorist 
infiltration to the U.S., but managing comprehensive control over such an extremely large 
area with the existing volume of traffic is an immense challenge.  The U.S. shares a 
7,500-mile border with Canada and Mexico along with an exclusive economic zone 
encompassing 3.4 million square miles (Whitehouse, 2002).  Combine this with the fact 
that more than 500 million people enter into the United States each year, 67 percent (330 
million) of which are non-citizens, one begins to get the magnitude of the border control 
challenge.   
On the cargo side of commerce, over 11.2 million trucks and 2.2 million rail cars 
cross into the United States annually (Whitehouse, 2002).  Our seaports are another 
access point to our borders, and no less high in traffic.  By sea, 8,000 foreign-flag ships 
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with multinational crews make 51,000 calls in U.S. ports annually (Loy and Ross, Feb 
2002).  It would surprise most people to know that more than 95 percent of our non-
North American foreign trade arrives by ship; and of the 7.5 million ship containers that 
enter the U.S. each year, only 2 percent are physically inspected for illegal or otherwise 
unauthorized materials or goods (Loy and Ross, Feb 2002).  The rules that govern the 
inspection of commerce were never created with the thought that shipments might carry 
containers that could contain weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and it is 
economically self-defeating to attempt to inspect all contents of every shipment.  
Stoppages or slowdowns for freight inspections would have grave economic 
consequences globally since the world is dependent on commerce for goods from oil to 
food and every imaginable item in between. 
In the air, U.S. and foreign airlines hauled 8.4 million freight tons to and from the 
United States during the year ended March 2001, a 3.6% increase from the previous year 
(USDOT, Mar 2001).  U.S. and foreign air carriers also transported 144 million 
passengers between the United States and the rest of the world for the year-ending March 
2001 (USDOT, Mar 2001).  This represents a traffic increase of 7% over the previous 
year.  As international commerce continues to grow, so does the concern that someday 
again, either by air, sea, or land, terrorists will use the weakest seams of our 
vulnerabilities to deliver a destructive blow to the civilized world.    
2. Identification Theft 
The anonymity of terrorists and the success of their operations can depend greatly 
on their ability to obtain false identification.  According to the FBI, every two minutes 
someone is having their identity stolen; this equates to roughly 350,000 times per year 
and is increasing annually (Regan and Willox, 2 Oct 2001).  The Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC), which maintains an Identity Theft Hotline and Identity Theft Data 
Clearinghouse, has seen a dramatic rise in reported identity theft, noting it received an 
average of over 1,800 reports per week in 2001 compared to 445 per week when the 
hotline started in November 1999 (Regan and Willox, 2 Oct 2001).  The fraudulent use of 
social security numbers as reported by the Social Security Administration (SSA) has risen 
by 500% in just four years (Regan and Willox, 2 Oct 2001).  Estimates of the number of 
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people victimized by identity theft in 2000 range from 500,000 to 700,000, and were 
approximately 750,000 in 2001.  The Wall Street Journal estimates that identity theft cost 
consumers and merchants combined an estimated $1 billion in the year 2000 (Regan and 
Willox, 2 Oct 2001).   
Since the terrorist attacks of September 11th, it has become know that some of the 
identities used by the hijackers in carrying out the terrorist plot were fraudulently 
obtained—false identities stolen from real people.  It appears that the hijackers 
maintained their claimed identities with the use of phony passports, drivers’ licenses, and 
other documents.  The identities they used were of real people who live in Saudi Arabia 
and Tunisia.   
Stolen passports previously issued to law abiding citizens can easily be altered to 
suit the terrorist’s needs, and legitimate blank passports can be stolen to create authentic 
looking passports for similar purposes.  Some of the 9-11 hijackers were able to forge 
Belgian passports.  Furthermore, Belgian authorities have estimated that some 19,050 
blank Belgian passports have gone missing or been stolen since 1990 (BBC, 21 Aug 
2001).  Organized international terrorists tend to assume identities of people in their 
native countries, or of that immediate area.  Regrettably, most of the authentication 
resources and capabilities that exist today consist of only domestic or local information.  
Without having overseas information on foreign nationals, comprehensive checking on a 
global scale remains unrealistic (Regan and Willox, 2 Oct 2001).   
Much has been stated concerning the potential benefit of using some form of 
biometrics in confirming identification of the international identity thief.  It should be 
emphasized that both surveillance and biometrics techniques are only as good as the data 
available to authenticate the individual in question.  For example, a computerized face 
recognition system designed to alert to the presence of a terrorist can only be useful if the 
individual’s face is in the computer database (Regan and Willox, 2 Oct 2001).  In the case 
where the database is normally populated with those who are known felons, then the 
system would not be able to detect a thief who is not yet known to be a criminal.  
However, when a system is supplemented by the corroboration of another piece of unique 
information such as a social security number or passport, then the system effectiveness 
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can be increased by an order of magnitude.  When perpetrated by a professional criminal, 
identity theft is used as a means to cover up or conceal a much larger crime, which is why 
tracking identity theft is difficult and challenging work, especially as it relates to the 
world of terrorism.  It is no surprise that the growth of the Internet has given this type of 
theft global reach, and quickly created greater tribulation for consumers, merchants, law 
enforcement, and policy makers (Regan and Willox, 2 Oct 2001). 
The convenience and sophisticated of computer technology, software, scanners, 
color printers, and Internet resources, have made control of this growing problem of 
identity theft all the more challenging.  The numerous threats that terrorism and crime 
bring to bare heighten the consequences of inaction.  Technology then can be seen as 
both a curse and a blessing in this respect.  Although the capability now exists for the 
villains of the world to do us harm with relative anonymity, technology also allows us the 
potential to imprint “unforgeable” biometric information into all forms of identification 
should we choose to embrace it.  Countering the risks of terrorism through combating 
identity theft may soon be seen as a necessary investment in our future.  Improvements 
upon current identification systems could deter this type of theft (Reuters, 17 Feb 2002).  
Another advantage to a secure and forgery-proof form of identification is that it will help 
protect the privacy of the American public by moving people away from using their 
Social Security numbers (SSN) for identification; once compromised for illicit purposes, 
SSNs can provide a host of other information about an individual (Sullivan, 3 May 2002).  
It is possible that a biometric driver’s license for example, will evolve to double as a 
“smart card platform” which can be used for wide range of other identification and 
electronic services, from automated payments to digital signatures for e-commerce 
(Reuters, 17 Feb 2002). 
In May 2002, two Virginia congressmen (Jim Moran-Dem. and Tom Davis-Rep.) 
proposed a $315 million program that would require biometric markers on driver’s 
licenses within the next five years (Sullivan, 3 May 2002).  The newly proposed license 
would carry the driver’s retinal scan, fingerprint, or some other kind of biometric marker 
within an imbedded encrypted chip.  The benefits of a foolproof identification system are 
vast.  America now seems poised at the dawn of a new era in security awareness, and the 
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ground has become fertile for what experts see as some surrogate version of a national 
identity card.   
3. Information Stovepipes and Disparate Bureaucracies  
“Water, water, everywhere, but we have not a drop to drink.”  Information is 
almost a utility, generated in enormous volumes every second of every day.  There is 
little argument that in this age of technology and information systems, we are drowning 
in information.  We need timely information to carry out our daily functions, make 
decisions, work, plan, adjust, and respond.  Yet typically, information is isolated in 
disparate stovepipe systems or contained within people who work in separate agencies.  
These systems and people often do not talk to one another; information is commonly lost 
within bureaucracies that cannot find it themselves inside their own systems and files.   
How many times have intelligence reports of terrorist plans listing specific targets 
failed to prevent strikes against Americans?  In 1983, we had several advanced reports of 
terrorists targeting the U.S. Marine compound in Beirut, Lebanon; and on 23 October 
1983, 241 U.S. soldiers were killed (Gates, 20 May 2002).  History can, and does repeat 
itself. 
It should be no surprise in the post-analysis, that the clues, which would have 
given America notice that 9-11 terrorists were plotting a horrific attack, were in existence 
all along; but for whatever technical, social, or bureaucratic reasons, that information was 
not pieced together.   
There were massive failures of intelligence that led to that terrible day on 
September 11th.  Key pieces of knowledge were not shared with appropriate agencies and 
individuals.  We need to learn from the past to plan for our future security effectively.  
Because of the extensive media reporting, some critical facts are now known; and 
Americans are responding by second-guessing whether we could have really prevented 
the terrorist plot of 9-11.  The short answer is, we might have prevented 9-11.  To see the 
system puzzle more clearly and appreciate the complexity of our intelligence systems and 
bureaucracy, let us examine the following 9-11 information trail: 
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On 5 July 2001, an FBI antiterrorism task force agent, Kenneth Williams, wrote a 
memo in Phoenix, Arizona, detailing the agent’s discovery of a pattern of Arab men, 
Williams’ believed to be Islamic radicals, signing up for training at flight schools (Elliott, 
20 May 2002).  In the memo, since known as the “Phoenix memo”, Williams 
recommended an investigation as to whether al Qaeda operatives were training at the 
schools.  Despite being sent to the counterterrorism division at FBI headquarters in 
Washington and to two field offices, including the counterterrorism section in New York, 
the Phoenix memo was ignored.  The memo was never shared with the CIA or the White 
House.  It was later discovered that one of 9-11 hijackers did indeed train in Arizona and 
had al Qaeda links (Elliott, 20 May 2002).  
On 6 Aug 2001, President Bush received his daily CIA Presidential Daily Brief 
(PDB).  The brief addressed possible terrorist threats inside the U.S.  In this particular 
brief, he received a document, which mentioned that al Qaeda might hijack airliners and 
perhaps use hostages to secure the release of an al Qaeda leader or sympathizer (Elliott, 
20 May 2002).  According to the NSA (Condoleezza Rice), the 6 Aug 2001 PDB had no 
mention that a hijacked plane would possibility be flown into a building.  Administration 
officials had conceded that turning a plane into a suicide bomb was something that 
nobody had considered (Elliott, 20 May 2002).  If officials had made the effort to review 
the recent history of suicide-style terrorist plots, they would have seen that a hijacking 
scenario should not have been discounted. 
In August 2001, the President was briefed by the CIA on the possibility that 
Osama bin Laden’s al Qaeda terrorist network might use hijacked airliners to win 
concessions from the U.S. (Elliott, 20 May 2002). 
On 16 August 2001, a student pilot named Zacarias Moussaoui, a man the French 
government knew was associated with Islamic extremists, was arrested in Minnesota on 
immigration charges after he aroused suspicion by apparently wanting to learn to fly 
jumbo jets but not land them (Arena and Lewandowski, 20 May 2002).  The Federal 
Aviation Administration (FAA) was notified about the arrest of Moussaoui in the days 
leading up to the 9-11 attacks but officials said the agency decided not to warn the 
airlines about the possible threat because Moussaoui was already in jail (Arena and 
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Lewandowski, 20 May 2002).  When the U.S. detained Zacarias Moussaoui, the FBI did 
not share information of the possible threat with anyone in the White House’s 
Counterterrorism Security Group (CSG) (Elliott, 20 May 2002).  Moussaoui has since 
been charged with complicity in the 9-11 attacks. 
After 9-11, the White House made a conscious decision not to disclose the August 
briefing, hoping that it would be discussed “in context” many months later, when 
congressional investigations into the attacks eventually got under way (Elliott, 20 May 
2002). 
President Bush’s national security aides had been warned during the presidential 
transition that there was an al Qaeda presence in the U.S., but prior to 9-11, fighting 
terrorism had not been a top priority in the early months of the Bush Administration 
(Elliott, 20 May 2002). 
There were earlier warning signs of the type of assault America could face.  The 
paradigm of systems and bureaucracies which do not talk to one another reveals itself 
further when in 1995, authorities in the Philippines foiled a mass hijacking plan, 
masterminded by Ramzi Yousef, whereby American planes were to be hijacked and 
blown up over the Pacific (Elliott, 20 May 2002).  Yousef was also notoriously known 
for plotting the 1993 World Trade Center bombing (Elliott, 20 May 2002).  More 
evidence of the potential for an air attack against America was discovered during the 
investigation of Yousef and his partner, Abdul Hakim Murad.  The subsequent analysis 
uncovered a plan to crash a plane into CIA headquarters in Langley, Virginia (Elliott, 20 
May 2002).  If this were not enough to prod the imagination, in 1994, French intelligence 
authorities discovered and foiled a plot by the Algerian Armed Islamic Group to fly an 
airliner into the Eiffel Tower (Elliott, 20 May 2002).  Despite the historical leading 
indicators, no one in the Bush Administration compiled this available threat intelligence 
information; and subsequently, the U.S. was surprise that such a tactic of mass murder 
might be a possibility.  In fact, up until the 9-11 terrorist attack, FAA security policy for 
airline crews dealing with hijacking remained “cooperate with hijackers’ demands” 
(Arena and Lewandowski, 20 May 2002). 
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The Phoenix memo had not been shared with the CIA, the Senate Intelligence 
Committee, White House, and President (Elliott, 20 May 2002).  Had the President’s 
brief writers been aware of it somehow, the 6 August 2001 PDB would have at least 
attracted more discussion.  While it certainly appears some of the pre 9-11 intelligence 
did look like an obvious smoking gun, it is far more difficult than it seems to package 
together the sometimes incomplete or ambiguous information and form compelling 
analysis, worthy of convincing higher government authorities enough to prompt complex 
and high-risk decisions (Gates, 20 May 2002).   
One of the major shortcomings of our existing intelligence information systems is 
that it is run by individuals who, for a variety of reasons, are overwhelmed, distracted, or 
are otherwise confused by volumes of “potentially useful” information that comes their 
way.  Information that is supplied often arrives too late for a proper staffing and analysis.  
When confronted by hundreds or even thousands of seemingly worthy pieces of 
intelligence information, an overworked and understaffed department may be forced to 
prioritize, and a key piece of information may go unnoticed in the downpour of data.  
People are often molded by outdated perceptions of the way the world should be or by 
existing models of their work process, which may be ingrained in decades of institutional 
tradition.  We should learn from this experience and reexamine our existing methods of 
information exchange.  We should capitalize on the ingenuity of our out-of-the-box 
thinkers, rewarding adopted ideas for improvement, and encourage the utilization of 
smart technologies where practical.   
Fixing a complex and bureaucratic system that desperately needs improvement is 
a great challenge, and it will not happen overnight.  The weaknesses in our national 
security system were revealed to the world after 9-11.  Sharing timely information among 
those who need it is key.  One could easily argue that had authorities tried to track down 
all Muslim flight-school students, they would have been accused of racial profiling.  
Undeniably, True.  Changing the way in which government agencies do business, and 
eliminating the things that contribute to discourse and inter-agency rivalry is also a 
monumental, but necessary task.  It is inevitable that some rights may be infringed upon 
as government seeks to protect the public.  One cannot help but wonder how much 
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sacrifice in privacy does America wish to pay in order to feel safe.  One FBI agent who 
prefers to remain anonymous, answered this question quite bluntly; he said:   
The public expects FBI agents to use instinct to surgically extract terrorists 
from society; and to do it without inconveniencing the public or infringing 
on innocent lives.  Americans have unrealistic expectations about what 
law enforcement can do in a society in which personal freedom is deemed 
more important than public safety.  Americans say they will give anything 
to be safe from terrorists.  They don’t really mean it.  They would rather 
live in a free society than be completely safe.  That means some dots 
won’t ever be connected. (CNN, 20 May 2002).   
During a recent commencement speech to the U.S. Naval Academy Class of 
2002, Vice President Dick Cheney emphasized America’s need to go on the offensive to 
eradicate terrorist networks where they live.  He said the terrorists are working to acquire 
the deadliest of weapons, and that another strike against the U.S. is almost certain (CNN, 
24 May 2002).  
It is apparent to military strategists that Cold War intelligence gathering systems 
are not effective in this new war on terror.  They did not envision an enemy living in 
Afghan caves one day, and moving to European and American apartments the next, 
blending into society, and stealthily infecting peaceful civilization with plots of death by 
surprise, sabotage, and deception (Elliott, 20 May 2002).  We now live in a world where 
criminals are as powerful as countries; and some countries are run by criminals (Elliott, 
20 May 2002).  The way we collect, analyze, and share information on an enterprise level 
must change to meet the needs of our new defense strategy.   
Creating smarter systems has as much impact on our ability to effectively share 
information as does repairing our disparate bureaucracies.  The terms: pattern-
recognition, data mining, intelligent networking, neural networks, intelligent algorithms, 
expert systems, decisions support systems, smart systems, and knowledge management, 
all come to mind when one thinks of building a better system for alerting authorities of 
impending danger or suggested actions to be taken.  We are not merely talking about 
computers systems now; we are talking about managing information and transforming it 
into knowledge in such a way, that it becomes powerfully synergistic.  This is relevant to 
surveillance and biometrics technology because the once-rival intelligence and police 
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agencies around the world now need to share and analyze information quickly (Patton, 1 
Feb 2002).  Many surveillance systems in the U.K., for example, are watched not by 
people but by software algorithms that query authorities if attention is required on a 
particular event. 
According to Homeland Security Director Tom Ridge, we need interoperable 
communications systems and a national surveillance network to assist with everything 
from border security and information sharing to bioterrorism and first responders 
(Porteus, 24 Apr 2002).  We need to have more organized background information about 
who is coming through our borders; we need to know when they arrive, how long they 
stay, where they are, and what they are doing.  If someone is on a “wanted list,” we need 
to know that.  If someone is using a false identity, we need a system that will alert us of 
that.  If a visa is expired, we need to know that automatically.  If someone is trying to 
smuggle in hazardous materials, arms, or WMD, we need a system that will help our law 
enforcement authorities to alert to that threat.  Our communications systems must be 
designed such that when a pattern of unusual events begins unfolding such as a pandemic 
medical crisis, our first responders, and medical teams can quickly react to keep the threat 
from spreading and harming others. 
For agencies to exchange vital information with other agencies, they must first be 
committed to “want to” share.  This is a cultural barrier that goes far beyond technology; 
in fact, it should be a prerequisite to employment of technology.  Members of the FBI, 
CIA, DEA, IRS, and Customs Service have had long running interagency rivalries.  
Secrecy, mistrust, and budgetary power plays historically damaged any chance of 
improving information exchange among agencies.  Any temporary cohesion gained out of 
responding to a crisis usually diminished again over time (Patton, 1 Feb 2002).  
Moreover, it is not always people but legal guidelines that limit interagency information 
exchange.  Intelligence and law enforcement agencies are not always permitted by law to 
share information.  This too must change.  This is even more profound on an international 
level when you are looking at laws between neighboring countries.  It gets complex since 
each country has different extradition laws and treaties, leading to inevitable 
disagreements as countries pursue suspected terrorists across borders.  To smooth out 
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these judicial procedures, the European Union earlier in 2002 created the European 
Judicial Cooperation Unit, EUROJUST, based in Brussels, Belgium, which brings 
magistrates together from different countries to cooperatively resolve differences (Patton, 
1 Feb 2002).  Europe is proving that most of the information sharing barriers are often 
political and easily workable through increased collaboration.   
Until the recent passage of the new antiterrorism bill, the FBI had not been 
allowed to reveal anything obtained during domestic criminal investigations with the CIA 
(Patton, 1 Feb 2002).  Communications between intelligence agencies is now a 
requirement.  The antiterrorism bill also authorizes the FBI to share its data with the State 
Department and the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS).  Lawmakers are also 
busily preparing additional legislation that will encourage information sharing and finally 
eliminate stovepipe information barriers. 
Once these bureaucratic barriers are crossed, the technology can be pivotal in 
making the information flows happen.  There are a few success stories that provide 
models for various intelligence agencies in information sharing using private networks 
and secure Internet systems.  For example, Interpol, the European-based law enforcement 
and intelligence network, is made up of 179 countries and has served as a hub for 
international law enforcement cooperation since its inception in 1923 (Patton, 1 Feb 
2002).  Interpol serves as a coordinator or liaison for the information flow.  Each country 
owns its own databases; Interpol merely serves as a central clearinghouse for 
international law enforcement cooperation.   
Even with the assistance of technology and the many corporate vendors waiting to 
help, the global transformation will not be straightforward.  Technology integrations can 
be extremely complex because of the uniqueness of different agency systems.  Federal, 
state, and local agencies face the daunting challenge of interconnecting hundreds of 
unrelated databases, each running on different hardware platforms using different 
operating systems and running dissimilar software suites.  Many of these departmental 
systems were purchased without any coordination with other agencies, making the cost 
and complexity of effort in linking them all the more challenging.  Fortunately, federal 
funding is coming to assist in the effort.  The administration has allotted $15 billion for 
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information technology in the proposed fiscal 2003 budget, with $4 billion of that going 
for IT security (Porteus, 24 Apr 2002).      
The ultimate goal is to link all of the major databases of U.S. intelligence, DoD, 
and police agencies into a single virtual intelligence network; but this will take many 
years.  In the short-term, we can at least use the Interpol sharing model and expand upon 
its information sharing capabilities.   
On a U.S. national level, several interagency communications models do exit.  For 
example, the military’s Secret Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET) is used to 
share classified and intelligence-related information among services and intelligence 
agencies.   
Another information sharing model is JNet, which Homeland Security Director 
Ridge pushed during his term as governor.  It is a web-based network linking data from 
various law enforcement agencies, which provides thousands of photos of criminal 
suspects.  Similarly, the U.S. government is investigating building its own Internet, called 
GovNet, to provide safe transmission of sensitive data and government communications 
(Patton, 1 Feb 2002). 
Intelink is also an existing effort to create a shared information environment for 
the intelligence community.  Intelink serves as a giant intranet for intelligence analysts in 
the National Security Agency (NSA) and the CIA, allowing analysts to share information 
in various classified levels.   
In 1996, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) began work 
on a pilot project, called Genoa, a peer-to-peer computing network designed to allow for 
interagency data sharing.  The concept is for high- level intelligence analysts to share 
information and patterns of criminal behavior.  The National Security Adviser has 
recently proposed using Genoa to foster information sharing among agencies (Patton, 1 
Feb 2002). 
The concept of knowledge management and interagency cooperation in law 
enforcement and intelligence dates back to 1974 when the DEA set up the El Paso 
Intelligence Center (EPIC).  Intelligence analysts, criminal investigators, and support 
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personnel from numerous federal agencies and two state agencies staff EPIC.  Their 
purpose is the hosting of intelligence from various federal databases, as well as their own.  
Most state police can contact EPIC to find out information about drugs or illegal aliens, 
and most notably, EPIC is now being used to assist in counterterrorism investiga tions 
(Patton, 1 Feb 2002).  
Information sharing models such as SIPRNET, Intelink, and EPIC, show that 
agencies can share data if there is an infrastructure established with a specific purpose in 
mind (Patton, 1 Feb 2002).  The battle to recast the legacy stovepipe information systems 
into knowledge sharing portals will be a difficult but attainable goal.  It must begin with 
changing the culture of people within each agency, and that includes providing effective 
leadership and focus on the road ahead.  It also means embracing biometric 
authentication, sensing, and surveillance technologies to accurately obtain credible 
information that can be digitally managed by fast and efficient systems.  Once the 
technological infrastructure is established and personnel are trained in the new processes, 
utilities such as data mining, pattern recognition, and decision support will become 
available on a more effective level.  In the future model, managers will need to ensure 
incentives are built- in to encourage continued sharing of knowledge.  The technology is 
not a panacea, but a means to maximize human intelligence and transform information 
into decisions and actions that will assist in our prevailing over terrorism and other 
criminal activity.  
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III. NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR HOMELAND SECURITY 
A. THE CHALLENGE  
The concept in establishing an office for homeland security serves to provide the 
United States with a coordinating agency that will be responsible for leadership oversight 
in managing federal, state, and local security, and defense responses.  Our nation has 
never had a blueprint for a national strategy to fight war on terrorism (Whitehouse, 2002).  
This is a new concept for the United States.  Security of our homeland, especially 
security against terrorism, has become an inescapable part of life in the 21st century.  
Americans were incapable of comprehending the likelihood of the 9-11 attack.  After the 
initial shock and subsequent resolve to respond, we are now rethinking our entire 
approach to operating in this new world.  There are many issues that must be addressed 
for developing homeland security; it is a task of monumental scale and complexity.  
Reaching our objectives will require hard work and a sustained investment of resources 
over many years.  Unfortunately, this is a mission that will have no end.   
The challenges ahead for the newly created Office of Homeland Security are 
multidisciplinary and will involve numerous agencies from all levels of government.  The 
plan to realize the goals of homeland security and maintain a certain level of defensive 
posture must be tempered with a balance for quality of life and a sense of cost-
effectiveness (USCNS, 15 Feb 2001).  The road to achieving the new agency’s goals has 
become an investment for the preservation of the civilized world. 
This chapter will discuss the strategy of the Office of Homeland Security and 
define the vital supporting role that technology and people will be asked to play in the 
months and years ahead.   
B. MISSION OF HOMELAND SECURITY 
The mission of the Homeland Security Office is to develop, coordinate, and 
implement a comprehensive national strategy to secure the United States from terrorist 
threats or attacks (Whitehouse, 28 Feb 2002).  It is a multi- layered concept of actions 
among federal, state, local, private, and individual citizens to deter, defend against, or 
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mitigate attacks within the United States, and to respond to other major domestic 
emergencies (ANSER, 28 Feb 2002).   
C. THE STRATEGY 
The strategy of the homeland security is based in three underlying themes.  First, 
government leadership must define a clear vision for homeland security in cooperation 
with all appropriate partners and muster the necessary resources to get the job done.  
Second, a detailed national homeland security strategy should be developed based on a 
comprehensive assessment of national threats and vulnerabilities.  Third, the great 
number of organizations that will be engaged in homeland security need to have clearly 
articulated roles, responsibilities, and accountability mechanisms (GAO, GAO-01-1158T, 
21 Sep 2001).   
The current homeland security strategy is a work-in-progress.  Guidelines for the 
formation of a homeland security strategy are provided in the Homeland Security 
Strategy Act of 2001, House Resolution 1292 (Library of Congress, 29 Mar 2001), and 
the Office of Homeland Security Act of 2001, House Resolution 3026 (Library of 
Congress, 18 Mar 2002).  Components of the strategy from the above-mentioned 
legislation include the following (H.R. 1292 and H.R. 3026): 
(1) A comprehensive research, development, and procurement plan for 
supporting homeland security. 
(2) Mechanisms to insure the flexibility and mobility in federal personnel 
policies and practices to achieve maximum effective use of personnel 
among all concerned agencies. 
(3) Policies and procedures to maximize the collection, analysis, 
translation, exploitation, and dissemination of information throughout 
federal, state, and local government. 
(4) Plans for improving the resources of, coordination among, and 
effectiveness of health and medical sectors for detecting and responding to 
terrorist attacks on the homeland. 
(5) Provide for augmentation of existing medical response capability and 
equipment stockpiles at the Federal, State, and local levels. 
(6) Specific measures to enhance cooperative efforts between the public 
and private sectors in protecting homeland security. 
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(7) Identification of explicit homeland security threats based upon the 
results of a comprehensive risk assessment. 
(8) Development of specific guidance for antiterrorism and consequence 
management activities as well as detailed objectives that provide measures 
of effectiveness. 
(9) Identification of the federal executive departments, agencies, and other 
organizations that should play a functional role in homeland security. 
(10) Provide for the selective use of personnel and assets of the Armed 
Forces in circumstances that their unique capabilities could be used 
without infringing on civil liberties. 
(11) Optimization of the use of intelligence capabilities, including 
improvement of processes by which intelligence information is provided 
to State and local governments. 
(12) Development of a multiyear plan for phased implementation of the 
overarching strategy and a comprehensive projected budget (H.R. 1292 
and H.R. 3026). 
These national homeland security strategies are long-term initiatives.  The goal is 
to prioritize implementation in workable stages.  The strategy will be based on 
partnership with state and local governments, the private sector, and citizens 
(Whitehouse, 2002). 
A multi-year federal budget preparation process will support the overall national 
homeland security strategy.  The plan calls for expenditure of monies only after proper 
analysis has been done to ensure that funds will be spent wisely.  Additionally, new and 
expanded Federal programs will aim to reorganize government at all levels—reforming 
legislation, providing tax incentives, cost-sharing, and developing cooperative 
arrangements with the private sector and citizens (Whitehouse, 2002). 
The homeland security plan will create emergency management and medical 
systems, which are better able to respond to terrorism, diseases, and mass casualties of 
every type.  It also seeks to build a broader management system that is more adept at 
filtering for terrorists as well as providing for the improved flow of lawful human traffic 
(Whitehouse, 2002). 
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The strategies aim to set clear, attainable objectives for homeland security, which 
include benchmarks and other performance measures by which progress and resources 
can be evaluated.  The strategy will take into account the existing institutions and systems 
for providing homeland security, such as law enforcement, public safety, public health, 
and emergency management.  Redundancies will be eliminated and complementary 
responsibilities will be linked for collaboration.  Individual agencies’ responsibilities and 
authorities for homeland security will be clearly and logically aligned with their core 
competencies.  The plan will build upon systems and processes that currently work well 
together and are logically organized, improve on others that require attention, and 
eliminate those that are detractors (Whitehouse, 2002). 
D. COMPONENTS OF THE HOMELAND SECURITY BUDGET PLAN 
The importance of funding the continued protection of America’s critical 
resources is vital.  This is especially important because we are a technology-dependent 
nation.  Technology is what will help us gather, analyze, and share intelligence 
information among appropriate agencies.  Funding of technology and other programs is 
key to enabling the effectiveness of homeland security.  The emerging Presidential 
Budget priorities have been aligned with national strategies for homeland security that 
include plans for information infrastruc ture, physical infrastructure, transportation and 
commerce, as well as law enforcement and intelligence.  Homeland security budget 
history and apportionment by area are provided in Figure 3.1 and 3.2 for reference.   
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Figure 3.1. Homeland Security Funding FY1995-FY2003. (From: Whitehouse, 2002). 
 
Figure 3.2. Homeland Security Funding Distribution, FY2003. (From: Whitehouse, 
2002). 
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Here are some specific programs from the proposed FY2003 Homeland Security 
budget: 
1. Homeland Security Budget Priorities 
The following key initiatives will be included in support of the homeland security 
agenda and funded under the President’s Budget for FY2003:  
a. Transportation Security  
The President’s Budget for 2003 requests $4.8 billion to fulfill aviation 
security authorizations established under the November 2001 Aviation and 
Transportation Security Act (TSA).  The plan calls for a phased program of vitally 
important milestones toward achieving a secure travel system (Whitehouse, 2002).  Air, 
rail, highways, bridges, and other transportation assets are critical to our economic and 
national security (Whitehouse, 2002). 
b. Federal Law Enforcement 
The 2003 budget will enable the FBI to add over 300 special agents and 
investigative staff for surveillance of terrorists operations and related intelligence.  The 
funding will also add more than 130 FBI special agents and 25 DEA agents wholly 
dedication to combating cyber-crime and drug money laundering, as well as protecting 
our banking, finance, utility, energy, and transportation systems from disruption by 
terrorists or other criminal acts.  The resources will help provide special financial crime 
investigators who are adept at identifying and shutting down the sources of money that 
support terrorist cells (Whitehouse, 2002). 
c. Citizen Corps 
The budget for 2003 provides $144 million in matching funds to support 
the formation and training of local Citizen Corps Councils.  The Citizen Corps is 
designed to enable Americans to volunteer their skills and abilities in participation of 
homeland security activities in their own communities.  The community-based Citizen 
Corps Councils develop action plans, assess possible threats, identify local resources, and 
coordinate with other Citizen Corps programs.  The budget further provides more than 
$230 million for these related Citizen Corps programs, including Volunteers in Police 
Service (VIPS) Program, Medical Reserve Corps, Operation TIPS (Terrorist Information 
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and Prevention System), Community Emergency Response Teams (CERT), and 
Neighborhood Watch Programs (Whitehouse, 2002). 
d. Department of Defense and Intelligence Community 
The 2003 budget requests $7.8 billion for homeland security-related 
activities of the Department of Defense and Intelligence community, of which $4.6 
billion is dedicated to physical security of stateside DoD facilities and personnel.  The 
remaining $1.3 billion is dedicated to supporting combat air patrols within U.S. airspace. 
Significant funding for counter terrorism research and development and specialized 
WMD response teams are also provided (Whitehouse, 2002). 
e. Critical Infrastructure Protection 
Since the 9-11 attack, the Administration provided broad and decisive 
measures to defend the highest risk targets and critical infrastructure systems.  These 
high-risk assets include nuclear power plants, seaports, hydroelectric dams, 
telecommunications nodes, border crossings, and chemical facilities.  This endeavor 
requires the close cooperation and involvement of many State and local agencies and 
private companies. The systematic process of defining and prioritizing our Nation’s 
efforts will provide further framework for unified critical infrastructure protection plan 
(Whitehouse, 2002). 
2. Information and Infrastructure Protection 
a. National Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC)   
The National Infrastructure Protection Center is the nation’s principal 
cyberspace-threat detection and response center located within the FBI.  They are 
responsible for protection from both physical and cyber attacks.  The President’s Budget 
for 2003 requests $125 million to fund the center.  The budget request reflects an increase 
of more than $50 million from the NIPC’s previous year’s funding level (Whitehouse, 
2002). 
b. Cyberspace Warning Intelligence Network (CWIN) 
The Cyberspace Warning Intelligence Network is designed to respond to 
Internet-based program attacks.  The CWIN mission is to link the major agencies in 
government and the private sector for improved coordination response to future cyber 
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attacks or Internet crisis.  The budget for 2003 calls for $30 million to create the CWIN 
(Whitehouse, 2002). 
c. Priority Wireless Access (PWA) 
In times of a major crisis, wireless communication channels can jam due 
to congestion, preventing first-responders from making calls in a timely manner.  The 
2003 budget requests $60 million to develop a wireless priority access program that will 
give authorized users priority on the cellular network (Whitehouse, 2002). 
d. National Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis Center 
(NISAC)  
The 2003 budget requests $20 million to fund the National Infrastructure 
Simulation and Analysis Center at the Department of Energy.  The center will support 
and foster partnerships between Federal and private research sector efforts to understand 
the dependencies between the Internet, our critical infrastructure, and our economy 
(Whitehouse, 2002). 
e. Secure “GovNet” Feasibility Study 
The government must make its information systems secure against 
intruders and attacks.  The 2003 budget requests $5 million for a feasibility study for 
developing a government network (GovNet) that will provide a secure environment for 
top government information exchanges (Whitehouse, 2002). 
f. Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) 
The President is supporting Federal agencies in acquiring new and  
improved computer security standards for information transfer.  The Advanced 
Encryption Standard has become a Federal standard designed to protect sensitive and 
unclassified information well into this century.  The standard is also expected to find 
wide use in the business and consumer markets (Whitehouse, 2002). 
g. Cybercorps Scholarships for Service (CSS) 
The budget for 2003 requests $11 million for the “Cybercorps Scholarship 
for Service” program.  By providing scholarship funding to universities across America, 
the CSS program encourages college students to become information technology security 
professionals within government.  Under the managed of the National Science 
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Foundation and Office of Personnel Management, this program also promotes the 
creation of computer security academic programs at universities (Whitehouse, 2002). 
E. HOMELAND SECURITY REORGANIZATION AND RESOURCES 
The notion of Homeland Security (HLS) is not new to Americans.  America 
addressed homeland defense and organizational restructure after Pearl Harbor.  In 
December 1945, shortly after America’s victory in World War II, President Harry 
Truman had Congress combine the War and Navy Departments into a single Department 
of Defense.  The idea was to organize for collaboration and for an effective fighting force 
capable of protecting the Nation.  This goal was achieved with the National Security Act 
of 1947 and its subsequent amendments in 1949 and 1958.  The resulting reorganization 
integrated the separate military Departments into the Department of Defense with a 
civilian secretary solely in charge.  It also created a Central Intelligence Agency to 
coordinate all foreign intelligence collection and analysis.  The National Security Council 
was also established to manage foreign and defense policy efforts.  Additionally, 
briefings to the Secretary of Defense by an expert panel of biological weapons experts 
emphasized the need for a vision of homeland defense (McIntire, 2002).   
The next time the term homeland defense was examined was in 1997 when 
Congress mandated post-Cold War reformation of the Department of Defense.  Congress 
mandated an internal “Quadrennial Defense Review” (QDR) of military strategy, which 
looked at how defense was organized and prioritized.  A subsequent National Defense 
Panel (NDP) then reported its conclusions that terrorism and related threats to the United 
States were becoming increasingly likely.  In the years that followed, other reviews came 
to similar conclusions, and the term “Homeland Defense” became popular just long 
enough for it to be renamed “Homeland Security” — encompassing a meaning beyond 
defense.  Homeland Security represents all the measures necessary for government and 
private agencies to collaborate in the actions and initiatives toward protecting the  
homeland.  As a subcomponent of homeland security, DoD was predetermined to be an 
adjunct first-responder to support domestic requirements during disasters and law 
enforcement crises.  This DoD “Civil Support” role implies that the military may be 
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asked to provide support within the United States for responses that have nothing to do 
with foreign attack (McIntire, 2002). 
The role of homeland security is purposefully broad and is presently undergoing a 
transformation that is being shaped by the chronology of U.S. responses to the 9-11 
attack (Appendix A).  Homeland security responsibilities are currently shared with over a 
100 governmental agencies.  A new structure was imminent.  The much needed 
reorganization plan was delivered in June 2002, and the “Office of Homeland Security” 
became the “Department of Homeland Security” (Appendix B).  The lessons learned 
since 9-11 has shown that for HLS to be most effective, it must be fully funded as a 
department with budget and control authority, and have a Cabinet appointed leader with 
power to direct.  Previously, the Director of Homeland Security had only advisory 
privileges to the President and a meager staff to coordinate dozens of agencies over 
whom they had no real control (Appendix C).  History continues to teach us that 
significant security challenges require clear lines of responsibility and the combined 
efforts of the government agencies.  History further reveals that new challenges require 
new organizational structures (Whitehouse, June 2002).  The HLS Department is ripe for 
such reorganization. 
Under the new plan, the Department of Homeland Security would have a clear, 
efficient organizational structure with four divisions (Appendix B):   
(1) Border and Transportation Security;  
(2) Emergency Preparedness and Response; 
(3) Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Countermeasures; 
and  
(4) Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection (Whitehouse, 
June 2002).  
Even after establishment of the new department, homeland security will still 
involve the efforts of the many Cabinet- level departments that have jurisdiction in the 
dozens of areas under their purview (Appendix D).  Furthermore, HLS will continue to 
provide interagency coordination and be the advisor to the President on homeland 
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security related issues (Whitehouse, 2002).  The ultimate mission of this new Department 
is to utilize the resources of America to keep our way of life free from terror. 
F. TECHNOLOGY AS LEVERAGE IN DEFENDING THE HOMELAND 
In recent statements to the Electronic Industries Alliance annual conference, 
current homeland security director Tom Ridge made it clear that homeland security 
depends on new technologies.  The director more specifically mentioned the importance 
of biometrics and surveillance technologies, including next-generation detection devices 
designed to find trace amounts of chemical or biological agents (Porteus, 24 Apr 2002).  
He further pointed out that technology supports all of the administration’s homeland 
security efforts: border security, information sharing, counter-terrorism, and first-
responder emergency support.  The importance of technology is paramount to verifying 
authentication of individuals, controlling our borders, and monitoring movement of 
commerce and human traffic.  Surveillance and biometrics are among the arsenal of 
sensor technologies capable of capturing and collecting vast amounts of intelligence 
information.  “Yes, it is a new world, but it is a world in which technology is suited to 
play a very critical role,” Ridge said (Porteus, 24 Apr 2002).   
Depending on which side of the homeland security argument one takes, 
biometrics, surveillance, and information technology can appear infringing on civil 
liberties, while on the other hand actually protecting the rights of Americans to live free 
of terror.  The dilemma is one that has continuous attention at the Homeland Security 
Department.  In defending the goals of homeland security, Attorney General John 
Ashcroft, in a testimony before a Senate subcommittee on the government’s ability to 
combat terrorism said, “We’re not destroying rights.  We’re protecting rights.  I believe 
the American people deserve to have their rights protected” (Klein, p. 6).   
The funded technology portion of Homeland Security is quite large.  In the $37.7 
billion slated for Homeland Security proposed in the fiscal 2003 budget, $15 billion is 
allotted for information technology while $4 billion of that goes to IT security (Porteus, 
24 Apr 2002).  The message seems clear that technology is well supported as a resource.  
The civil liberties watch keepers should also be appraised that emerging legislation is a 
positive feature helping to integrate and balance technology into our homeland security 
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strategy for the 21st century (Porteus, 24 Apr 2002).  In the next two chapters, we will 
examine closely the specialized technologies supporting homeland security and discuss 
their unique applications. 
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IV. UBIQUITOUS SURVEILLANCE AND BIOMETRICS 
TECHNOLOGY 
A. VIDEO SURVEILLANCE AND VIDEO FORENSIC TOOLS  
Since the 1980s, security cameras have increasingly been installed at public areas, 
such as ATMs, intersections, transportation centers, department stores, campuses, 
packing lots, corridors, and stadiums (Petersen, pp. 8-51).  Since 9-11, video surveillance 
has grown dramatically.  The threat of additional terrorism has made the use of 
surveillance technologies in the United States inevitable.  One only needs to visit New 
York City and Washington D.C. to see its new implementations.  At these locations, the 
U.S. has used the United Kingdom (UK) as a model to develop its system.  Similar 
surveillance systems are being employed at other high threat locations and events.  Part 
of the video surveillance infrastructure already exists in many areas of our country and 
could be leveraged to expand the evolving surveillance grid.  Most of the surveillance 
systems in the U.S. are privately owned and are made up of products similar to those 
shown in Figure 4.1.  
 
                     
         CCTV                            Infrared                           Bullet Camera Systems 
 
Figure 4.1. Video Surveillance Equipment. (After: 123CCTV.com, 2002). 
Although cameras are the first technology we think of when we imagine 
surveillance, cameras are merely one of the many layers in an ideal ubiquitous 
surveillance network.  Technologies such as video forensic tools, “smart” cameras, and 
facial recognition play important roles. 
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New advances in digital video and video forensic tools (like Sarnoff 
Corporation’s VideoDetective) and various products from companies (such as Avid 
Technology and Ocean Systems) provide agents with new methods to extract clear 
pictures of surveillance scenes and suspects from poor-quality images.  By digitizing 
analog video images and processing them through PCs, video tapes can be stabilized so 
that it is easier to follow a suspect in a video clip, extract license plate numbers hidden in 
shadows, filter out rain and snow in a background to have a better view of an image scene 
(see Figure 4.2.)(Sarnoff, 1 Apr 2002 and Avid, 19 Jun 2002). 
 
                       
Figure 4.2. Video Forensic Tools. (After: Sarn.off, 1 Apr 2002 & Avid, 19 Jun 2002). 
 
The use of “smart” cameras can aid in monitoring large government or public 
areas that are considered potential terrorist targets.  The Sarnoff Corporation, located in 
Princeton, N.J., has developed advanced video microprocessors that along with 
developed computer algorithms could allow security cameras to monitor an area, 
recognize suspicious behavior, focus on it, and send an alert if any action is deemed 
dangerous (Sarnoff, 1 Apr 2002).   
Non-intrusive biometric technologies, such as facial recognition, gait recognition, 
and thermal facial-scans, can be used to aid in developing an effective ubiquitous 
surveillance system, which link cameras at security checkpoints with government 
databases of suspected terrorists via the Internet. 
B. BIOMETRICS 
Technologies involving physiological and behavioral adaptations can come to 
play a major role in proposed ubiquitous surveillance systems and smart card 
technologies.  Biometrics is the science of automatically identifying individuals based on 
their physiological or behavioral characteristics.  It has emerged as a viable solution for a 
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range of applications, and its use as a tool should be strongly considered in this new “age 
of terror.” 
Prior to 9-11, biometric technology was limited in use.  The overall market for 
biometrics was approximately $325 million in 1999 (Evangelista, 21 Feb 2000).  Until 
recently, biometric technologies were slow to catch on because of the high cost and 
enormous computing power required to build accurate systems.  However, the 
combination of the growth in PC computing power, evolution of proprietary adaptive 
algorithms, lower-cost infrared optics, and improved measurement methods have enabled 
manufacturers to create biometric devices for mainstream applications at a lower cost. 
Biometric technologies are now emerging as a practical, effective solution for law 
enforcement, security, and fraud-free e-commerce.  It is also preventing identity the ft and 
attendance fraud.  The following are some startling statistics that explain the evolving use 
of biometric technologies:  
· Approximately $1 billon in welfare benefits in the United States are 
annually claimed by welfare recipients who “double dip” with fraudulent 
multiple identities.  
· Master Card has estimated credit card fraud at $450 million per year based 
on charges made on lost or stolen credit cards. 
· Cellular bandwidth thieves, many who use stolen PINs or cellular phones, 
make approximately $1 billion worth of cellular telephone calls annually.  
· Approximately $3 billion per year is lost due to ATM related fraud. 
· Billions of dollars are misappropriated due to fraudulent encashment of 
checks each year (Jain, p. 2). 
In this new “terror age,” the biometric market will surely grow exponentially as 
government agencies and public sectors investigate its further use to solve security and 
law enforcement problems.  According to industry analysts, the worldwide biometrics 
market will reach $10 billion by 2003 (I/O Software, Jun 2002).  It will be deployed 
where identification and authentication is required.  Today biometric devices control 
access to many computers, ATMs, secured rooms, vaults, research laboratories, prisons, 




1. Biometrics Overview 
a. Identification and Authentication 
Both government agencies and the public sector are increasingly 
recognizing the limitations of picture IDs, paper documents, passwords, and PIN numbers 
as identity theft, computer hacking, cyber crime, and terrorism become more prevalent 
(Polemi, p. 3).  Identity theft or fraudulent identification can lead to security breaches that 
result in unauthorized access to secure or restricted areas such as airport handling areas, 
military installations, laboratories, nuclear power plants, water reservoirs, and the secured 
networks that make up our critical cyber infrastructure (Polemi, p. 5).   
The two types of security processes that can be used to counter these 
threats are identification and authentication.  Identification is the process whereby an 
identity is assigned to a specific person.  Authentication is verifying an individual’s 
identity.  Authentication procedures are based on the following premises: 
· Proof by Possession (lowest level of security): what the person owns, such 
as a smart card without biometrics or a photo ID. 
· Proof by Knowledge (second level of security): what the person knows, 
such as a password or PIN.  
· Proof by Property (highest level of security): what the person is or does, 
behavioral or physiological biometrics (Dysart, 1998). 
Traditional technologies that are based on the first two premises of 
authentication are not sufficient to reduce the impact of counterfeiting or fraud.  Smart 
cards can be lost or stolen.  Fraudulent photo IDs can be fabricated.  Passwords can be 
lost, cracked, or obtained using social engineering.  Biometric technologies provide the 
highest level of security because they verify physiological or behavioral characteristics 
that are unique to each individual and are difficult to disguise or falsify (Polemi, p. 5). 
They are more reliable and are more capable in distinguishing between a specific person 
and an impostor than any other type of identification technique.  They provide the 
additional, convenient security barriers that are required as we evolve into a more secure 
society and become even more computer-dependent.  The use of biometric devices also 
provides user-convenience because users do not have to deal with remembering 
passwords or having to reset them periodically (Polemi, p. 5).   
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During identification (see Figure 4.3) a biometric system tries to answer 
the question “Who is this?” and establish whether a biometric record exists for that 
individual.  This process is often referred to as between subject variability (1:N).  If it 
does, it will attempt to identify the person whose sample was matched.  Verification is a 
one-to-one comparison.  During verification (see Figure 4.3) the biometric system tries to 
answer the question ”Is this person who he or she claims to be?” and attempts to verify 
the identity of someone, for example, who is using a smart card (I/O Software, Jun 2002).  
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The person’s biometric image data is compared
against his or her enrolled templates in storage, a
match/no match decision is made, and output is
produced.
 
Figure 4.3. Identification and Verification Processes. (After: Nanavati, p. 11). 
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It is desirable for a biometric technique to have maximal between-subject 
variability but minimal within-subject variability.  The number of forms of variation, 
degrees of freedom, which are spanned by the biometric patterns determine the 
relationships between the two types of variability (Jain, p. 103).  It is also desirable for 
recognition decisions to be based upon features that allow for the identification between 
even genetically identical or related individuals. 
b. Biometric-Based Systems 
The most popular physiological biometric techniques are iris scan, retina 
scan, fingerprint verification, hand geometry verification, and facial recognition. The 
most popular behavioral biometric techniques are signature verification, voice 
verification, keystroke recognition, and gait recognition.  Lesser commercially deployed 
or new biometric methods include DNA pattern, vein pattern, ear recognition, odor/scent 
identification, thermal face-scan, subcutaneous hand-scan, sweat pores analysis, and 
fingernail bed identification. 
Biometric-based systems rely on a wide range of technologies and 
algorithms to operate.  Figure 4.4 illustrates the typical operating subsystems that make 


























Figure 4.4. Generic Biometric System. (After: Jain, p. 348). 
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In the Data Collection subsystem, a biometric characteristic is presented 
to the system’s sensor, and a pattern image of the biometric characteristic is captured.  
This process occurs in both the initial enrollment and in the identification and verification 
processes (Jain, p. 347).  During the enrollment process, some biometric technologies 
may require additional samples to be obtained in order to build a useful profile of the 
biometric characteristic (I/O Software, Jun 2002). 
In the Transmission subsystem, the unique biometric features are 
converted into a signal representing the biometric pattern and are compressed, 
transmitted, and expanded.  Noise may be inadvertently added during this process (Jain, 
p. 347). 
In the Signal Processing subsystem, stable, unique features are extracted 
from the received signal and converted by the system into a mathematical code that is 
then either stored as a template or compared to templates already stored in Storage (Jain, 
p. 347).  A biometric template is a mathematical representation of a person’s unique 
biometric characteristic stored in digital form.  By itself, the template is of no use.  It 
cannot be used to reconstruct a biometric image pattern to allow a person to be identified 
as someone else (I/O Software, Jun 2002). 
In the Storage subsystem, the templates derived from the image features 
are stored.  Storage could also include the raw signals received from the Transmission 
subsystem.  Templates can be stored in different places depending on the security 
requirements of the application.  The templates can be stored in the biometric device, in a 
central database, or in smart cards.  When storing templates in a centralized database, 
Trusted Third Party (TTP) services provide security in transmitting and managing the 
templates (I/O Software, Jun 2002). 
In the Decision subsystem, accept or reject decisions are made based upon 
the signal processing system’s policy and the comparative scores received (Jain, p. 348).  
The biometric system attempts to verify an individual's identity by comparing the new 
biometric sample captured with the previously stored template.  If the two samples 
match, the biometric system confirms the applicant’s identity.  Because both physical and 
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behavioral biometric characteristics may change slightly over time as we age or become 
scarred, the biometric system must allow for subtle changes in these biometric 
characteristics.  To allow for these minute changes of a person’s biometric characteristics, 
a threshold or error tolerance is built in within the decision subsystem set.  Comparison 
between the new image sample and the stored template must meet or exceed the system’s 
threshold before an image is accepted.  The use of threshold and policies provide 
flexibility in the system (I/O Software, Jun 2002).  The setting of the threshold, or error 
tolerance, of biometric systems is critical to their performance. 
The overall performance of a biometric system is measured on how well it 
performs between the two kinds of variability among the acquired biometric templates: 
· One-to-one (within-subject variability) - which sets a minimum False 
Reject Rate (FRR) 
· One-to-many (between subject variability) - whose lower limit sets False 
Match or False Accept Rate (FAR) 
Figure 4.5 shows the ideal biometric performance curve.  The objective in 
setting a threshold is to have both errors (FRR and FAR) be low (I/O Software, Jun 
2002).  In practice, however, a low FRR usually means a high FAR and vice versa.  
Therefore, biometric systems designed for high-security applications, where concerns 
about unauthorized access are great, operate at a low FAR.  As a result, the number of 
people who are falsely rejected is greater in these systems.  Biometric systems designed 
for law enforcement applications operate at a high FAR.  In these applications, the desire 
to catch a criminal outweighs the inconvenience of investigating a large number of 
falsely identified individuals (Encarta, Jun 2002). 
 
Figure 4.5. Ideal Performance Curve. (From: Ashbourn, p. 71). 
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2. Physiological Biometric Technologies 
Physiological biometric techniques measure the physiological traits of a person.  
These physiological traits are stable physical characteristics, such as fingerprints, retina 
patterns, and iris patterns that remain essentially unaltered over a lifetime.  Therefore, 
physiological biometric traits are ideal for application in smart cards for the proposed 
national ID card. 
a. Iris Scan 
The iris pattern of the eye is a biometric feature which exactly meets 
maximum between-subject variability (1:N) and minimal within subject variability (1:1) 
that is desired with biometric technologies (Jain, p. 103).  The iris is the colorful part of 
the eye between the pupil and the white area of the eye.  Based on clinical observations 
that every iris was unique and remained unchanged in clinical photographs (see Figure 
4.6), ophthalmologists originated the idea that the iris of the eye could be used as a kind 
of “optical fingerprint” for personal identification (Polemi, p. 24).  
 
 
Figure 4.6. Iris Images. (From: Evangelista, 9 Feb 2001). 
What makes the iris such a great tool for identification is that each iris 
consists of unique combination of contraction furrows, rings, crypts, freckles, 
vasculature, colorations, meshwork of connective tissue, fibers, a corona, processes, and 
other features (Polemi, p. 24).  It has been mathematically proven that there are about 266 
independent degrees of freedom in the iris among people to impart to it the same 
uniqueness as an individual’s fingerprint (Jain, p. 103).  According to IriScan, the leading 
iris technology company, the probability that two irises will create the same digital code 
is one in 1078 (Evangelista, 9 Feb 2001). 
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Iris scan technology uses a captured video image of the eye, encoding its 
unique features such as iris pattern and coloration.  Iris scanners typically use video 
cameras and sophisticated targeting software to isolate and identify complex 
characteristic patterns that make up an individual’s iris.  Once the eye is located in the 
image, a series of concentric circular zones are produced that provide unique identifiable 
information about the iris (Ashbourn, p. 53).  This data is extracted, and a digital code is 
created (see Figure 4.7).   
 
 
Figure 4.7. Iris Code. (From: Nanavati, p. 81). 
An advantage of iris scanners (see Figure 4.8) over retina scanners is that 
they do not require the user to focus on a target because the patterns on the iris are 
located on the eye’s surface.  In fact, a video image of the eye can be taken from up to 36 
inches away (Bioconsulting, 5 May 2001).  This feature allows for the use of iris scanners 
at ATM machines.  Sensar, Inc., a worldwide supplier of iris identification products for 
the banking industry, has a major contract with OKI Electric Industry, Ltd. who is the 
leading supplier of ATM’s in Japan (Sensar, Jun 2002).  Sensar has a similar agreement 
with NCR, the largest supplier of ATM’s worldwide.  Tables F.1 and G.1 list current iris 
scanning products and applications, respectively.   
                                   
                            PC / Network Access                  Physical Access 
Figure 4.8. Iris-Scan Devices. (From: Nanavati, p. 78). 
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Eye health does not significantly affect this technology.  Iris scans can still 
be conducted on visually impaired persons as long as they have intact irises.  In this 
situation, the iris can be captured and encoded with iris imaging products that have active 
iris capture, such as the ATM application mentioned previously.  Since cataracts are a 
malady of the lens, which is located behind the iris, cataracts do not affect iris scanning in 
any way.   
Countermeasures against deception have been developed, which include 
detecting a printed pattern on a contact lens by the using 2D Fourier domain artifacts of 
printing (Jain, p. 118). 
Iris scanning strengths include the following: 
· Technique is highly accurate (iris is more unique than a fingerprint) 
(Bioconsulting, 5 May 2001). 
· Technique is highly resistant to false matching, and provides reliable 
identification as well as verification (Nanavati, p. 77).  
· It is a stable measurement characteristic over a lifetime and is protected 
from the external environment (Polemi, p. 24). 
· It is considered non- intrusive (Bioconsulting, 5 May 2001). 
· It is easy to register an iris image at some distance from the subject 
without a physical contact (Polemi, p. 24). 
· It is suitable for both logical and physical access control (Nanavati, p. 77). 
· Process takes about 100 ms (Dygart, 1998) 
· It is impossible to modify the iris without the risk of loss of vision. 
· It is based on physiological response to light, providing a natural test 
(Polemi, p. 24). 
Iris scanning weaknesses include the following: 
· By comparison to other biometrics, it generates a relatively large template 
(256 bytes) (Bioconsulting, 5 May 2001). 
· It has a propensity for false non-matching and failure of an individual’s 
iris image from being acquired (~12%) (Bioconsulting, 5 May 2001). 
· The core and key elements that have been developed for iris identification 
come from a single source and have been patented (Patent 5,291,590 by 
Dr. John Daugman) by IriScan, Inc. (Jain, p. 103).  Its sole licensee is 
SENSAR (Bioconsulting, 5 May 2001). 
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· Although iris  recognition offers probably the highest available accuracy 
and low intrusiveness, physical access models come at a relatively high 
price (Bioconsulting, 5 May 2001). 
b. Retina Scan 
The retinal blood vessels are a unique physical characteristic and provide a 
highly accurate means to verify an individual’s identify.  Retinal scans are performed by 
directing a low-intensity infrared light through the pupil to illuminate the interior of the 
eye and identify patterns in the capillaries on its back wall (see Figure 4.9) (Gomes, 27 
Sep 2001).  The image of the pattern of veins is reflected back to the camera.  The sizes 
of veins, location of vein bifurcations, and capillary endings form a unique biometric 
pattern image that is used to differentiate people.  The person undergoing the retinal scan 
must gaze into an eyepiece and focus on a designated spot for digital images of a fixed 
portion of the retina to be acquired.  After the retina is scanned, special software creates a 
digital data image of the individual’s unique pattern of retinal blood vessels.  Once the 
image is processed and reduced from 16 kilobytes to 48 bytes, it is compared to a profile 




Figure 4.9. Pattern of Capillaries of the Retina. (From: Sullivan, 27 Sep 2001). 
Since they offer one of the lowest FRR and a nearly 0% FAR, most retinal 
scanners (see Figure 4.10) are used in high-security access control applications where 
occasional false rejects are preferable to an impostor being able to defeat the system 
(Ashbourn, p. 56).  Retina scanning systems are resistant to fraud since duplicate artificial 
eyes do not respond to light (Polemi, p. 24).  While it would be hard to spoof retinal-
based systems by constructing an accurate artificial model, an extracted eye could spoof 
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retina systems if it does not have a thermal test subsystem (Dysart, 1998).  However, a 
person who had an eye transplant could spoof the system as long as the capillaries in the 
back of the eye were unaltered. 
 
 
Figure 4.10. Retina Scanner. (From: Nanavati, p. 108). 
Some medical research has recently shown that retinal patterns show 
critical variations in people with organ dysfunctional deceases (Polemi, p. 24).  Cataracts 
can negatively affect the retinal image quality.   
Though extremely accurate, retina scanners are highly intrusive, difficult 
to use, and typically cost $2,000 to $2,500 per unit (Raikow, 12 Mar 2001).  There are 
only a limited number of retina-scanning products available on the market.  EyeDentify 
owns U.S. and international patents, which protect the rights for exclusive use of retinal 
technology.  
Retina scanning strengths include the following: 
· It has a relative small template size, approximately 35 bytes.  
· It has a high resistance to false matching (Bioconsulting, 5 May 2001). 
· Retinas are a stable characteristic over lifetime, except in cases of certain 
degenerative retinal diseases or organ dysfunctional deceases (Polemi, p. 
24).  
· It provides relatively fast verification, typically in about 1.5 seconds 
(Ashbourn, p. 56).  
Retina scanning weaknesses include the following: 
· The amount of cooperation by the user that is required for a retinal scan 
make this technique unacceptable in many applications since refusal to 
cooperate is not apparent to the tester.  
· Some users may find it difficult to use, typical user discomfort with eye-
based technology. 
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· It is considered an intrusive technology. 
· EyeDentify Inc. is the only current vendor for these products. 
· This technology has not proven to carry out 1:N searching. 
· Its products are expensive (Bioconsulting, 5 May 2001). 
c. Fingerprint Scan 
With its long history in law enforcement and government agencies 
worldwide, fingerprints are the most widely researched and understood biometric.  The 
use of fingerprints as a biometric technique for identification traditionally has been 
employed by law enforcement agencies worldwide for over a century.  In the past, 
fingerprint analysis and matching was conducted by hand and required significant time 
and effort.  Today, Automated Fingerprint Identification Systems (AFIS) are used to 
automate the analysis and matching processes.  They automatically analyze and match 
single fingerprints against large databases to find a proper match of all possible  
candidates (Dysart, 1998).  The new techniques involved in acquiring a fingerprint image 
are very similar to the old-fashioned way of acquiring an ink fingerprint.  A scan of the 
finger is taken using fingerprint scanning devices.  They consist of a high-resolution 
digital camera behind a Plexiglas slate where the user presents a finger (Dygart, 1998). 
The camera creates data images that digitally contain the same distinctive ridge patterns 
that the ink process presents on paper.  This data image is then compared to fingerprint 
templates of individuals that are stored in a storage device (database or smart card).   
The geometric features and patterns of fingerprints are different for each 
person and tend to remain unchanged over a lifetime.  The classification of a fingerprint 
is based on certain characteristics—arch, loop, and whorl (see Figure 4.11).  The most 
distinctive characteristics are the minutiae, the forming patterns, the forks, or endings 
found in the friction ridges (see Figure 4.12), and the overall shape of the ridge pattern 




Figure 4.11. Fingerprint Classifications. (After: Jain p. 46). 
 
 
Figure 4.12. Arch Pattern Fingerprint Minutiae. (After: Sullivan, 27 Sep 2001). 
One disadvantage of fingerprint verification systems is that they are 
subjected to an imitation attack.  Some systems are not capable of differentiating a 
fingerprint from a live user or a copied fingerprint.  Prevention of these types of attacks 
have been addressed in some of the new systems by adding thermal sensors that detect 
subcutaneous blood vessels and reject a user if none are present (Dygart, 1998).  A 
fingerprint reader can incorporate a heat sensor to gauge the presence of a real live finger 
versus a gelatin reproduction of the finger (Bhanbhani, 3 Jun 2002). Another 
disadvantage of using a fingerprint as a biometric is that the condition of fingers—finger 
surgery, injury, and deterioration due to heavy usage—might affect the performance of 
fingerprint verification systems.   
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In recent years, fingerprints have rallied significant support as the 
biometric technology that will probably be most widely used in the future.  A GAO report 
stated that “fingerprinting may be the most viable option” among the various biometric 
methods investigated (Polemi, p. 23).  Another study conducted by the CASCADE 
project claimed that fingerprint verification was the best technology to reduce 
passenger’s clearance time through customs (Polemi, p. 23).  In addition to general 
security and access control applications, fingerprint verifiers are installed at many 
military facilities, including the Pentagon and most government labs.  Although 
fingerprint verification devices tend to reject over 3% of authorized users, the FAR is less 
than one in a million (I/O Software, Jun 2002).   
 
Figure 4.13. Types of Fingerprint Products. (From: Nanavati, p. 46). 
Due to its relatively high accuracy, low price, and minimal intrusiveness, 
fingerprint verification devices (see Figure 4.13) have been by far the most popular 
biometric for use in business and enterprise solutions.  Individual fingerprint scanners 
typically cost between $100 and $150 (Raikow, 12 Mar 2001).  Tables F.2 and G.2 list 
fingerprint products and applications, respectively.   
Fingerprint scanning strengths include the following: 
· A person’s fingerprints are unique.  
· Fingerprints are a stable physical characteristic throughout a person’s life. 
· There are a large number of huge databases already in existence. 
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· A large amount of research has already been conducted to develop and 
perfect fingerprint processing (image capture, template definition, 
matching, thresholds, etc.). 
· It is considered non- intrusive. 
· Equal Error Rate (EER) for fingerprint match algorithms can be very low 
(Bioconsulting, 5 May 2001). 
· It is a proven technology, capable of high levels of accuracy.  
· It can be employed in a wide range environments and applications 
(Nanavati, p. 58). 
· It employs easy to use (ergonomic) devices (Nanavati, p. 59). 
· The ability to enroll multiple fingers can increase system accuracy and 
flexibility (Nanavati, p. 59). 
Fingerprint scanning weaknesses include the following: 
· Certain ethnic and demographic groups have lower-quality fingerprints, 
therefore, some devices are unable to enroll some individuals in theses 
groups (Asian, elderly, manual laborers) (Nanavati, p. 59). 
· There is performance deterioration (error increase) over time for users 
who work with their hands.   
· It requires the deployment of specialized devices (Nanavati, p. 60). 
· People with missing fingers cannot use fingerprint system. People with 
injured or swollen fingers might have a problem in being verified by these 
systems (Nanavati, p. 45). 
· The template size is relatively large (~256 to 512 bytes per finger image) 
when compared to other biometric template sizes. 
· Scanned images may become blurred due to injury, dirt on the scanning 
surface, or dirt on the finger. 
· Processing requirements when performing a 1:N search of a huge database 
can be slow, unless many separate resources (matchers) are used together 
to process the match request (All other biometric techniques also suffer 
from this problem.  Due to the sizes of current fingerprint databases, it is 
more prevalent with this biometric technique) (Bioconsulting, 5 May 
2001). 
d. Hand Geometry 
The hand geometry biometric technique is based on the distinct 
characteristics of the hands.  Hand characteristics measured include the external contour 
of the hand, internal lines of the hand, geometry of hand, length and size of fingers, palm 
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print, fingerprints, and the blood vessel pattern in the back of the hand.  The same details 
are measured for finger geometry, a reduced form of the hand biometric technique, but 
they are conducted on only two fingers instead of an entire hand.  
One form of the hand geometry technique employs hand geometry readers 
that use a digital camera to take an image of the top of the hand.  To operate a hand 
geometry reader (see Figure 4.14), the user first enters a PIN number on the reader’s 
keypad, and then positions a hand on a plate.  The hand is lined up with five guide pegs 
on a platen that ensures that the hand will generally be located in the same position for 
every scan.  Then a digital camera mounted above the plate, with the aid of a mirror, 
takes a picture of the top and side views of the hand (Dygart, 1998).  The image is then 
transmitted into a computer for processing.  Ninety characteristics in total are examined, 
including dimensions of the hand, length and width of the fingers, brightness of the skin, 
and shape of the knuckles (Gomes, 27 Sep 2001).   
Contrary to the fingerprint, finger and hand geometry is not susceptible to 
incisions and chaps.  Finger and hand geometry can still be influenced by major injuries 
of the fingers and the hand, and environmental conditions, such as dirt.  Another 
technical problem is caused by the rotation of the hand when it is placed on the plate.  
The performance of these systems might be influenced if people wear big rings, have 
swollen fingers or no fingers.  Paralyzed people or people with Parkinson’s disease are 
not able to use this biometric method. (Polemi, p. 26) 
 
 
Figure 4.14. Hand Geometry Reader. (From: Nanavati, p. 100). 
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Products that use palm print for identification or authentication are also 
available (see Figure 4.15).  With these products, infrared scanners are used to take a 
digital image of the hand’s palm.  Each image is taken in less than a second.  After 
registering the image data, the system compresses the biometric hand image and 
transmits it to a secure remote location via public/private key encryption.  Then, a 
standard computer processor conducts an identity-match analysis against a database of 
pre-scanned hand templates, allowing a security system to grant access only to authorized 
individuals.  This technology also employs measurement algorithms that tolerate some 
small changes in the palm over time.   
 
 
Figure 4.15. Hand Scan. (From: Evangelista, 21 Feb 2000). 
Palm scanning technology is gaining popularity, and more and more 
deployments are being announced.  This technology is mostly used in physical access 
control and in law and order areas.  Currently, hand geometry systems are employed at 
over 3,500 locations, including the Colombian legislature, San Francisco International 
Airport, day care centers, welfare agencies, hospitals, and immigration facilities 
(Bioconsulting, 5 May 2001).  The advantages of a palm print are similar to the benefits 
of a fingerprint in terms of reliability, although palm print readers take up more space.  A 
survey following tests on various biometric devices concluded that hand geometry system 
was the user’s overall favorite biometric when it was compared with fingerprint, 
signature, voiceprint, and retinal techniques (Polemi, p. 26).  It was found, however, that 
cultural backgrounds do affect biometric device preferences.  It has been found that, 
 60
although hand geometry is highly acceptable in most countries, people in Japan prefer not 
to place their palm where other people have (Polemi, p. 26).  
Several factors can affect hand reader performance.  Background 
environmental factors can influence hand reader performance.  The hand image can be 
influenced by the direction of the sunlight as it relates to the platen.  Temperatures can 
affect performance.  Since below freezing temperatures and temperatures over 110 F 
cause problems for hand readers, most readers are designed to be used indoors in a 
controlled template environment (Polemi, p. 26).   
Although hand geometry systems that are based on three dimensions 
(length, width, and thickness) are more secure, they can still be deceived by objects that 
accurately represent all three dimensions.  These objects could include artificial models 
that reconstruct the bone structure of the individual or a detached limb (Polemi, p. 26).  
Like in fingerprinting, these attempts at evasion can be countered by the use of thermal 
sensors.  Tables F.3 and G.3 list hand geometry applications and products, respectively.   
Hand geometry strengths include the following: 
· It develops a small sized template, about 9 bytes. 
· Hand geometry systems are reasonably fast and provide short verification 
times.   
· People tend to view it as non- intrusive. 
· It provides satisfactory one-to-one match accuracy (FRR/FAR) for middle 
security applications (Bioconsulting, 5 May 2001). 
· Some hand geometry readers have the ability to operate in challenging 
environmental conditions (Nanavati, p. 103). 
· It is an established and reliable core technology. 
· Hand geometry is a relative stable physiological characteristic. 
· It provides a balanced combination of convenience and deterrence 
(Nanavati, p. 104). 
Hand geometry weaknesses include the following: 
· It provides inherently limited accuracy for high- level security applications. 
· Its form factor (reader size and shape) limits the scope of potential 
applications (Nanavati, p. 105).  
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· Hand geometry readers are expensive. 
· It has no proven open search (1:N) capability. 
· Readers are relatively large and can be easily damaged (Bioconsulting, 5 
May 2001). 
e. Facial Recognition 
Facial recognition is one of the fastest growing sectors of the biometrics 
industry.  It is perhaps the most active area for deployments and the one that has been 
receiving most of the headlines, particularly in the post-9-11 era, when airport security 
and public safety are of paramount importance.  Its appeal lies in the fact that 
identification of an individual could be conducted at a distance without having the 
individual physically interact with the system.  Its employment efforts have also been 
stimulated by the fast rise in multimedia video technology that is placing more cameras in 
public areas, in front of computers, and in the workplace.  However, the technology is 
still considered to be in its infancy, and additional testing for full-scale deployment is 
required. Nevertheless, specific applications, such as monitoring airport lounges and 
sporting events for suspected terrorists, and screening driver license or welfare databases 
for duplicates are being employed.  
The theory behind facial-recognition technology is that facial 
characteristics are unique and can be used to reveal an individual’s identity. This 
technology uses computer software to scan a picture captured from video from 
surveillance cameras.  Then, the system imports the image and encodes measurements 
between distinctive facial features, a process called triangulation, using neural network 
methodologies and algorithms.  Face-recognition technologies use a variety of techniques 
to identify unique or unusual facial features and the distances between them (see Figure 
4.16).   
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Figure 4.16. Facial Landmarks. (From: Blackburn, 10 Aug 2001). 
 
Details of the face that are used include the distance between the eyes, the 
hairline, the outline of the face, angle of the chin, size of nose, shape of eyes, shape of 
chin, shape of eyebrows, color of the skin and shape of mouth, all relative to other 
locations on the face (Polemi, p. 25).  Once an image is captured and stored in a database 
or smart card as a template, it is used to compare against other facial biometric templates 
that exist in large databases (Gomes, 27 Sep 2001). 
The latest versions of facial recognition software can be used in 
conjunction with closed circuit television surveillance systems to provide additional help 
in the fight against crime and terrorism.  While the resulting collection of facial data does 
not have the uniqueness of other biometrics such as DNA, iris, fingerprint, and retina 
scans, it can still be useful as a valuable non-intrusive way of monitoring for suspected 
terrorists, provided the individual pre-exists in a database.  By comparing faces in a 
crowd with a database of known criminals and suspected terrorist, law enforcement can 
pinpoint likely suspects and take action when appropriate.   
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Facial-recognition technologies have some weaknesses that have 
prevented agencies from embracing the technology.  Though non-intrusive and low cost, 
facial recognition systems offer relatively limited accuracy and may require substantial 
processing power in a commercial IT environment (Raikow, 12 Mar 2001).  Facial 
recognition systems have difficulty identifying identical twins as different persons.  Some 
facial recognition systems are unable to cope with angles or facial expressions, which are 
a little different from those used during the enrollment process.  Some systems are not 
able to analyze people with imposed physical characteristics such as a beard, styled hair, 
disguises, or with certain facial expressions.  Templates are also required to be updated 
periodically because changes occur in the facial skeleton during the human aging process.  
Algorithms are still being trained to accommodate for factors such as aging, image 
resolution, and lighting variances in different photos (Ellis, 15 Sep 2000). 
With some existing facial recognition systems, certain restrictions are 
imposed on the user.  The user must look straight into the camera with certain lighting 
available in order for the system to analyze and identify the person.  However, various 
new graph-matching techniques are being developed that enhance the quality of picture, 
thus decreasing these constraints. 
Visionics FaceIT System (see Figure 4.17) and Viisage Technology‘s 
FaceFINDER (see Figure 4.18) are two of the most popular systems that are available 
right now.  Visionics' FaceIt system measures approximately 80 facial characteristics of a 
person and compares them with templates that are stored in a central database.  The 
system needs to see 15 to 20 of these characteristics to make a match, so obstructions 
such as hair blocking the face can impede the system.  This weakness can be eliminated 
by using the technology at passenger check- in or at different checkpoints where 
personnel are forced to face a camera without obstructions (Stikeman, Dec 2001).  
Facial recognition technology is improving; and its algorithms are 
evolving the capability to match faces regardless of age, facial hair and other alterations.  
The use of extra cameras can increase accuracy, and provide the ability to provide 
combine multiple views to create three-dimensional (3D) images (Stikeman, Dec 2001).  
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Tables F.4 and G.4 list facial recognition scanning products and applications, 
respectively.   
 
      
Figure 4.17. Visionics‘ FaceIT System. (From: Cass, Jan 2002). 
 
 
Figure 4.18. Viisage Technology‘s FaceFINDER System. (From: Cass, Jan 2002). 
The strengths of facial-recognition include: 
· Since facial-recognition technologies are software-based, they can be 
deployed without additional proprietary hardware.  In most cases, it has 
the ability to leverage existing image acquisition equipment, such as 
CCTV cameras or standard video cameras that are already installed. 
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· Facial-recognition technology is one of the only biometric techniques 
available that allows use without physical contact, user involvement, or 
awareness. 
· Facial-recognition technologies allow the enrollment of static images 
(pictures). 
· It is non- intrusive (Nanavati, p. 73). 
The weaknesses of facial-recognition include: 
· Matching accuracy can be affected by the acquisition environment 
(lighting, camera position, acquisition angle, background composition). 
· Matching accuracy can be reduced by the changes in physiological 
characteristics (hairstyle, makeup, facial hair, addition or removal of 
eyeglasses, addition of hats or scarves). 
· There could be a perception of potential privacy abuse due to non-
cooperative enrollment and identification (Nanavati, p. 74). 
· It can have difficulty in distinguishing identical twins. 
· When compared to other biometrics, Equal Error Rate (EER) for facial 
algorithms can be much higher (Bioconsulting, 5 May 2001). 
3. Behavioral Biometric Technologies 
A behavioral characteristic, like one’s voice, signature, or keystroke dynamics, is 
influenced by controllable behavioral actions as well as less controllable psychological 
factors.  Since behavioral characteristics can change over time, the enrolled biometric 
reference template is required to be periodically updated (I/O Software, Jun 2002).  For 
this reason, these biometric techniques have limited applications in the war against terror. 
a. Voice Recognition  
A person can be identified by the various characteristics of the sounds, 
vocals, and phonetics the person makes as he or she speaks.  A person’s vocal 
characteristics such as mouth, nasal cavities, and vocal tract produce speech patterns that 
are relatively “unique” and different for other people.  Although humans can use these 
characteristics naturally for identifying someone, a complex algorithm is required for a 
computer system to analyze the voice characteristics (see Figure 4.19).  Speech 
recognition technologies use voice recordings to create voiceprints based on inflection 
and the distinctive highs and lows in a person’s speech (Gomes, 27 Sep 2001).   
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Figure 4.19. Voiceprint Characteristics. (From: Sullivan, 27 Sep 2001). 
With voice recognition systems, a person speaks into a microphone or 
over a telephone attached to the system.  The system then analyzes the voice 
characteristics of the voice sample.  The system typically uses Fourier-based methods to 
extract the biometric features and create a template of the “voiceprint.”  Finally, the 
system compares the characteristics of the newly produced template with the voice 
characteristics of a prerecorded template.  
Since they require only standard microphones or modems built into most 
modern PCs, voice-recognition systems are extremely cheap.  They are non- intrusive and 
can be used over a telephone or other remote voice connection.  They, however, offer 
relatively poor accuracy, and are often highly vulnerable to background noise and other 
environmental factors (Raikow, 12 Mar 2001).  The use of Time Encoded Speech (TES), 
a form of waveform coding, combined with the use of artificial neural network 
architectures, has allowed its use in high background noise environments (Polemi, p. 28).  
New systems are based on a technology called Time Encoded Signal Processing and 
Recognition (TESPAR), which is a simplified digital language for coding speech.  It 
provides a simple way of generating a template that defines any sound.  Its method differs 
from the classical Fourier analysis of previous systems.  It works by analyzing snapshots 
of a sound wave image template against time without calculating frequencies (Polemi, p. 
27). 
There are several problems associated with this biometric technique.  
Voice verification is not as accurate as other biometric techniques.  Some systems have 
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tedious enrollment procedures.  Illness, fatigue, and stress can also cause problems in 
voice verification.  Women generate more complex voice frequencies, which make it 
harder to identify them.  People affected by alcohol, by dental anesthesia, by oral 
obstruction also will have difficulty being verified by voice verification systems (Polemi, 
p. 28).  An individual’s voice can change over his lifetime; therefore, it requires enrolled 
templates to be updated periodically.  There is also fear that, as digital recording 
equipment evolves and becomes more sophisticated, accurate reproduction of a person’s 
voice will be possible in the not to distant future (Polemi, p. 28).  
Another concern about this biometric approach is impersonations. 
However, since these devices focus on different characteristics of speech than people do, 
it is not considered a problem.  Although an impersonation may sound similar to human 
ears, it is not when analyzed by voice analyzers.  Duplication of voice using a tape 
recorder is more of a major threat to these systems.  As digital recording systems are 
enhanced and become more advanced, some systems will not be mathematically capable 
of differentiating between real and prerecorded voices. 
Presently, systems developers are combining voice verification with other 
forms of security and surveillance technologies (Polemi, p. 28).  It is currently being 
deployed in radio or telephone communication surveillance to identity individuals, such 
as suspected terrorists and their associates.  Tables F.5 and G.5 list voice recognition 
products and applications, respectively.   
The strengths of voice verification include: 
· It is easy to use. 
· It is considered non- intrusive (Bioconsulting, 5 May 2001). 
· One can leverage existing telephony infrastructure. 
· It can be effectively layered with speech recognition and verbal account 
authentication. 
· It is relatively resistant to imposters. 
· It generally does not have the negative perceptions that are associated with 
other biometrics (Polemi, pp. 94 and 95). 
The weaknesses of voice verification include: 
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· As digital recording media becomes more advanced, voice 
authentication/recognition becomes more susceptible to replay attacks 
than other biometrics. 
· Its accuracy is challenged by ambient noise and low quality capture 
devices. 
· People are usually unaccustomed to speaking to their computers. 
· It has a large template size (typically 250 to 1000 bytes) (Polemi, pp. 95 
and 96). 
· A person’s voice can vary with their mood (anger, depression, excitement, 
etc.) or health (cold, flu, etc.) (Bioconsulting, 5 May 2001). 
b. Handwriting/Signature Recognition 
Handwriting/Signature Recognition is based on an individual’s reflex 
action that is not influenced by deliberate muscular control.  Writing characteristics such 
as rhythms, pen pressure, successive touches of the writing surface, measurements of 
spacing, number of contracts on the surface, duration the pen touches the tablet, total time 
of writing a signature, turning point, number of horizontal turning points, loops, slopes, 
velocity, and acceleration tend to be unique for each individual.  This method uses 
sensors to detect dynamic rhythms, speed, and pressure exerted by the hand when an 
individual is writing.  The static shape of the completed signature is also analyzed 
(Gomes, 27 Sep 2001) (see Figure 4.20).   
There are two methods in use to identify a person based on signatures: 
static and dynamic.  The static method compares already written signatures with a 
signature from a reference source.  Static signature capture is becoming quite popular as a 
replacement for pen and paper signing in bankcard, PC, and delivery-service applications, 
such as those used by package delivery services.   
The second method examines the dynamics of the signature when it is 
written down.  Since it is more difficult to imitate a signature that is controlled 
dynamically, most of the commercially available signature-verification systems and those 
under development are based on dynamic signature verification (Nanavati, p. 125).  The 
development and use of artificial neural networks have made these systems more accurate 
and cheaper.   
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Figure 4.20. Handwriting Recognition Image. (From: Evangelista, 21 Feb 2000). 
Signature verification devices use wired pens, pressure-sensitive tablets, or 
a combination of both.  Devices using wired pens are less expensive and take up less 
room but are potentially less durable.  Dynamic signature-verification systems use 
sequential methods to divide the signature into independent events, and examine each 
piece separately (I/O Software, Jun 2002).  Multiple enrollments are often required for 
some systems (Nanavati, p. 126).  At the time of verification, the user is asked to sign.  
The system compares various aspects of its signature on a hierarchical manner.  If a good 
match is not found between the signatures characteristics of the new template and the 
stored template, the new template is rejected.  
Since signature is a familiar way in identifying individuals, hand written 
signature verification systems can be highly acceptable.  In a survey performed by a 
branch of a UK Post Office, a signature verification system was preferred over the 
fingerprint system (Polemi, p. 29).  
There are still some challenges with the use of signature-verification 
technologies.  Some systems have had difficulties with people that change their signature 
often or radically.  Other systems cannot distinguish pen pressure from palm pressure. 
Signature dynamics can be affected if a person has an injury, illness, or is under the 
influence of drugs or alcohol.  People with Parkinson's disease are not able to use these 
systems.  This technology also cannot be used in countries with low literacy rates.  To-
date, the financial community has been slow to adopt automated signature verification 
methods for credit cards and check applications because signatures can still be too easily 
forged.  This keeps signature verification from being integrated into high- level security 
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applications.  However, electronic signature verification is gaining ground in retail and e-
commerce applications (Polemi, p. 29). 
There are about ten products commercially available, and about the same 
number are under development.  Applications in the war against terror could include 
identifying origins of terrorist-related correspondence.  An example of this application 
was the Israeli analysis of the paper trail of the arms shipment to the Palestinian 
Authority and their request for funds for suicide bombings.  Tables F.6 and G.6 display 
signature verification applications and products, respectively.   
The strengths of signature verification include: 
· It is resistant to imposters. 
· It leverages existing processes. 
· It is perceived as non- invasive. 
· Users can change signatures (Nanavati, p. 123). 
The weaknesses of signature verification include: 
· Inconsistent signatures can lead to increased error rates. 
· Some users are unaccustomed to signing on tablets. 
· It has limited applications (Nanavati, p. 123). 
c. Keystroke Recognition 
The theory behind keystroke analysis is that every individual has his 
unique pattern or rhythm of typing.  The combination of typing speed, the duration of a 
keystroke, time lapses between keystrokes, typing error frequency, forced keystrokes, and 
time lapses when two keys are stroked simultaneously are relatively unique per individual 
(Polemi, p. 30).  These characteristic details of a user's typing “signature” can be used for 
identification.  During the enrolment phase, the average and deviation of these details are 
calculated and stored in a template for use in the future.  Identification of individuals 
becomes easier if the analyzed individuals are trained typists.  
The Keystroke Analysis software analyzes an individual’s keystroke 
dynamics or typing rhythms by monitoring the user’s keyboard input 1,000 times a 
second (I/O Software, Jun 2002).  One of the advantages of this technique is that neither 
enrollment nor verification detracts from the regular workflow (I/O Software, Jun 2002).  
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Two kinds of systems have been developed.  One uses a static verification technique 
while the other uses a dynamic verification technique.  The static technique uses a neural 
network approach for pattern recognition to analyze the way a username or password is 
typed.  Dynamic approach uses statistics to verify the person continuously with any 
arbitrary text input. (Polemi, p. 30) 
Despite its appeal in some sectors, efforts to commercialize the technology 
have failed.  Due to the infancy of the technology and the possible variations of 
keystrokes a user may have, this method of authentication or verification should only be 
offered as supplement to some secure authentication mechanism and not to be used 
independently.  Hand injuries, distractions, and fatigue can affect the accuracy and 
performance of this method (Polemi, p. 30).  Several universities and research 
laboratories are studying keystroke dynamics, and are developing identification, or 
authentication systems using this technology (I/O Software, Jun 2002).  Companies and 
laboratories developing products that use keystroke dynamics are listed on Table F.7.  
Applications for this biometric technique, with some modifications, in the 
war against terror could include pre-deployment at cyber-cafes known to be frequented 
by suspected terrorists to aid in monitoring an individual’s use of the Internet.  
The strengths of keystroke recognition include: 
· It leverages existing hardware. 
· It leverages common authentication process. 
· It can enroll and verify users with little effort (Nanavati, p. 133). 
· Individuals can change their usernames and passwords but their keystroke 
behavior remains relatively the same. 
The weaknesses of keystroke recognition include: 
· It is a young and unproven technology. 
· It does not increase user convenience. 
· It retains many flaws of password-based systems (Nanavati, p. 134). 
· It requires an expensive system (system uses neurological methods and 




d. Gait Recognition 
While automated face recognition receives the most attention of non-
intrusive biometric technologies, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 
(DARPA) is also funding efforts at a handful of universities to identify people through 
their body language (Cameron, 23 Apr 2002).  There is research interest on recognizing 
people by their gait.  The theory is that each person creates his or her own distinct “gait 
signature.”  In the same way that each person has a unique fingerprint, iris, retina, or 
signature, each person also has a unique walk or gait.  Distinguishing one person’s gait 
from another’s is something some researchers believe they will be able to do reliably 
enough in the not too distant future to aid in “surveillance situations,” especially when 
someone’s face is not visible (Ellis, 5 Sep 2000).  Since a person’s gait is characterized 
by hundreds of kinetic parameters, it is believed that a gait is distinguishable and hard to 
“fake” or hide.  People can hide or disguise their faces but they cannot change the way 
they walk and still look “normal.”  The reason for this new interest is that unlike faces 
and irises, a gait can be analyzed from a great distance even with low-resolution cameras 
(surveillance video, home video). 
The DARPA effort on Human ID at a distance is a sub-program of the gait 
research.  Although DARPA’s interest is primarily in potential military and security 
applications, other researchers envision a broad range of uses, including: 
· Automatic person identification in video sequences 
· Identify the shopping patterns of different demographics 
· Recognize shoppers who return within half-hour – then forget them to 
protect their anonymity 
· Use with every-day computer interfaces (Sciencenet, Dec 1999) 
As with many applications of pattern recognition, the studies being 
conducted on gait recognition concern statistical recognition and model-based 
recognition.  Statistical recognition deploys principal components analysis for data 
compression, canonical analysis (see Figure 5.21) for improved recognition, processing 
of threshold- image, and optical flow data.  Relationship to the mechanics of a gait has 
been achieved by a new approach that uses statistical moments computed for moving 
objects, called “velocity movements.”  Database techniques extract particular features of 
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a person’s gait such as the shape and angular velocity of a limb or the length of a joint 
(Sciencenet, Dec 1999).  Recognition can also be derived from the motion of a subject's 
silhouette mathematical characteristic root, called an eigenvalue (see Figure 5.22). 
Statistical methods similar to automatic face recognition can also be used to recognize 
people by their gait (ISIS, 9 Jan 2001). 
 
Figure 4.21. Canonical Space Trajectories of Five Subjects. (From: Jain, p. 242). 
 
 
Figure 4.22. Eigenvalue of a Silhouette. (From: ISIS, 9 Jan 2001). 
Model-based recognition considers human motion to be that of a moving 
pendulum.  This method has allowed development of a gait signature based on the 
variation in inclination of the human thigh (see Figure 4.23).  This method uses the 
pendulum-like motion of the leg joints extracted from an image sequence to analyze a 
gait (Sciencenet, Dec 1999).  The gait is modeled as Simple Harmonic Motion (SHM) 
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and the indication to identity is the difference between perceived motion and that of pure 
SHM.   
 
Figure 4.23. Example of Simple Harmonic Motion Analysis. (From: ISIS, 9 Jan 2001). 
Prototypes that use gait recognition techniques have already been created 
that can filter out noise from a video image and recognize a person walking past a 
moving camera even in windy or cloudy conditions (Ellis, 15 Sep 2000).  Applications of 
gait recognition technologies include bulk surveillance in public areas or in the 
battlefield, if gait templates exist on file in a database (Ellis, 15 Sep 2000).  Future 
research involving this technology should include the ability to identify individuals from 
a distance using aerial surveillance (Predator). 
The strengths of gait recognition include: 
· Accuracy is about 90-95% (Cameron, 23 Apr 2002). 
· Each person tends to have a distinct gait. 
· General perception as non-intrusive, passive surveillance. 
· Provides vehicle for testing motion-based evidence gathering techniques 
(ISIS, 9 Jan 2001). 
The weaknesses of gait recognition include: 
· Technology is in its infancy.  
· Database technique is poor at ignoring flapping clothing when analyzing 
the gait of a person.   
· Currently, all database images are two-dimensional and depend greatly on 
the angle of the camera (ISIS, 9 Jan 2001). 
· When a system tries to compare two sequences of the same person, taken 
at a different angle, it is far less effective.  This weakness can be addressed 
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with computer-graphics techniques that re-render images at new angles. 
(Cameron, 23 Apr 2002) 
4. Other Emerging Biometric Technologies 
Lack of standards or independent testing, as well as high deployment costs, are 
the weak points of the following technologies:   
a. DNA 
All human cells, except for the red corpuscles, contain a core of genetic 
information, which is unique for every individual (Polemi, p. 30).  This core of genetic 
information is called DNA (Dysart, 1998).  The genetic information that is encoded in 
DNA may be the ultimate source of identification.  Identification or verification using 
DNA (see Figure 4.24) is regularly used in forensic laboratories.  The amount of material 
needed for such an analysis is very small; e.g., one hair or a drop of saliva is sufficient.  
The major advantage with this biometric technique is that a DNA print is the same for 
every cell or tissues of the body (Polemi, p. 30).  
The basic concerns against this technique are the ethical and practical 
acceptability from the user.  There is a strong resistance against the use of DNA for 
identification or authentication in common applications.  This resistance lies in the fact 
that human cells need to be taken from the human body.  There is also the perception of 
the potential use and misuse of additional information contained in the DNA.   
The major area of application for DNA technologies will continue to be 
criminal justice.  This method is widely used in forensics to identify criminals and 
unknown corpses (Polemi, p. 31).  Its application in the war on terror would remain the 
same, verifying the identities of dead and captured terrorists.  
One of the major disadvantages of DNA pattern recognition is that it is a 
laboratory procedure that requires the isolation of the DNA, processing, transfer of DNA 
to nylon, and probing, and thus is an expensive process that requires time to perform 




Figure 4.24. DNA and DNA Pattern. (After: DOE Human Genome Project, 2002). 
b. Vein Pattern Recognition 
Vein pattern recognition is an idea for identification that is being 
considered by some researchers.  In this technique, the veins of the back of the hand and 
wrist (see Figure 4.25.) are scanned while the user grips a bar of a reading device 
(Ashbourn, p. 63).  Prototypes of various vein recognition systems have already been 
developed that obtain two-dimensional scan images of the vein patterns of the back of the 
hand and develop templates using numerous vein pattern matching algorithms (Polemi, p. 
26).   
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Figure 4.25. Vein Pattern. (From: Jain, p. 7). 
 
The British Technology Group (U.K.) is one research group, which is  
working on this technology by developing their Veincheck Systems. 
The strengths of vein-pattern recognition include: 
· It is relatively tamper-proof . 
· It is not easily damaged by minor abrasions (Ashbourn, p. 63). 
The weaknesses of vein-pattern recognition include: 
· There is low interest in the technology (Ashbourn, p. 63). 
· Its form factor (Reader size and shape) limits the scope of potential 
applications. 
· General perception is that it is intrusive (Polemi, p. 26). 
c. Ear Recognition 
Ear Recognition technologies allow the identification of an individual by 
the shape of the ear.  The theory behind this technique is that each person’s ear has 
unique characteristics for a given individual—a distinct bone structure and shape of the 
outer ear and ear lobe (Gomes, 27 Sep 2001).  With the help of a video camera, an image 
is taken of the ear, which is then analyzed and used for further identification or 
authentication.  Currently there are to types of methods that have been developed to 
analyze the ear.  One method (see Figure 4.26.) uses the anthropometric measurements 
and locations of ear characteristics—[1] Helix Rim, [2] Lobule, [3] Antihelix, [4] 
Concha, [5] Tragus, [6] Antitragus, [7] Crus of Helix, [8] Triangular Fossa, and [9] 
Incisure Intertragica—to develop an ear template.  The other method (see Figure 4.27) 
develops an ear biometric graph model by first tracing the features of the ear, 
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constructing a Voronoi diagram, and creating a Neighbor Graph that is used to form the 
ear template.  
 
Figure 4.26. Ear Shape Biometrics. (From: Jain, p. 277). 
 
 
Figure 4.27. Stages of Building the Ear Biometric Graph Model (From Jain, p. 279). 
This technique has already been used by law enforcement to identify 
criminals.  Currently few products available apply ear pattern recognition. One of these, 
created by ART Techniques (U.S.) and called Optophone, was built into the ear part of a 
telephone (Polemi, p. 31).   
d. Odor/Scent Identification 
This olfactory biometric technology uses sensors that recognize the unique 
chemical patterns of human body odor to determine a person’s identity (Gomes, 27 Sep 
2001).  While humans and animals use body odor as a basic qualitative biometric, using it 
as an accurate representation for identification purposes may seem a little strange, but 
there has been much research in this area.  The theory of this technique is that 30 
chemicals substances a body emits, called “rolatiles,” make up a person’s distinctive 
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smell (Dysart, 1998).  A system or device using this technique uses a number of chemical 
receptors and sensors that generate a difference in voltage in case a particular substance is 
present.  With the help of neural networks, it is possible to disentangle specific scent 
patterns.  The differences in voltages are used to differentiate the different compounds 
that make up a person’s scent.  This method is under development and its applications are 
limited.  A system called “Scentinel” was being developed in 1997 using this biometric 
technique by Mastiff Electronics (Polemi, p. 31).  This biometric technique has received 
very little interest for deployment in real-world applications (Dysart, 1998). 
e. Thermal Facial Scan 
Thermal facial-scan (see Figure 4.28) is a biometric technology that was 
first developed in the mid-90s (Nanavati, p. 113).  This technique measures the infrared 
patterns caused by the distinct flow of blood under the surface of the skin of the face.  
 
Figure 4.28. Thermal Facial-Scans. (From: Jain, p. 195). 
As a biometric identification technique, it has been shown to be highly 
distinctive with a stated accuracy of 85 to 98 percent (Jain, p. 212).  In addition to 
identification, thermal face-scans have been tested to detect lies (see Figure 4.29) almost 
as good as polygraph machines and could identify people under stress that might be 
undertaking a hostile action (DeNoon, 25 Jun 2002).  Thus, this technology might be 
useful in interrogations or in monitoring crowds. 
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Figure 4.29. Non-Intrusive Lie Detector. (From: DeNoon, 25 Jun 2002). 
 
f. Subcutaneous Hand-Scan 
Subcutaneous hand-scan analyses the palm’s tissue structure below the 
surface of the skin.  The outlook for this technique is reasonably strong.  Prototypes have 
already been built and have attracted some interest. (Nanavati, p. 113) 
g. Sweat Pore Analysis 
In 1823, Czech Jan Evangelista Purkinje, while studying sweat glands, 
observed that precise patterns of grooves and ridges resulting from the sweat pores of the 
skin seemed to be unique and believed that the distribution of the pores in the area of the 
finger was distinct for a given person (Ashbourn, p. 5).  Based on this theory, sweat pores 
analyzers have been developed which analyze the sweat pores on the tip of the finger. 
When the finger is placed on the sensor of the sweat pore analyzer, the analyzer’s 
software records the pores as stars and stores their position relative to the area of the 
finger (Polemi, p. 31).  Interest in this biometric technique remains low. 
h. Nail Bed Identification 
Nail bed Identification techniques are currently being studied.  This 
technique analyses the vertical ridges beneath the human fingernail (Nanavati, p. 113).  





C. SCANNERS AND SNIFFERS 
To improve surveillance capabilities at airports, ports, and our borders, new 
scanning and “sniffing” security equipment is already being employed to supplement 
traditional metal detectors and screening procedures.   
1. Scanners  
a. Explosive Detection System (EDS) 
Prior to 9-11, carry-on baggage typically went through an X-ray scanner.  
Today, improved scanning devices, similar to Invision’s computer tomography (CT) 
machines (see Figure 4.30), are required and are being employed to do a better job at 
detecting weapons.  CT scanners use an x-ray mechanism that revolves slowly around 
baggage to obtain image data or tomogram (see Figure 4.31).  The scanner is able to 
determine the mass and density of individual objects and alert operators if an object’s 
mass and density falls within the range of a dangerous material (Tyson, Jun 2002). 
 
                               
               CTX 5500 DS                                          CTX 9000 DSi 
 
Figure 4.30. Explosive Detection Systems from Invision Technologies. (From: 
Invision-tech.com, 2002). 
 
The major problem with these systems is that they cost over $1 million 
each, occupy large areas, and the suppliers cannot meet the required demands made by 
the new Transportation Security Agency (TSA).  In the meantime, to meet the new safety 
guidelines, many airports are using the more readily available and less expensive 
Explosive Trace Detectors (ETDs).  Due to the short supply of EDS machines, more than 
740 ETDs are now being used in conjunction with metal detectors and x-ray machines at 
airport security checkpoints (Orenstien, Nov 2001). 
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Figure 4.31. CT Mechanism and Tomogram. (From: Tyson, Jun 2002). 
b. Body Scanners 
The FAA has tested a low-power X-ray machines, such as BodySearch 
(see Figure 4.32) and Rapidscan’s Secure 1000, to allow the operators to detect any 




Figure 4.32. BodySearch Technology. (From: CNN.com, 21 Aug 2000 and 
NewsMax.com, 9 Mar 2000). 
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The systems reflect X-rays, which penetrate only a few millimeters below 
the skin, producing images that can be analyzed by the operator.  Similar detection 
devices are already deployed at some international airports, prisons, and customs 
checkpoints.  In 2000, customs officials had already deployed these body scanners at JFK 
Airport in New York, Miami International, Chicago’s O’Hare Airport, Atlanta’s 
Hartsdale Airport, Houston Intercontinental, and Los Angeles Airport (NewsMax.com, 9 
Mar 2002).  Before Sept. 11, the FAA believed the privacy issues were difficult to 
overcome.  Since 9-11, with the public demanding more security, more deployments at 
major airports are likely. 
c. Cargo, Truck and Vehicle Scanners 
New scanning technologies have been developed to aid in the inspection 
of cargo, trucks, and vehicles.  With significant financial support from the U.S. 
Government, Ancore Corporation has developed Pulsed Fast Neutron Analysis (PFNA) 
and Thermal Neutron Analysis (TNA) that can aid in inspecting cargo at airports and 
seaports as well as inspecting trucks and vehicles at weigh stations and border crossings 
(Gozani, 12 Mar 2002).  TNA technology (Figure 4.33) uses a small neutron source or an 
electronic neutron generator to produce neutrons that in turn are used to detect bulk 
quantities of explosive and drugs concealed in trucks or cargo containers (Brown, 19 Feb 
2002).   
 
Figure 4.33. TNA Material-Specific Inspection. (From: Brown, 19 Feb 2002). 
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The neutrons are used to interact with the inspected materials.  TNA 
detectors then measure the signals resulting from the interactions.  Each signal is unique 
to a given element.  According to Dr. Tsahi Gozani of Ancore Corporation, “TNA 
devices can be readily augmented to detect passively and actively nuclear materials 
(Gozani, 12 Mar 2002).” 
Currently, PFNA technology is the only automated, non- intrusive, 
material-sensitive technology available to inspect large shipping containers, cargo 
containers, and trucks (Gozani, 12 Mar 2002).  PFNA (Figure 4.34) measures the 
elemental contents within small volumes, called voxels, of an inspected object.  
 
 
Figure 4.34. PFNA Inspection Process. (From: Brown, 19 Feb 2002). 
Inspected objects are scanned by the system using short pulses of fast 
neutrons.  The bombardment of the object and its contents by fast neutrons results in the 
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emission of gamma rays.  Gamma detectors, located strategically around the inspected 
object, collect the gamma rays, which were omitted.  Then an electronic data acquisition 
system processes the signal and routes the elemental signal data to the system’s 
computer, which further processes the data and produces elemental images of what 
elements are present in the container (Brown, 19 Feb 2002).   
One advantage to the TNA and PFNA technologies is that its computer 
analyzes the signals automatically and alerts operators if it detects the presence of drugs 
or explosives, removing the operator from the decision making process (Brown, 19 Feb 
2002).  The other advantage is that the detection determination does not rely on shape and 
is immune to diligent packaging.  TNA and PFNA both provide a better alternative to low 
and high-energy technologies that require operator interpretation of what an image is 
representing (Gozani, 12 Mar 2002) (see Figures 4.35 and 4.36).  
 
 
Figure 4.35. Comparison of Low Energy X-Ray and PFNA Technologies. (From: 




Figure 4.36. High Energy X-Ray and PFNA Technology Comparison.  (From: Gozani, 
12 March 2002). 
 
Ancore has two PFNA products available that could be used as highly 
effective non- intrusive tools to detect explosives, narcotics, chemical weapons, 
environmentally hazardous materials, and specific dutiable goods.  The Ancore Cargo 
Inspector (ACI) (see Figure 4.37) can be effectively used to inspect air cargo and 
passenger luggage, full-size marine cargo containers, loaded freight trucks, freight trains, 




Figure 4.37. Ancore Cargo Inspector. (From: Gozani, 12 Mar 2002). 
Ancore Corporation’s Vehicular Explosive Detection System (V-EDS) 
(see Figurer 4.38) is a non-invasive tool, which can be used from a distance of several 
feet to detect explosives hidden in cars or trucks.   
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Figure 4.38. Vehicular Explosive Detection System (V-EDS). (From: Ancore.com, 
2002). 
 
2. Sniffers  
a. Explosive Trace Detector (ETD) 
Airport security personnel are using ETDs to detect minute particles of 
drugs or explosives that may be present in luggage.  Security personnel wipe a swab or 
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pad over luggage and insert the sample into a machine that quickly checks for such 
particles (see Figure 4.39).  ETDs are also are being used at embassies, police 
departments, prisons, nuclear power plants, and other high-security environments 
throughout the world (Orenstein, Nov 2001). 
 
 
Figure 4.39. Explosive Trace Detector. (From: Barringer.com). 
b. Personnel Sniffers  
As part of a pilot program, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) 
installed EntryScan (built by Ion Track Instruments and Barringer Technologies) at 
McGee-Tyson Airport in Knoxville, Tennessee.  Another device being tested by the TSA 
is a telephone booth-sized Barringer IonScan Sentinel II (see Figure 4.40) (Masterson, 3 
Apr 2002).  When travelers pass through the IonScan Sentinel II device shoots short burst 
of air to dislodge and disperse microscopic particles from the skin and clothing 
(Orenstein, Nov 2001).  The microscopic particles are the vacuumed by the device.  The 
Sentinel II then sniffs and analyzes the particles for traces of explosives, chemicals, or 
drugs.  Ionscan type machines can be adjusted to test for 60 types of drug residues 
(Masterson, 3 Apr 2002). 
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Figure 4.40. Barringer’s IONSCAN Sentinel II. (From: Barringer.com, 2002). 
D. OTHER UBIQUITOUS SURVEILLANCE TECHNOLOGIES 
Video surveillance tools, biometric technologies, scanners, and sniffers should not 
be the only “silver bullets” used in the battle to counter terrorism.  Along with the 
technologies listed above, the following technologies are also being considered to make 
up a complete ubiquitous surveillance system. 
1. Scoping Out Terrorists 
· National/Travel/Visa/Passport Biometric ID Cards that use biometric 
technologies such as fingerprint, iris, and facial recognition—to reduce 
fraudulent identification, and automatically detect individuals who are 
suspected terrorist, criminals, or have expired visas. 
· Unmanned armed CIA Predator aircraft—to fly over areas, gather 
intelligence, take reconnaissance photos, and take action as required.   
· Reconnaissance and communications satellites—to monitor terrorist 
movements and communications.   
· Electronic surveillance programs, such as ECHELON, and Carnivore (see 
Figure 4.41)—to ease-drop on terrorist communications.   
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Figure 4.41. Carnivore. (From Hogan, Dec 2001). 
 
· Enclosed Space Detection System (ESDS) —to detect the presence of 
persons hiding in enclosed spaces of vehicles or cargo containers (see 
Figure 4.42).  The system operates by detecting the presence of the human 
ballistocardiogram, or small but measurable shock wave produced by the 
heart and propagated through the body and to surfaces the body is in 
contact with (DePersia, p. 140). 
 
 




· Acoustic surveillance—to protect against “diving terrorists.”  
· Real time, peer-to-peer computing networks—to share information, obtain 
assessments, and coordinate actions. 
2. Scoping Out Weapons  
· Biological surveillance systems, such as dogs and sea mammals. 
· Low Frequency Magnetic Imaging (LFMI) systems—to detect concealed 
weapons (De Persia, p. 108). 
· In a project sponsored by the Department of Justice, Trex Enterprises is 
developing a passive millimeter wave camera (see Figure 4.43) to 
distinguish between body heat and heat given off by objects a person is 
carrying to detect hidden weapons (Tarquinio, p. 74).   
 
 
Figure 4.43. Millimeter Wave Camera Image. (From: DePersia, p. 123). 
 
· Explosives and Nuclear Portals, being developed by the Department of 
Energy’s Los Alamos and Sandia National Laboratories—these machines 
scan individual’s who walk through them and are sensitive enough to 
detect the presence of both explosives, even small traces due to handling, 
and nuclear materials. 
· Department of Energy’s Idaho National Engineering and Environmental 
Laboratory is developing neutron source locating systems that can be used 
to collect real-time data to allow analysis of trends.  Tests have already 
shown that putting just three sensors in motion could cover about 98% of a 
small city. 
· Department of Energy’s Idaho National Engineering and Environmental 
Laboratory is developing portable X-ray tomography systems.  These 
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systems create three-dimensional images of contents and make dangerous 
items clearly identifiable (Tarquinio, Jun 2002). 
· Acoustic surveillance sensors widely distributed over a community or 
threat area—used to triangulate gunfire or explosion location (see Figure 




Figure 4.44. ShotSpotter. (From: ShotSpotter.com, 2002). 
 
3. Safeguarding Cargo at Borders and Homeland 
· Ship and Truck Transponders—to track location and routes taken. 
· Accelerator Nuclear Materials Detector is being developed by the 
Department of Energy’s Los Alamos and Idaho labs, in partnership with 
Aracor, to detect radioactive materials such as uranium or enriched 
plutonium (Tarquinio, p. 76). 
4. Addressing the Biochemical Threat 
· Rapid Syndrome Validation Project is being developed by the Department 
of Energy’s Sandia Lab to allow doctors to enter symptoms into a 
computer network and immediately find out if similar cases are being 
detected by other doctors and what is know about those symptoms and its 
source.  By monitoring such a network, epidemiologist at national, state, 
and local levels can detect problems and take action as appropriate 
(Tarquinio, p. 76). 
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· Health Alert Networks and a National Medical Intelligence Database are 
being developed to provide better data infrastructure to link emergency 
rooms, physicians and public health departments, and serve as an early 
warning system for public health crisis and bio-terrorism (Tarquinio, p. 
77). 
· National Institute of Health (NIH), John Hopkins University’s Center for 
Civilian Biodefense Strategies, and other research institutions are 
developing DNA Chips to identify DNA structures of biochemical agents 
(Tarquinio, p. 77). 
· Autonomous Pathogen Detection Systems are being developed by the 
Department of Energy’s Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory to test 
air particles for signs of contaminants.  These systems could be built 
directly into a building’s ventilation system (Tarquinio, p. 76).  A U.S. 
Department of Defense bio-agent to monitor and test the air for pathogens 
(see Figure 4.45) is also near deployment (Talbot, Dec 2001). 
 
 
Figure 4.45. DOD’s Bio-Agent Detector. (From: Talbot, Dec 2001). 
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· MIT’s Lincoln Laboratory is developing Canary Chips to detect biological 
or chemical attacks (Tarquinio, p. 77). 
· Department of Energy’s Oak Ridge National Laboratory is developing 
Block II Chemical and Biological Mass Spectrometers to analyze both air 
and liquid to identify potential threats (Tarquinio, p. 76). 
· Department of Energy’s Sandia National Laboratories are developing soil 
and ground water chemical sensors to help detect deadly chemicals being 
dumped in small reservoirs.  These sensors allow detection of chemical 
agents on-site and signal an alarm at a remote location (Tarquinio, Jun 
2002). 
Although there is no foolproof technical fix to counter terrorism, 
ubiquitous surveillance technologies and biometrics could significantly aid in the battle 
against terrorism (Woodward, Dec 2001).  The challenge will be in determining the most 
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V. APPLICATION AREAS FOR SURVEILLANCE AND 
BIOMETRICS 
The rise of networked, non-state terrorists requires the United States to change its 
national strategy.  The U.S. government must understand that to beat a network one has 
to fight as a network.  The strength of a network depends on how well it functions in the 
organizational, narrative, doctrinal, technological, and social levels (Arquilla, p. 324). 
New strategies must strengthen our ability to perform as a network at each of these levels.  
Strategies must also hinder on how well the adversary performs at each level.  The rise of 
networked non-state actors requires the U.S. and its departments and agencies to evolve 
into hybrid all-channel networks (see Figure 5.1) in order to conduct “netwar” against 
this new type of adversary.  All-channel networks allow improved collaboration and 




Figure 5.1. All-Channel Network. (From: Arquilla, p. 8). 
Biometric and surveillance technologies provide both offensive and defensive 
tools that work in the technology- level of this war.  They allow us to monitor changes in 
the adversaries use of information technology, target information flows, deter offensive 
operations by the networked actors by providing better security infrastructure, and allow 
the U.S. to work more efficiently as a network, thus beating non-state actors at their own 
game (Arquilla, pp. 52-54).   
Changes in U.S. and international surveillance laws in the wake of the 9-11 
attacks have allowed the U.S. and its allies to round up various al Qaeda terrorist cells 
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worldwide.  Because of the success of the U.S. campaign against al Qaeda in 
Afghanistan, however, al Qaeda leadership has authorized its operative to ally themselves 
with helpful Islamic extremist groups (Priest, 30 Jun 2002).  With al Qaeda reaching out 
to other terrorist groups, such as Hezbollah, to coordinate explosives and tactics training, 
money laundering, weapons smuggling, and the acquisition of forged documents (Priest, 
30 Jun 2002), much still needs to be done to secure the homeland.  As President George 
W. Bush has stated, this is a long war; and sleeper cells may already be in the United 
States waiting to strike.  The following is an outline of various present and future 
applications of ubiquitous surveillance and biometric technologies, but they are only a 
small fraction of the actual deployments to date. 
A. GOVERNMENT  
Prior to 9-11, both surveillance and biometric technology were limited in use in 
the United States.  Surveillance technologies saw limited use, because the threat against 
the homeland was not deemed significant.  Therefore, their use was primarily limited to 
security applications in the private sector.  Biometric technologies were slow to catch on 
because of the high cost and enormous computing power required to build accurate 
systems.  The overall market for biometrics was approximately $325 million in 1999 
(Evangelista, 21 Feb 2000).  However, the combination of the growth in PC computing 
power, evolution of proprietary adaptive algorithms, lower-cost infrared optics, advances 
in digital imaging, and improved measurement methods enabled manufacturers to create 
biometric and surveillance devices for mainstream applications at a lower cost.  
Biometric and surveillance technologies emerged as a practical, effective solution for law 
enforcement, security, and fraud-free e-commerce.  Biometric technologies aid in 
preventing identity theft and attendance fraud.  According to industry analysts, the 
worldwide biometrics market will reach $10 billion by 2003 (I/O Software, Jun 2002).    
Before 9-11, there were many initiatives to use biometric products by both the 
public and private sectors in various applications.  The U.S. government had already 
invested heavily in biometrics technology research.  A General Accounting Office (GAO) 
study ordered prior to July 31, 2001 to investigate the total Federal funds spent on 
researching biometric technologies revealed an expenditure of over $50 million, with $47 
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million being spent  on facial recognition technologies (see Table 5.1) (Sullivan, 15 Apr 
2002).   
 
 U.S. Department 
Year State Energy Justice Defense Total 
Pre-1997 $0 $125,000 $3,668,000 $5,730,000 $9,523,000 
1997 $0 $0 $4,843,000 $744,000 $5,587,000 
1998 $0 $0 $5,500,000 $3,171,000 $8,671,000 
1999 $12,000 $400,000 $787,000 $2,872,000 $4,071,000 
2000 $450,000 $0 $784,000 $7,330,000 $8,564,000 
2001 $100,000 $0 $5,709,000 $4,843,000 $10,652,000 
Total $562,000 $525,000 $21,291,000 $24,690,000 $47,068,000 
 
Table 5.1. Facial Recognition Spending by Departments Prior to July 31, 2001. 
(From: Sullivan, 15 Apr 2002). 
 
Although twelve different government agencies had funded or conducted research 
on biometric technologies, the study revealed that only one agency reported it had 
actually deployed the technology.  The resistance to deploy biometric and surveillance 
technologies was greatly due to pressures felt from privacy groups.    
Although biometric technology is a popular choice among agencies since the 9-11 
terrorist attacks, some biometric technologies require further testing to ensure that they 
are appropriate and effective for the given application.  Both privacy and technical issues 
have caused the GAO to caution agencies that are considering biometric applications that 
the new Patriot Act does not give them authority to start applying these technologies.  
The GAO is suggesting that agencies conduct more research on each technology to figure 
out which technologies are best and where they would be best applied.  The GAO is also 
encouraging agencies to think about how these systems might be evaded and develop 
methods to guard against such evasion.  Agencies also need to consider layering 
technologies.  By mixing the use of biometric technologies with tokens, smart cards, 
PINs, passwords, and multimodal biometric systems, authentication processes can be 
strengthened. The objective in using biometric technology is not to replace security 
personnel but to aid agencies in identification and authentication during a time when 
identifying identity theft and terrorism is growing (Bhanbhani, 3 Jun 2002). 
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New bills signed to promote homeland security have brought about many new 
deployments of surveillance and biometric technologies.  Biometric and surveillance 
technologies are now being tested for an increasing number of applications under the 
most challenging and demanding conditions at the Defense Department’s Biometrics 
Fusion Center.  The center is reporting each device’s strengths, weaknesses, and 
suggested uses to the Biometrics Management Office at the Pentagon (Bhambhani, 15 Jul 
2002).  The center is currently conducting field tests of nine fingerprint products, two iris 
scanners, and one hand geometry reader (Jackson, 22 Jul 2002). 
Biometric devices are now being deployed to protect facilities that are vital to 
national security, prevent unauthorized people from crossing borders, and preserve the 
integrity of our critical infrastructure: financial systems, power grids, air control, and data 
networks.  Real-world applications of biometric technologies have shown that its 
products are robust, easy-to-use, and cost-effective.  As new needs continue to be 
identified, the practical applications of biometric and surveillance technologies will 
expand.  In this war against terror, the application areas are primarily in law enforcement, 
security, physical access control, and network access control.  The biggest challenge 
remains settling on a specific identifier for each application. 
1. National ID Card and Driver’s Licenses 
Immediately after the 9-11 attacks, Oracle Corp. chairman Larry Ellison offered 
to provide the software for a national ID system free of charge (Scheeres, 25 Sep 2001).  
Ellison has since said he favored a national standard for current ID data.  Though no 
single member of Congress has spoken out in favor of a universal ID card, tech company 
representatives have shown their products to various government subcommittees.  The 
U.S. is not the only country debating the use of a national ID card. The Dutch 
government is also studying the integration of their national identification card with 
biometrics (I/O Software, Jun 2002).  Some members of the UK government are pushing 
for a national ID card after launching early in 2002 a chip-based biometric ID cards to 
document the tens of thousands of asylum seekers that come into their country every year 
(CardTechnology.com, 8 Jul 2002).  Iris and fingerprint biometric technologies show the 
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best promise for application with a driver’s license, national ID, visa, passport, or 
frequent traveler ID card.   
Another key hurdle in information strategies and prevention is the driver’s 
license, which is issued by states and generally accepted in other states as valid 
identification.  Rules for issuance vary greatly from state to state.  Although none lived in 
Virginia, seven of the 9-11 hijackers had Virginia driver’s licenses and used them to 
board airplanes, use credit cards, and open bank accounts.  Both falsified and legally 
obtained driver’s licenses can be used as a gateway to criminal activity.  The U.S. 
government should discuss with states the need to develop standardized rules for issuing 
licenses and require biometric templates and digital pictures on all licenses (O’Hanlon, 
Summer 2002).  Biometrics can turn a questionable driver’s license into a secure 
identification card that can be relied upon to identify a licensed individual.  Biometric 
technologies can also be used to conduct background checks on, and create secure 
identification cards for, workers who have access to cargo, hazardous materials, and 
shipping goods.  Initiatives are underway among some states and national governments to 
use biometric technologies to aid in detecting and eliminating duplicate driver’s licenses 
and verify the identity of license holders.   
2. Government Facilities 
Government facilities contain sensitive materials, critical data, high-ranking 
officials, and sensitive information.  For this reason, positive identification of all 
personnel is required. 
a. Common Access Card 
Biometric technologies are part of a redesigning of the Department of 
Defense (DOD) Common Access Card (CAC).  DOD is issuing the Common Access 
Card (CAC) to 4.3 million active duty U.S. military personnel and eligible contractors 
(Bhambhani, 6 May 2002).  Figure 5.2 shows the DOD’s timeline for the biometric cards.  
DOD’s biometrics program is now a line item in the DOD budget proposals for fiscal 
2004 through 2009 (Jackson, 22 Jul 2002).  The Biometrics Fusion Center is currently 
evaluating 56 biometric products—25 fingerprint devices, eight facial recognition 
systems, two iris scanners, two hand geometry scanners, two speaker recognition 
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systems, one signature recognition system, one iris scanner, 14 middleware products, and 
a Web portal (Jackson, 22 Jul 2002). 
 
Figure 5.2. DOD’s Timeline for the Secure Installation Access Control System. 
(From: Jackson, 22 Jul 2002). 
 
b. CCTV and Facial Surveillance 
Washington D.C. Mayor Anthony A. Williams has said increased 
government surveillance is a reality of post-September 11 world and thinks Washington 
D.C. needs to follow the lead of cities such as London, England and Sydney, Australia 
and expand its camera system (ObservingSurveillance.org, Jun 2002).  Figure 5.3 shows 
how the National Park Service has deployed around-the-clock video surveillance at all 
major monuments on the Mall and throughout buildings of interest throughout 
Washington, D.C. (Hsu, 22 Mar 2002).   
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Figure 5.3. Surveillance Camera Infrastructure in Washington D.C. (From: 
ObservingSurveillance.org, Jun 2002). 
 
Abu Zubaida’s interrogations led to increased surveillance at some of New 
York City landmarks.  Since in the course of his marathon debriefings he stated that al 
Qaeda cells had discussed attacking “the statue in the water,” a facial-recognition 
surveillance system was deployed to take pictures of visitors to the Statue of Liberty and 
Ellis Island as they board ferries.  It is comparing the images with those in a database of 
suspected terrorists provided by the FBI (Kugler, 27 May 2002). 
3. Military 
a. Aerial Surveillance 
The use of various military and government surveillance platforms have 
made great contributions in the war against terror.  The CIA has used its RQ-1 Predator 
UAV (see Figure 5.4) extensively in operations in Afghanistan.  The Michigan National 
Guard wants $4 million in funds to acquire a Predator spy plane to monitor infiltrations 
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from Canada (Newman, 31 Mar 2002).  What makes the RQ-1 Predator an invaluable 
tool for surveillance and reconnaissance is its long endurance, over 40 hours, and its 
surveillance imagery capability: synthetic aperture radar, video cameras, and a forward-
looking infra-red (FLIR).  Surveillance images can be distributed in real time via satellite 
communication links to the front line soldier, the operational commander, or worldwide. 
(Army-Technology.com, 2002)  RQ-1 Predator is also evolving into a strike platform.   
 
 
Figure 5.4. RQ-1 Predator UAV with a Product.  (From: FAS.org, 22 Jun 1996). 
Aerial surveillance platforms patrolling the northern Arabian Sea, such as 
P-3C Orion aircraft, are being used as part of the massive dragnet, Leadership 
Interdiction Operation (LIO), aimed at hunting down al Qaeda members who may be 
trying to flee Pakistan by ship.  Orions have special infrared cameras that can spot human 
targets moving on the ground as well as vessels trying to maneuver in the dark without 
their running lights.  The cameras are sensitive enough to detect the ship’s wake.   
U.S. aerial surveillance has also aided the Philippine government in its 
war against Abu Sayyaf, who has ties with al Qaeda.  Abu Sayyaf extremist guerillas 
were tracked by U.S. surveillance planes on the southern island of Jolo in the Sulu 
province (MSNBC, 28 Jun 2002).  Abu Sayyaf camps were also detected in Patikul town 
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and were raided by U.S. trained Philippine troops.  The U.S. is also supplying the 
Pakistani government with five U.S. helicopters fitted with sophisticated communications 
and surveillance technologies and three surveillance planes to aid in monitoring its tribal 
regions for al Qaeda and Taliban operatives (Associated Press, 5 Jul 2002).  Other aerial 
surveillance technologies undergoing testing include: 
· Global Hawk (see Figure 5.5) – High-altitude, long-range UAV with 




Figure 5.5. Global Hawk. (From: Associated Press, 12 Jul 2002). 
 
· CamChopper (see Figure 5.6) – Small-scale  helicopter with video camera, 
infrared imager, small payloads, 6-hour endurance, and controlled via 
laptop-style ground station (Associate Press, 12 Jul 2002).  
 
 
Figure 5.6. CamChopper. (From: Associated Press, 12 Jul 2002). 
 
· Micro Air Vehicles (MAV) - DARPA is funding development of small 
flying machines for military intelligence, such as the Black Widow (see 
Figure 5.7).  Endurance for MAVs is typically 30 minutes (Associate 
Press, 12 Jul 2002).  MAVs provide unique surveillance capabilities in 
both the urban areas and the battlespace (see Figures 5.8 and 5.9).  MAVs 
could aid in preventing civilian casualties by allowing identification of 
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friend or foe.  MAVs could also be used to detect the makeup and 
direction of chemical clouds. 
 
 
Figure 5.7. Black Widow MAV. (From: Associate Press, 12 Jul 2002). 
 
 
Figure 5.8. Micro Air Vehicle Surveillance Applications in Urban Areas. (From: 




Figure 5.9. MAV Surveillance Applications in the Battlespace. (From: Wilson, 30 Jun 
1998). 
 
· Micromechanical Flying Insect (see Figure 5.10) – biologists and 
technologists at the University of California, Berkeley are trying to 
develop a tiny robot that will flutter like a fly.  DARPA is funding much 
of the work because of its potential application in both reconnaissance and 
surveillance (CNN.com, 28 Jul 2002). 
 
 
Figure 5.10. Micromechanical Flying Insect. (From: Associate Press, 12 Jul 2002). 
 
b. Pier Access Control 
The U.S. Navy is integrating Viisage’s FacePASS system into a mantrap 
environment to limit access to one person at a time to the Submarine Base Point Loma 
pier.  This is being done to investigate whether or not a move from a manned facility to 
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an unmanned facility during off hours.  Cindy Milholland, a project engineer at Point 
Loma, stated, “Our initial findings have been promising.  In the present environment, the 
system is performing the job of access control very well.” (BiometriTech.com, 8 Jul 
2002). 
c. Communication Surveillance 
U.S. Navy submarines are playing a critical role in gathering intelligence 
about the al Qaeda terrorist network by intercepting telephone conversations and by other 
means.  Their capabilities are in high demand by both the Pentagon and CIA, and their 
missions have risen 30% since 9-11.  They provide one of the best tools for gathering 
intelligence information because they are stealthier than unmanned aerial vehicles and 
cannot be tracked the way surveillance and communication satellites can.  The rise in 
missions, however, has reduced the projected service life of the submarines’ nuclear 
cores (Jaffe, 26 Jun 2002). 
4. Immigration and Border Control 
Immigration, travel, and border control are some of the key areas in which 
biometrics and surveillance technologies are gaining acceptance and are being applied to 
fight this new war on terror at home.  Prior to 9-11, little was being done to administer a 
strong program to secure the gateways to the country.  The legacy of an open society and 
the naïve assumptions that the U.S. homeland was immune to terrorist attacks allowed the 
toleration of large porous borders and the use of fragmented administration systems.  In 
just the year 2000, 489 million people, 127 million vehicles, 11.6 million maritime 
containers, 11.5 million trucks, 2.2 million railroad cars, 829,000 planes, and 211,000 
vessels passed through U.S. border inspection systems.  In addition, 100,000 temporary 
work visas and 280,000 student visas were issued by the State Department.  About half of 
the 7 to 8 million illegal immigrants in the United States have overstayed their student or 
tourist visas (Lodal, 1 Apr 2002).    
The U.S. Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002, signed 
by the President on 14 May 2002, seeks to eliminate the vulnerabilities of the U.S. 
immigration system and border security.  Some highlights of this new law include: 
· INS shall install biometric readers to scan biometric documents at all ports 
of entry to the U.S. by 26 Oct 2003. 
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· State Department shall issue visas and travel documents to international 
visitors that are tamper-resistant and machine-readable using biometrics 
by 26 Oct 2003. 
· All planes and ships arriving from abroad must submit in advance 
passenger and crew list or manifests.  
· All countries that want to continue to take part in the U.S. Visa Waiver 
program are required to issue biometric embedded passports to its 
nationals. 
a. Passport and Visa Issuance 
Processing an increasing number of legitimate travelers and visa 
applicants while at the same time identifying lawbreakers, has put a major a strain on 
immigration authorities and transportation security screeners around the world.  To allow 
these authorities to quickly and automatically process law-abiding travelers and identify 
illegal immigrants, terrorist, drug-runners, and people involved in identity theft, new 
systems are being deployed throughout the U.S. and internationally.  The INS has 
stipulated that it could each day detect and deter about 3,000 illegal immigrants crossing 
the Mexican border without delaying the legitimate people entering the United States if it 
had a quick way of establishing positive personal identification.  (I/O Software, Jun 
2002)  
The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) and the Justice 
Department are now becoming major users and evaluators of biometric technologies. The 
objective of using biometric technologies is to deter and prevent illegal aliens holding 
false visas, forged passports, stolen papers, or copied documents from entering the 
country (Polemi, p. 32).  Another objective is to identify individuals who have overstayed 
their student or tourist visas.  Biometrics technologies and other technologies are being 
employed in a number of diverse applications and include: 
· The U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service Passenger Accelerated 
Service System (INPASS), in place since 1993, is an automatic passport 
control system that is being used to verify passengers at transportation 
hubs (Polemi, p. 32).  It allows frequent international travelers to bypass 
waiting lines in the airport.  Approximately only 0.64 percent of the total 
international travelers were enrolled in 1999.  It uses Recognition 
Systems’ hand-scan technology.  There are approximately 50,000 active 
users of the kiosk-based hand-scanners.  The system is in operation in 
New York, Newark, Washington-Dulles, Miami, Los Angeles, San 
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Francisco, and U.S. pre-clearance hubs in Vancouver and Toronto 
(Nanavati, p. 102). 
· The U.S. Customs Service’s (USCS) legacy Automated Customs System 
(ACS) is being replaced with the Automated Customs Environment (ACE) 
(5 years, $1.3 billion).  ACE is operational in three border stations, right 
now, and should be fully deployed by 2004.  ACE was designed only to 
reduce the paperwork associated with border crossings and does not 
interface with the FBI’s National Crime Information System (NCIS).  The 
USCS is spending over $1 billion to keep ACS running while ACE is 
being developed (Lodal, 1 Apr 2002). 
· The Justice Department is developing a program that will fingerprint and 
photograph aliens of national security concern, who meet as-yet-
unidentified criteria (but may include country of origin).  Foreign 
individuals holding visas in good standing would also be asked to come in 
for fingerprinting and photographs.  INS’s Computerized Applicant 
Information Management System already holds photographs of aliens and 
has been modified to hold fingerprints.  However, INS lacks the staff and 
resources to operate the system at all 300 ports of entry (Dizard, p. 15). 
· The U.S. State Department is planning to develop a visa tracking system, 
which would create alerts on visas that had expired to keep track, which 
visa holders are overstaying on the visas.   It should eliminate passport and 
visa fraud and digitize existing photographs (Bhanbhani, 3 Jun 2002).   
· As the first step in the government’s plan to track temporary student visas, 
the INS has launched a Web site system called SEVIS to register foreign 
students.  The system will become mandatory at campuses nationwide on 
30 Jan 2003.  The system is being implemented to close many loop holes 
that have led to the government’s losing track of foreign visitors with 
student visas by ensure that they actually are attending school and not 
heading off to places unknown. Using the Web site, campuses would 
report when the student arrived, course of study, and any changes in the 
field of study.  If the student never shows up or disappears, the INS would 
then try to track down the foreign student with law enforcement agents 
(Associated Press, 2 Jul 2002). 
· A pilot program called CANPASS was deployed to ease and secure the 
passage of goods and services across the U.S. and Canada northern border.  
Only low-risk U.S. and Canadian citizens can register for CANPASS.  
CANPASS uses fingerprint technology (Nanavati, p. 102).  The European 
Union (EU) is considering a similar program (Polemi, p. 32). 
· The INS has recently been developing several new projects: 
· To comply with the INS Data Management Improvement Act, INS 
has requested $362 million for fiscal year 2003 to develop its 
Entry-Exit Visa System.  The new system will integrate databases 
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used by the Customs Service, INS, State Department, and other 
agencies to track individuals entering and leaving the country 
(GCN, 24 Jun 2002).  
· Working with the Transportation Department, INS is developing a 
Dedicated Commuter Lane System that will allow pre-approved 
frequent border crossers to enter the country without a border stop.  
The system will scan vehicles’ unique identifiers or driver and 
passengers’ biometric identifiers (GCN, 24 Jun 2002).   
Biometric technologies are gaining widespread acceptance in Australia, 
Bermuda, Germany, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, and Taiwan.  King Fahd University of 
Petroleum and Minerals, in Saudi Arabia, plans to control access to its 900-acre campus 
with biometric technologies (CardTechnology.com, 9 Jul 2002).   
b. Immigrant ID Verification 
The INS is employing biometric technologies to aid in ensuring that 
immigrant documents are not tampered with.  Facial and finger biometrics are being 
employed to verify that the name and photo on the document does belong to the same 
person and that the identity of the person holding the document matches the identity of 
the person who was issued the document.  The INS has recently been developing several 
new projects to aid in keeping track of immigrant status (GCN, 24 Jun 2002): 
· INS’s Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements verifies immigration 
and employment status for more than 50,000 users nationwide. 
· INS’s Verification Information System verifies and manages reporting of 
immigrant-status data to INS-approved users. 
· The State Department has a biometric identification card system, which 
works under a special agreement with Mexico and gives about 6 million 
Mexican nationals legal access to the United States (Dizard, p. 15). 
Although the new systems and upgrades provide advancements in the right 
direction, some major problems still exist.  New INS systems currently only interface 
with the FBI’s NCIS at two locations and do not interface with the INS border patrol 
system that uses biometrics to track illegal immigrants or the program that issues digital 
biometric green cards to resident aliens (Lodal, 1 Apr 2002).  Fingerprint verification is 




c. Mobile Identification 
Verification of a person’s identity should does not have to be done at a 
particular location, situation, or environment.  At airports, borders, seaports, and other 
locations where security takes precedent, handheld wireless identification devices are 
available to perform this task (see Figure 5.11).  They allow security personnel to conduct 
on-the-spot immediate identity verification checks. 
 
 
Figure 5.11. IBIS Remote Data Terminal. (From: Identix.com, 2002). 
 
d. Surveillance at Borders and Ports  
The Coast Guard and the Customs Service are the agency elements that 
make up the nation’s counterterrorism effort against illicit cargo hidden within containers 
at our borders, seas, and ports.  Both are vital agencies in detecting and stopping 
explosives or WMD headed for the U.S. homeland on a cargo ship.  Over 1,000 foreign-
flag ships reach U.S. shores each week and present the Coast Guard with a huge 
challenge.  The Coast Guard has been patrolling at over 100 security zones around major 
naval bases, key landmarks, oil refineries, prominent ports, and nuclear power plants 
along navigable waterways.  To improve the security of vessels ashore, the Coast Guard 
is updating the National Distress and Response System (maritime 911 system), which 
monitors distress calls from vessels.  Other new proposals being discussed, involving 
cargo container security, include databases that provide real-time tracking of containers 
headed to the U.S. that include certification of inspections by the companies shipping 
them, attached security devices that detect breaches in containers, and ship transducers to 
track ports of call before reaching U.S. shores or land borders (O’Hanlon, Summer 2002). 
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The U.S. Customs Service inspectors are using Radiation Detection Pagers 
(see Figure 5.12) to be alert when they are radioactive ma terials in their vicinity.  These 
sensitive devices have a range of several hundred feet and classify radiation levels into a 
1 to 10 scale.  A detected strength level of 8 requires the inspectors to evacuate people 
from the area and to call hazardous material specialists.  The Customs Service is also 
setting up isotope identifiers to distinguish the kinds of radiation being emitted—
commercial, medical, or other radioactive materials (Gilot, 27 Jul 2002). 
 
 
Figure 5.12. Radiation Detection Pager. (From: Gilot, 27 Jul 2002). 
 
Some of the most promising products available to protect our borders with minimal 
effects on commerce and global trade include Ancore’s ACI and V-EDS systems (see 
Chapter IV).  Ancore’s non- intrusive inspection systems can automatically detect 
explosives, chemical weapons, illegal drugs, and nuclear devices.  Ancore has adapted its 
PFNA and TNA technologies for use at airports, seaports, and border crossings to inspect 
a range of objects, from shipping containers to cellular phones (Gozani, 12 Mar 2002).  
Drs. Douglas R. Brown and Tsahi Gozani of Ancore Corporation outlined conceptual 
ideas on how Ancore’s PFNA and TNA technologies could best be used for air cargo, 
border, and seaport security (Brown, 19 Feb 2002 and Gozani, 12 Mar 2002).  Ancore’s 
V-EDS products (see Figures 5.13 and 5.14) could best be utilized at border crossings 
and weigh stations.  Ancore’s ACI could be used to develop a movable cargo inspection 
facility (see Figure 5.15) to be employed in ports (Gozani, 12 Mar 2002).  A similar fixed 
scanning facility could also be developed for both border and port application (see Figure 
5.16).  American Science and Engineering Inc. has also developed specially equipped 
trucks that can scan unopened shipping for radiation emissions.  It is currently courting 
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the U.S. Customs Service with their technology, but it is a hard sell at $2 million per unit 
(Gilot, 27 Jul 2002). 
 
       
Figure 5.13. Ancore’s Rail-Mounted V-EDS. (From: Ancore.com, 2002). 
 
 
Figure 5.14. Ancore’s Truck-Mounted V-EDS. (From: Wilson, p. 52). 
 
 
Figure 5.15. Mobile Cargo Inspection Facility for Ports. (From: Gozani, 12 Mar 2002). 
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The challenge facing TSA is analyzing the security threats faced by airports and 
leveraging existing technologies to counter these threats.  The TSA is also trying to 
develop effective surveillance and screening procedures that both provide security and 
reduce customer’s waiting time.  An airport is not only a transportation hub; it is also part 
industrial complex and shopping mall.  With millions of law-abiding people flying on 
planes, there is always the possibility that a terrorist or criminal will try to hide among 
the masses with the intent to do harm.  Threats to airport occupants could come from 
passengers, visitors, employees, cargo, and mail.   
The TSA has addressed the various weak points at airports (see Figure 5.17) by 
applying increased biometric technologies, human surveillance, animal surveillance, 
scanners, and sniffers.  The TSA is also examining lessons learned from applications 
abroad (Masterson 3 Apr 2002): 
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Figure 5.17. Applications at Airports. (From: Masterson 3 Apr 2002). 
 
1. Vehicles 
Currently, there is no reliable system in place to prevent someone from driving a 
bomb-laden car up the front drive and setting it off, but vehicles outside airports are being 
closely monitored.  Packed, unattended vehicles are towed.  Lessons from abroad 
include: 
· Unattended or illegally parked vehicles are also towed in Europe and Asia. 
· Vehicle monitoring extends to entry roads at several foreign airports. 
· Tel Aviv's Ben Gurion International Airport uses checkpoints with armed 
guards and inspectors.  They inspect documents for every car. 
· At Narita International Airport in Tokyo, police and security personnel 
routinely inspect the underside of trucks and cars that arrive. 
2. Outside of Airport 
Currently, there are no security checks outside of most U.S. airports.  Curbside 
and off-site baggage check- in are again becoming available in several cities, after being 
prohibited by the FAA in the aftermath of the 9-11 attacks.  Lessons from abroad include 
(Masterson 3 Apr 2002): 
· Curbside check- in is not allowed at most foreign airports.  
· Armed undercover security officers patrol the area outside Ben Gurion 
International Airport in Tel Aviv.  They stop and question passengers, 
then alert their colleagues inside the airport to any suspicious individuals.  
· At Tokyo's Narita International Airport, police check the identification of 
every person entering the airport. 
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3. Ticket Counter 
Due to the shootings at Los Angeles International Airport on 4 Jul 2002, the TSA 
is planning on placing armed uniformed and plainclothes officers at ticket counters and 
other areas of the airport as the first line of defense against a threat (Associated Press, 6 
Jul 2002).  One of the first lines of defense at airports is confirming a person’s identity.  
This is currently being done with the use of a photo ID, such as a passport, military ID, or 
a driver’s license.   
One of the lessons learned from Italian investigations of convicted Egyptian 
terrorist, Abdelkader Mahmoud Es Sayed, also known as Abu Saleh, who headed al 
Qaeda’s document committee based in Milan, was that al Qaeda has been successful in 
conducting clandestine movement of their terrorist cells by supplying them with a variety 
of false travel documents (Crewdson, 30 Jun 2002).  To counter this, studies are being 
conducted to improve the verification of a person’s identity by using biometric smart 
cards.  Biometric Passport/Visa/Travel/ National ID card are being studied.  Already, 
local and federal agencies use ID cards and databases in issuing Social Security cards, 
driver’s licenses, passports and other identifications.  A consolidation of at least some of 
those various IDs into one national card could make it harder for terrorists and criminals 
to pass through travel and immigration gateways.  Proponents of National ID cards in the 
U.S. and UK have called for embedding biometric templates, such as finger and facial 
scans, into smart cards as part of a system (see Figure 5.18) that could be used at 
transportation centers  (Scheeres, 25 Sep 2001).  Using facial recognition technology in 
conjunction with installed CCTV cameras at airports, individuals can be checked against 
terrorist or criminal watch lists and manifests lists as they check in at a ticket counter, or 



























National ID Card Reader
 
Figure 5.18. Ubiquitous Surveillance System at a Transportation Center. 
 
Since testing and deployment of biometric technologies such as face recognition 
are supported in new airport-security bills, facial recognition systems are now being 
deployed to scan airport terminals for suspected terrorists.  A government committee, 
appointed by Transportation Secretary Norman Mineta to improve airport security, 
received briefings from the leading facial recognition vendors: Visionics and Viisage.  By 
installing hundreds of cameras at airports and connecting them via the Internet to servers 
running programs similar to Visionics' FaceIt program, airport security and other law 
enforcement agencies will try to identify terrorists and other criminals (see Figure 5.19).  
Safe-Travel is ready to launch its patented Secure Perimeter Identification System 
(SPIdS).  The system defines the process of embedding real-time biometrics on airline 
boarding passes.  The system is using fingerprint and facial-recognition systems from 
Imagis Technologies, Identix, Inc., and Digital Persona (BiometriTech.com, 5 Aug 
2002). 
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Figure 5.19. Video Surveillance with Facial Recognition. (From: Stikeman, Dec 2001). 
 
Facial recognition systems by both of the companies listed above were tested at 
various airports with mixed results.  Systems by both companies installed at Boston’s 
Logan Airport, where two of the 9-11 hijacked flights originated, worked more than 90 
percent of the time.  These positive results contrast with a report on a similar test 
conducted at Florida’s Palm Beach International Airport, which showed that a Visionics’ 
system failed to work 52.5 percent of the time.  Other tests conducted on a Visionics’ 
system at Texas’ Dallas/Fort Worth International Airport had a success rate of between 
85 to 93 percent (Reuters, 16 May 2002). 
The Aviation and Transportation Security Act requires that EDS screenings (see 
Figure 5.20) be in place for all checked baggage by Jan. 18.  A total of between 2,000 to 
3,000 detection systems need to be deployed to cover the 429 commercial airports across 
the country.  The only two companies (Invision Technologies, Inc. of Newark, California, 
and L-3 Communications Corp. of New York) that are certified by the Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA) to make the systems, do not have the production capacity to 
produce enough machines by the government deadline.  Therefore, most experts believe 
that airlines and airports likely will miss the government’s deadline.  Many airports want 
to match bags with passengers in lieu of screening bags for explosives, but ensuring that 
checked luggage is cross-referenced against passenger manifests does not deter suicide 
bombers.  Therefore, by 2003, passenger matching will no longer be allowed as an option 
for screening checked bags and ETDs are being used in place of EDSs for the time being.  
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Passengers with tickets and photo ID but no luggage to check can bypass the ticket 
counter (Johnson, 26 Mar 2002).   
 
 
Figure 5.20. Invision’s EDS at Chicago’s O’Hare International Airport. (From: 
Johnson, 26 Mar 2002). 
  
Lessons from abroad include (Masterson 3 Apr 2002): 
· Government-trained security personnel interview all passengers at Ben 
Gurion International Airport for up to 20 minutes before they even get to 
the ticket counter (see Figure 5.21). Every passenger at Narita 
International Airport can also expect to be questioned before checking in. 
Experts are recommending that a similar model be used at U.S. airports.   
 
 
Figure 5.21. Passenger Interviews at Gurion International Airport. (From: Masterson, 3 
Apr 2002). 
 
· Security officers at many European airports interview randomly selected 
passengers before allowing them to proceed to ticketing.  
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· Like many foreign airports, London’s Heathrow International Airport (the 
largest in Europe) and the Hong Kong International Airport (Asia's 
largest) inspect all checked baggage. 
· Airports in Europe and the Middle East employ baggage matching.  No 
bags are loaded onto the plane until each passenger is onboard. 
· In the wake of the attacks, some countries, such as Malaysia, are 
introducing biometric smart card in an attempt to strengthen their national 
security (Scheeres, 25 Sep 2001). 
· Iris-recognition technology is being used to expedite the passport control 
process at Schipol Airport in Amsterdam, the Netherlands as part of a pilot 
program called the “Privium Project.”  In this program, iris templates and 
passenger details are stored on a smart card, and inserted into a reader 
when passengers pass through gates.  Passengers are then required to look 
into a scanner, and their iris-developed template is compared to the iris 
template stored on the card. (Guevin, 9 Apr 2002) 
· At Heathrow Airport in London, Virgin Atlantic Airways is using 
EyeTicket Corporation’s JetStream iris recognition product line in a pilot 
program to expedite airline passenger processing at the passport control 
stage.  JFK Airport in New York City and Dulles Airport in Washington, 
D.C. are also considering JetStream trials (Guevin, 9 Apr 2002). 
Although six of the 9-11 hijackers were selected for special security screenings, 
two were singled out because of irregularities in their identification documents, and one 
was listed on ticket documents as traveling with one of the hijackers with questionable 
identification, all nine were able to successfully board their planes.  Their checked 
baggage was checked for explosives or unauthorized weapons.  They were able to board 
with their box cutters since such knifes were allowed on airplanes before 9-11 (Eggen, 2 
Mar 2002). 
4. Carry-On Baggage 
To ensure detection of any weapons, metal detectors are set on the highest levels.  
Passengers are limited to one carry-on bag and one personal item.  All bags may be 
subject to individual hand searches after screening (see Figure 5.22).  Electronic items, 
such as laptop computers and cell phone may be subjected to additional screening.  The 
same restrictions apply at foreign airports.   
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Figure 5.22. Physical Luggage Searches. (From: AP file, Julie Jacobson). 
 
5. Security Checkpoints 
At security checkpoints, biometric technologies, and video surveillance tools are 
being used to enhance the capabilities of an airport’s CCTV system and the effectiveness 
of the security personnel.  A new addition to developed biometric airport security systems 
is the National Integrated Security Suite, a collaboration of technologies from Identix, 
EDS, PwC Consulting, Sun Microsystems, and Oracle.  The system is already deployed 
at Israel’s Ben Gurion Airport and has processed about 1.5 million passengers since 1998 
(see Figure 5.23).  The suite includes: 
· Known Traveler – a voluntary passenger registration system.  Passengers 
can register using the Internet or at an airport kiosk by filling out a 
questionnaire and agreeing to a background check.  Once cleared to be on 
the program, the registered passengers are directed to an airline affinity 
club, where they receive a smart card with an electronic template of their 
iris and fingerprint.  This smart card is then used to expedite check- in by 
authenticating the “known” passengers. 
· Secure Employee – pre-employment background investigations are issued 
for each potential airport employee or contractor.  Each applicant is 





Figure 5.23. EDS’s Known Traveler kiosk at Israel’s Ben Gurion Airport. (From: 
Electronic Data Systems, 2002). 
 
Since new, sophisticated non-metallic explosives designed to evade current 
explosive detection systems can be hidden inside shoes and belts or the frame of a carry-
on bag, new scanners are being tested at airports.  At Orlando International Airport in 
Florida, passengers can volunteer to go through security procedures designed to test a 
series of new devices the government is testing.  One of the new technology products 
being tested, Rapiscan’s Secure 1000 (see Figure 5.24), uses a weak x-ray technology 
similar to the body scanner that was discussed in Chapter IV.  Another new technology 
being tested is Barringer Ionscan Sentinel sniffer, also discussed in Chapter IV 
(Masterson, 3 Apr 2002). 
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Figure 5.24. Rapiscan’s Secure 1000. (From: Wilson, p. 53). 
The Department of Energy’s (DOE) Pacific Northwest National Laboratory is 
looking to employ holographic imaging technology called the 3-D Body Holo Scanner at 
airports and other locations.  The scanner does not depend on ionizing radiation and can 
identify concealed weapons made of composite materials, plastic explosives, and liquids.  
The FAA funded the research project, and a prototype was built in 1992.  The project 
stalled because the lab lacked a commercial partner to market and manufacture the 
scanners.  The events of 9-11 have revived the interest in this type of technology and 
deployments of this technology are likely.  SafeView is licensing the lab’s holo-scanning 
technology.  The technology is based on radar and an advanced computerized system that 
allows 3-D image reconstruction.  The advantage of using radar waves is that they 
penetrate clothing but are reflected by skin and other objects hidden under clothing.  The 
3-D images are generated by measuring the time difference of the reflected waves that 
return to the detector.  Algorithms are then used to illuminate concealed objects.  
Estimates on the initial costs for holo scanners are as high as $100,000 per unit (Paulson, 
5 Aug 2002). 
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Lessons from abroad included (Masterson 3 Apr 2002): 
· In addition to checking boarding passes and identification, airport 
personnel at Ben Gurion apply a security sticker to each passenger’s 
boarding pass.  The sticker prevents the passenger from re-entering the 
check- in area and is required during the boarding process.  
· In several European and Asian countries, passengers can expect to be 
patted down if they set off the metal detector. 
6. Waiting Areas 
FAA agents are roaming airports with bomb-sniffing dogs.  TSA security 
personnel are patrolling concourses, checking for unattended bags and watching for 
weapons.  Lessons from abroad include: 
· Armed guards patrol waiting areas of European and Asian airports.  
· In addition to surveillance, Ben Gurion furnishes waiting areas with an eye 
toward passenger safety.  
7. On-Board the Plane  
The number of armed federal air marshals has increased since 9-11, giving top 
priority to nonstop, long-distance flights.  Air marshals currently fly on select flights, 
including all flights in or out of Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport.  
Transponders, the devices that enable ground controllers to track a plane's flight path, can 
no longer be made inoperable from the cockpit.  
The Transportation Department, with support from some in Congress, is 
considering video cameras that provide cockpit and cabin views (see Figure 5.25).  
United Airlines is conducting a six-month test of Rockwell Collins’ cabin surveillance 
system.  The system feeds images from as many as 32 cameras to hand-held computers in 




Figure 5.25. Airplane Cockpit and Cabin Cameras. (From: Wald, 30 May 2002). 
Images can also be beamed back into the cabin and picked up by pocket 
computers.  This feature would allow air marshals to obtain the camera images using a 
PDA.  The system can also be configured to record and play back the last few seconds, 
and can be set up to beam images of the cabin and cockpit to the ground. Honeywell is 
developing a similar system, which has fewer cameras but has infrared capability (Wald, 
30 May 2002).   
Animal surveillance is also playing an important role in ensuring that explosives 
are not being loaded into airplanes.  When available, canines are being used to inspect 
airplanes and baggage (see Figure 5.26).     
 
  
Figure 5.26. Animal Surveillance. (From: USA Today, 8 Feb 2002, Joel Salcido and 






8. Ramp Access 
The aviation regional hub system has millions of connections a year. However, 
bag matching is not required for connecting flights.  This loophole led to the 1988 Pan 
Am bombing over Lockerbie, Scotland.  A terrorist could gain access to the aircraft or 
baggage and slip explosives into the cargo bay, since they are not re-screened for the 
subsequent legs of their flights.  Currently, there is no standard way of tracking lost ramp 
passes or ground crew identification.  Therefore, many countries, including the United 
States, are investigating biometric smart cards as a solution (Masterson 3 Apr 2002).  The 
Aviation and Transportation Security Act of 2001 calls for upgraded access control 
systems for secure areas at airports, and the best way to ensure that only authorized 
personnel gain access to secured areas is with the use of biometric technologies.  The 
challenge will be to choose pick the best biometric technologies that fit the application. 
9. Dangerous Goods  
Items such as manicure sets, aerosol cans, and corkscrews are now considered 
possible weapons. These items are now required to be packed in checked- in luggage and 
are screened for at security checkpoints.  Similar restrictions have been in place 
worldwide since the Sept. 11 attacks. 
10. Employee Screening 
Bombs can be slipped onto or carried aboard baggage handling equipment or can 
be left in bags at baggage claim.  A would-be suicide attacker, using an acquired 
baggage-handling uniform, could load a deadly bag with others on a cart and move with 
little interference through a terminal.  The Aviation and Transportation Security Act of 
2001 mandates fingerprint background checks on all airline and airport employees. 
The TSA now oversees aviation security rather than the airline industry and 
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA).  By November, the TSA is scheduled to have its 
30,000-strong workforce fully in place at more than 420 airports across the nation.  The 
screeners will have to be U.S. citizens, fluent in English, with a background check and 
100 hours of training under their belts.  The FAA is piloting the use of smart cards in the 
Transportation Department by issuing cards to 50,000 FAA employees and contract 
workers (Vasishtha, p. 9).  The new TSA is planning to use smart card authentication 
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system that use biometric identifiers such as fingerprints, iris scans, and encoded 
photographs to authenticate airline workers such as pilots and flight attendants (GCN, Jun 
2002).  Lockheed Martin Corporation has been contracted by TSA to integrate security at 
airports ($490 Million) and to train TSA employees in the techniques of screening airport 
passengers ($105 Million) (Hasson, 1 Jul 2002).  Identix’s live scan systems, which can 
be directly linked to the FBI IAFIS system, will be adopted by over 100 airports to aid in 
complying with the Aviation and Transportation Security Act of 2001 (Identix.com, 
2002).  Six Identix Live Scan TouchPrint 2000 Applicant Fingerprint Systems have been 
deployed in Chicago’s O’Hare International Airport, the St. Petersburg-Clearwater 
International Airport in Florida, Lincoln Airport in Nebraska, Des Moines International 
Airport in Iowa, and Springfield Airport in Missouri (Guevin, 9 Apr 2002). 
Lessons from abroad include (Masterson 3 Apr 2002): 
· Employees at most foreign airports are required to be citizens of the 
country they work in.  
· The Israeli government trains all baggage screeners at Ben Gurion 
International Airport.  Japan requires 150 hours of classroom training for 
its baggage screeners. France requires 60 hours. 
Information gathered from papers seized in Abu Zubaydah’s hideaway in 
Faisalabad, Pakistan, included attacks on tankers and  cruise ships (Reuters, 1 Jul 2002).  
Therefore, security at other transportation centers should not be overlooked.  Security at 
cruise ship and bus terminals should also be strengthened.  There is also a concern that 
terrorist could use some of the 200,000 general aviation aircraft (private planes) in the 
United States to carry explosives or scatter chemical and biological materials (Associated 
Press, 6 Jul 2002). 
C. CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION 
1. Terrorist Threat 
Since al Qaeda will likely strike where they believe we are vulnerable, our 
cyberspace infrastructure is ripe for attack.  Intelligence gathered from surveillances of 
chat rooms, interrogations of al Qaeda captives, and terrorist laptops found in 
Afghanistan and Pakistan have revealed al Qaeda’s interest in conducting coordinated, 
conventional cyber attacks.  One al Qaeda laptop found in Afghanistan had made 
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multiple visits to a French site (run by the Anonymous Society) that offers a “Sabotage 
Handbook” with sections on tools of the trade, planning a hit, switchgear and 
instrumentation, anti-surveillance methods, and advanced techniques.  Computers in 
Islamic chat rooms linked to al Qaeda had access to cyber tools that can be used to search 
out networked computers, scan for security flaws, and exploit them to gain entry or full 
command.  The most significant find by U.S. investigators was digitally logged evidence 
that al Qaeda operators had spent time on sites that offer software and programming 
instructions for the digital switches that run power, water, transport, and communications 
grids (Gellman, 27 Jun 2002).  
These unveiled and unsettling signs of al Qaeda’s aims and skills in cyberspace 
mean that terrorists are at the threshold of using the Internet as a direct instrument for 
terrorism.  Al Qaeda is suspected of having already tapped into some utility company 
computers in Northern California in an effort to find vulnerabilities.  Unknown browsers 
originating from the Middle East and South Asia were detected conducting suspicious 
surveillance on digital systems that manage Bay Area utilities and government offices 
during the fall of 2001.  The FBI, working with Lawrence Livermore National 
Laboratory, has traced trails of broader reconnaissance operations on various sites 
nationwide.  The reconnaissance operations took place at the meeting points of computers 
and the physical structures they control.  Routed through telecommunications switches in 
Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, and Pakistan, the browsers studied nuclear power plants, gas 
facilities, electrical generation and transmission, water storage and distribution, and 
emergency telephone systems.  U.S. analysts believe that by disabling or taking 
command of nuclear power plant subsystems, of the floodgates in a dam, for example, or 
of substations handling 300,000 volts of electric power, an intruder could use virtual tools 
to cause havoc in the real world, especially if it is conducted in conjunction with physical 
attacks.  A conventional al Qaeda might be followed by cyber attacks to disrupt 
emergency first responders, fire mains, and power to hospitals (Gellman, 27 Jun 2002). 
The risks of cyber-terrorism, until recently, were regarded as remote, but it is now 
commanding the attention of various government agencies.  A security vulnerability in a 
data transmission standard Abstract Syntax Notification (ASN.1) discovered in February 
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2002 could have been exploited to bring down telephone networks and halt air traffic 
control communications.  In a book- length Electricity Infrastructure Security Assessment, 
the industry concluded on 7 Jan 2002, “It may not be possible to provide sufficient 
security when using the Internet for power system control.”  To provide the needed 
security, power companies need to build a parallel private network for power system 
control.  Digital control devices called distributed control systems (DCS) and supervisory 
control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems connected to the Internet can be 
exploited.  These devices are used to collect measurements, throw railway switches, close 
circuit breakers, or adjust valves in the pipes that carry water, oil, and gas.  Intruders have 
been able to assemble a detailed map of each system.  They have also been able to 
intercept and change SCADA commands without detection (Gellman, 27 Jun 2002). 
Two examples showing the vulnerabilities of SCADA systems include: 
· In 1998, a 12-year-old hacker, exploring his cyber skills, broke into the 
computer system that runs Arizona’s Roosevelt Dam.  He did not know or 
care, but federal authorities said he had complete command of the SCADA 
system controlling the dam’s massive floodgates. 
· In Queensland, Australia, on 23 Apr 2000, police arrested Vitek Boden, 
48, who had used commercially available equipment and software to turn 
his vehicle into a pirate command center for sewage treatment along 
Australia’s Sunshine Coast.  From his car, he remotely controlled 46 
leakage events of hundreds of thousands of gallons of sewage into parks, 
rivers, and the grounds of a Hyatt Regency hotel (Gellman, 27 Jun 2002). 
Nearly identical systems run oil utilities, gas utilities, and many manufacturing 
plants throughout the world.  They are also used in the generation, transmission, and 
distribution of electrical power.  To counter this threat, President Bush has launched a 
top-priority research program at the Livermore, Sandia, and Los Alamos labs to improve 
safeguards in the estimated 3 million SCADA systems in use.  “Red Teams” of mock 
intruders from the Energy Department’s four national laboratories have been able to 
devised eight scenarios for SCADA attack on an electrical power grid that work.  
Eighteen such exercises have been conducted to date against large regional utilities with 
alarming success (Gellman, 27 Jun 2002). 
We can no longer ignore the amount of attention al Qaeda is paying to the Internet 
or underestimate their capabilities and ambitions.  They have spent time mapping our 
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systems and vulnerabilities.  In February 2002, the CIA issued a revised Directorate of 
Intelligence Memorandum, which stated that al Qaeda had “far more interest” in cyber-
terrorism than previously believed and had contemplated the use of hackers for hire to 
speed the acquisition of capabilities (Gellman, 27 Jun 2002).  To counter future 
reconnaissance operations, surveillance programs (ECHELON, Carnivore), cyber 
forensics and other tools, such as “honey pots,” need to be used.  EDS is offering a 
computer program that tracks cyber-attacks over time and shows any relationships among 
the attacks (Hasson, 1 Jul 2002).  These tools could be invaluable tools to detect and 
gather intelligence on terrorist’s future targets and actions.  Biometric technologies 
should be used to control access to both public and private sensitive critical infrastructure 
networks.  In June 2002, Sprint, one of two vendors on the General Services 
Administration (GSA) FTS 2001 telecommunications contract, added a number of 
products and services to preserve vital data and operational communications, such as 
video services and faster connections in the event of a catastrophic attack that knocked 
out communications (Hasson, 1 Jul 2002). 
2. Recent Developments 
Since 90 percent of the country’s critical infrastructure is privately owned, 
government analysis and coordination is extending to the private sector.  Legislation is 
being introduced to increase information sharing and threat analysis for critical 
infrastructure (CBSNews.com, 23 Jul 2002).  To date there have been additional steps in 
protecting our critical infrastructure in this increasingly interconnected world (GCN, 24 
Jun 2002): 
· DOE’s National Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis Center is 
collecting 10 years of research from Los Alamos and Sandia national 
laboratories’ supercomputers to develop response plans to bio-terrorism, 
transportation, war games, economic consequence analysis, and 
infrastructure interdependency. 
· GSA’s Federal Computer Incident Response Center, working with 
Carnegie Mellon University’s CERT Coordination Center, is studying a 
pilot program to use sensors in firewalls and intrusion detection systems to 
analyze intrusions and “hacks.”  Information will be collected 
government-wide and analyzed for trends.  Initial pilot deployment will 
begin during Fall 2002 at four to five agencies with expansion nationwide 
within a year.  GSA is also having a Request For Proposal (RFP) for 
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vendors to compile and market government-developed security tools to 
government agencies.  The center also plans to develop a knowledge 
management portal that lets security managers access tools and services 
and communicate in a secure environment and link to a security patch 
Website that Science Applications International Corporation is 
developing. 
· Justice Department’s National Infrastructure Protection Center is 
developing: 
· Information Sharing and Analysis Centers to aid in identifying 
critical infrastructures such as water, financials services, 
transportation, health care, electric power, IT, and 
telecommunications, and provide threat assessments on each. 
· Data Mining and Data Analysis Project to be able to retrieve real-
time incident data from multiple, analyze the data, and generate 
incident reports. 
· A large government- industry partnership to share information 
about system intrusions and other critical infrastructure protection. 
· A Key Asset Initiative to prepare a comprehensive database of 
critical infrastructure assets in the United States.  The database 
would identify and protect information on more than 5,700 entities 
vital to national security to protect critical infrastructure against 
physical and cyber-attacks. 
D. FINANCE 
1. Financial Surveillance to Detect Terrorist Funding 
Some of the nation’s largest banks are installing new software products, which 
can screen new and current clients for potential terrorist ties.  The software can also 
examine millions of daily transactions for suspicious patterns of behavior, such as 
indications of money laundering and terrorist funding.  Using the Treasury Department’s 
secure online Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), financial institutions 
can report any suspicious account activity or customer behavior.  As of 5 Jun 2002, 
suspected terrorists’ assets totaling more than $115 million have been frozen worldwide 
(Barrett, 12 Jun 2002).  
E. HEALTH CARE 
1. Health Care Information Systems  
Given that the outbreak of disease may now be the result of deliberate and 
widespread attempts to infect rather than natural spread of infection, government and 
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health experts have recognized a need for rapid (near-real time) surveillance and 
detection of disease.  This has led many universities and hospitals to develop systems to 
collect and analyze disease data immediately at hospitals and emergency rooms as a 
patient is admitted: 
· A system called Real-Time Outbreak and Disease Surveillance (RODS), 
financed by the National Library of Medicine, is being developed at the 
Center for Biomedical Informatics at the University of Pittsburgh.  It 
receives patient information, such as patient’s chief complaint, reported 
health problems, patient’s age, time, and date of visit, gender, and ZIP 
Code.  Personal information, such as name, address, and social security 
number is not shared to protect privacy.  The information is obtained as 
soon as the patients are admitted, through a private computer network 
from 15 Western Pennsylvania hospital emergency departments.  The 
system looks for similarities between new reports with those already 
stored in the central database, and uses geographic information software to 
reveal any geographical patterns behind the surveillance information.  To 
aid in detecting any incidents of bio-terrorism during the Winter Olympics 
in Salt Lake City in February 2002, RODS was used to connect 30 area 
hospitals and walk- in clinics.  Based on the number of patients who 
showed up with respiratory complaints during this period, the system was 
able to detect an influenza outbreak (Greenman, 4 Jul 2002).  
· Children’s Hospital Project in Boston, financed by the federal Department 
of Health and Human Services, is another real-time surveillance program 
that is being developed.  It monitors complaints at Children’s Hospital and 
neighboring Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center.  Several area hospitals 
are expected to participate in the project in the coming year (Greenman, 4 
Jul 2002). 
· The New York City Health Department has a medical early warning 
system, which links emergency rooms, 911 dispatch facilities, and 
pharmacies throughout the city (Walsh, p. 16). 
· The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s Health Alert Network 
(HAN), a secure e-mail and fax alert system, is being considered as the 
basis for a national medical intelligence database (Walsh, p. 1). 
· The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) is developing 
Metropolitan Medical Response Systems (MMRS) to enable cities to 
coordinate emergency first responders, public health systems and hospitals 
to better respond to the needs of the community during a crisis situation 





2. Wireless Priority Access Service 
To give first responders and other emergency preparedness officials priority 
access to wireless service dur ing disasters, a DOD’s National Communications System 
has been running since April 2002 in New York City and Washington D.C.  VoiceStream 
is the program’s carrier, and plans are to expand the program nationwide (GCN, Jun 
2002). 
3. Information Security 
To meet recent government legislation surrounding the integrity, confidentiality, 
and privacy data of patient data, the healthcare industry is restructuring current IT 
infrastructure and methods.  Biometric technologies are being used to implement security 
mechanisms to secure stored or in-transit patient confidential information, to protect 
against disclosure of patient data, and to enable only authorized personnel to view patient 
records (Indentix, 2002).   
4. Physical Security 
Biometric technologies are being employed or are being considered for use at 
many hospitals and laboratories that contain hazardous chemicals or materials.  These 
systems also allow for audit and positive ID of individuals who enter and exit these areas. 
F. LAW ENFORCEMENT AND INTELLIGENCE 
1. Criminal Background Checks 
A bigger challenge than settling on a specific biometric identifier is putting 
together an enterprise-wide system for storing, accessing, and retrieving biometric 
templates in a timely matter.  The Federal Bureau of Investigation has been developing a 
nationwide digital data network in order to determine the identification of individuals and 
to match it with records already on file.  This network will provide quick access to a new 
integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System (AFIS) and will speed up suspect 
identification (I/O Software, Jun 2002).  A similar network is also being considered in the 
U.S. for children fingerprints in order to identify a child (whose identity might have been 
changed after abduction) by comparing the fingerprints against a national database of 
missing children’s fingerprints (Polemi, p. 33). 
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2. Mugshot/Booking Systems  
Imagis Technologies and ORION Scientific Systems are collaborating in an effort 
to deploy a digital image network based on Imagis’ ID-2000 facial-recognition software 
and its centralized digital booking system called the Computerized Arrest and Booking 
System (CABS).  All enrolled digital facial images and suspect information is stored in 
the system’s shared database.  The data store in the centralized database can be accessed 
at any time and from any location (Guevin, April 9, 2002). 
3. Mobile Identification 
Identix has patented wireless identification systems that use fingerprints and/or 
photographs and allow police officers to access criminal databases.  These systems could 
be configured to link with FBI and CIA watch lists to catch any suspected terrorist who 
may be stopped for a traffic violation.   
Identix’s IBIS system (see Figure 5.10 above) is being employed at the West 
Valley city police department near Salt Lake City, UT.  The IBIS system will interface 
with legacy law enforcement databases.  It will enable field officers to capture forensic-
quality fingerprints and facial images on handheld devices and submit them through a 
cellular connection.  The objective is to compare and match against criminal and fugitive 
records in AFIS and other available systems.  If a match is not made, the files are 
discarded from the system.  The police department is using six mobile units with the IBIS 
server residing with the Ontario police department in California.  West Valley’s criminal 
fingerprint files and criminal files have been added to the server in California and will be 
wirelessly accessed (Guevin, April 9, 2002). 
Visionics Corporation’s IBIS mobile identification system is being installed at 
Hennepin County sheriff’s office in Minnesota, and the Redlands, California police 
department.  A handheld Remote Data Terminal is used to capture photographs and 
forensic-quality fingerprint images or magnetic stripe data.  The information is first 
transmitted wirelessly to a laptop in the squad car.  It is then transmitted to a central IBIS 
server through the police radio communication system or via cellular communications. 
Once the information has reached the central server, it is processed and transferred to one 
or more AFIS databases for fingerprint matching.  Positive matches alert the Remote 
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Data Terminal.  If there is no match, fingerprint and photo files are discarded (Guevin, 
April 9, 2002). 
4. Facial Surveillance 
More and more law enforcement departments across the country are lobbying 
their city and state legislatures to use facial recognition surveillance technologies.  An 
example is the Virginia Beach Police Department, which is installing Identix 
Corporation’s facial recognition system with 13 CCTV cameras that will monitor the 
beach area for criminals, missing persons, and runaways (CardTechnology.com, 3 Jul 
2002).   
5. Electronic Surveillance 
As the U.S. and its allies continue to hunt down terrorist cells throughout the 
world, al Qaeda, Hamas, Hezbollah, and other militant Muslim groups are increasingly 
turning to the Internet to raise funds, recruit, and coordinate their activities.  The FBI, 
CIA and other agencies need to continue to search e-mail traffic for specific senders, 
recipients, and keywords.  They must monitor the Web for rouge websites, such as 
Jihadunspun.net, Azzam.com, Alneda.com, Almuhajiroun.com, and Qassam.net.  The 
challenge facing agencies is that most of the information on these websites is written in 
Arabic, encrypted, and hidden in digital photographs.  The militant groups also regularly 
change the addresses of their websites to hinder intelligence surveillance efforts.  They 
use computers in libraries and cyber cafes (Kelley, 10 Jul 2002).  Systems such as 
Echelon and Carnivore can aid in electronic surveillance efforts.  Magic Lantern can aid 
in recording keystrokes on targeted computers at these locations, thus circumventing 
encryption (O’Hanlon, Summer 2002).   
6. Information Systems  
The problem facing federal agencies is not that there is not enough information or 
intelligence.  It is that they have too much and have not fully integrated effective 
repositories of data that can be shared.  Intelligence agencies also do not have enough 
interpreters and analyzers to look at the vast amount of information in a timely matter.  
“Actionable” intelligence is what is needed for the CIA, FBI, and NSA to compile the 
current daily picture of terrorist threats.  According to FBI Director Robert S. Mueller III,  
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It would be nice if…you put into our computer system a request for 
anything relating to flight schools, for instance, and have every report in 
the last 10 years that…mentions flight schools or flight training and the 
like kicked out…We do not have the capability now…We have to have 
that capability. (Miller, 13 Jun 2002) 
To detect terrorist operations before they occur, U.S. agencies must use 
information effectively—collecting, collating, analyzing, sharing, and then deploying it 
quickly and in a useful form.  Although considerable resources have gone to ensure that 
these tasks were conducted prior to 9-11, serious weaknesses exist that must be 
addressed.  Prior to 9-11, information strategy lacked an overall architecture.  The need 
for strong human intelligence assets was somewhat ignored.  Massive amounts of 
information was available but was of little value because it was not analyzed promptly 
due to lack of translators or was not shared in a useful way.  In addition, agencies did not 
collate and promptly combine raw shared data to develop a meaningful picture.  To 
correct some of these weaknesses both the public and private sectors are improving their 
abilities to collect and analyze data with the use of collaborative tools and data mining 
agents. 
a. Information Management and Database Issues 
The federal government has more than a dozen terrorist watch lists and at 
least 55 databases, which contain watch list information.  However, two of the 9-11 
hijackers were on a CIA watch list, but the airlines had no access to government 
databases that would have alerted them of the two men (Miller, 13 Jun 2002).  The truth 
is that the FBI and the other government departments and agencies have an uneven blend 
of antiquated computer systems that require upgrading.  The FBI has over 35 separate 
investigative database applications that they use (Miller, 13 Jun 2002).  Component 
agencies, such as the Secret Service, has a mix of Windows, Unix, and Linux platforms, 
plus multiple vendors’ database management systems and telecommunication platforms.  
FEMA and the Coast Guard run mostly Microsoft Windows NT environments that 
require near-term upgrade because of NT’s phase-out.  In contrast, the Border Patrol has 
a secure intranet and a centralized Oracle database.  Most federal law enforcement 
databases cannot communicate with each other.  Local and state databases also cannot 
link and share information with federal, state or local agencies. 
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Fixing information management and database issues are the corner stones 
of President Bush’s proposal to create the new Homeland Security Department that, using 
his words, “will review intelligence and law enforcement information from all agencies 
of government and produce a single daily picture of threats against our homeland (Miller, 
13 Jun 2002).”  Almost every new federal initiative for homeland security has involved 
an increase on storage, with a particular emphasis on the management of large 
information databases.  Agencies are exploring more efficient ways to manage the 
increasing volumes of data and to make it accessible throughout the new Homeland 
Security Department and associated agencies.   
President George W. Bush’s Homeland Security proposal calls for a single 
enterprise architecture to eliminate duplication (Menke, p. 1).  Seat management and 
outsourcing are emerging as the keys to transforming the systems of seven dissimilar 
agencies into the enterprise architecture that is envisioned by the President: the 
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS); the Secret Service; the Customs Service; 
the Animal, Plant, and Health Inspection Service (APHIS); the Coast Guard; the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA); and the Transportation Security 
Administration (TSA).  Some agencies, such as the INS, have taken steps in this 
direction.  Other agencies, such as the Customs Service and the Secret Service, which 
have built their IT environments piecemeal, will have more difficulty going in this 
direction (Menke, p. 12). 
Once established, the new unified enterprise architecture will become the 
first large-scale test of the Office of Management and Budget’s initiative to unify and 
simplify government systems (Menke, p. 1).  The biggest challenge facing the Homeland 
Security Department is determining how to set up its databases.  Choices include the 
development of a multi-terabyte data warehouse, enable streaming of multiple data 
sources through a Web portal interface, or enable querying of the component agencies’ 
existing databases (Menke, p. 1).  The new enterprise architecture must accommodate 
disparate databases and legacy applications, linking communities within and outside 
government via standards-based technology (Jackson, p. 12).   
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b. Counter-Terrorism Information Technology (CTIT) 
Technology exists to link existing databases or to create new databases 
that can be mindful of privacy and constitutional concerns (Miller, 13 Jun 2002).  As an 
example, software similar to that used by credit card companies could be used to track the 
movements of suspected terrorists by tracking their credit card purchases, residences, and 
communications.  The Independent Task Force on America’s Response to Terrorism of 
the Council on Foreign Relations proposed a Counter-Terrorism Information Technology 
(CTIT) system that uses commercially available techniques from the private sector, 
including database merge-and-search techniques that are currently used by many Internet 
applications (Lodal, 1 Apr 2002).  The commercial sector has already developed and 
fielded many applications that integrate vast amounts of information from multiple data 
points, scan this information based on “suspicion rules,” and generate rapid alerts based 
on set parameters.  CTIT can be directly translated from the existing civilian applications 
(see Table 5.2):  
 
Technique  Commercial Application Counter-Terrorism Application 
Touchpoints Web site visit, call center, point of sale, 
customer service call 
Visa interview, border 




Web click, items bought, quality complaint to 
customer service 
Visa type, border location, 
school name, ticket 
destination, date, and class 
Data 
maintained 
Internet service provider, on-line account 
activity, store purchased items 
Current residence, 
educational courses, travel 




Credit card X owned by internet ID holder Y 
who shops as buyer Z 
Visa holder X attending 
school as student Y traveling 
as credit card holder Z 
Pattern alert 
rule 
If customer XYZ has higher than average on-
line purchases of video equipment and has 
claimed more than 2 cash refunds at multiple 
stores within 24 hours, and is standing at a 
customer service return desk with another 
video camera return, page a security guard. 
If foreign student XYZ has 
missed more than 2 weeks of 
aviation class and has used a 
new credit card to book more 
than 2 plane trips to the same 
city in 1st class, email the 
school and the district FBI 
office. 
 




These applications can be leveraged to enable government agencies to 
track, address, and prevent terrorist activities (Lodal, 1 Apr 2002).  A system that uses the 
CTIT model (see Figure 5.27) could bring together members of the various federal, state, 
and local communities to address the effects of information sharing on homeland 
security.  It would meet the objectives of gathering, sharing, interpreting, and presenting 
information across the intelligence and law enforcement communities at federal, state, 
and local levels.   
 
 
Figure 5.27. Architecture of the CTIT. (From: Lodal, 1 Apr 2002). 
 
The major components of the CTIT solution are (Lodal, 1 Apr 2002): 
· Adapter module – provides the means for agencies and civilian agents to 
give periodic data or information, and to forward messages presenting 
interesting events to the CTIT environment, in a common data format such 
as XML.  
· Integration Hub - provides the ability to log, route, transform messages 
from the Adapters, and calls on the Interaction Manager to evaluate events 
in real time and inserts the events into the real time data store.   
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· Data Warehouse – provides real time, integrated data store of events from 
all participating agencies and organizations.  
· Analytic Engines – use data-mining software to analyze CTIT data and 
develop models.  Models of high-risk scenarios are constructed of events 
and their surrounding context. Multiple analytic environments are 
maintained to support various organizations that have access to the Data 
Warehouse.  
· Interaction Manager – uses an inference based rules engine to evaluate 
events as they occur and executes data-mining modules against context 
data within the Data Warehouse, as well as current event data.  It issues 
alerts to specific client groups in the event of suspicious outcomes and 
high-risk events. 
c. Other Developments 
There have been several recent developments within the law enforcement 
and intelligence communities to address data mining, collaboration, and information 
sharing: 
· EDS and Public Safety Systems are collaborating to develop a product 
called Ramsafe, which can provide virtual blueprints of buildings for 
SWAT teams in hostage situations.  It will also be able to analyze 
biological or chemical attack scenarios, how many people are likely to be 
affected, and provide the location of the nearest hospitals (Hasson, 1 Jul 
2002). 
· National Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis Center, in conjunction 
with Los Alamos National Laboratory and Sandia National Laboratories, 
is developing intelligence assessment tools that include high-end modeling 
software (Menke, p. 12). 
· Currently, a client-server system, called GENOA, is being used by 
agencies to collaborate and share information on issues relating to 
Homeland Security.  
· As one of the first to steps taken to begin the reorganization and 
revamping of government systems, the Office of Homeland Security 
identified databases from federal departments and agencies to determine 
which have information pertaining to areas such as border control, bio-
terrorism prevention, and emergency response (Miller, 13 Jun 2002). 
· The FBI and CIA are providing airlines with “no-fly” lists of suspected 
terrorists. 
· Lately, al Qaeda has stressed the use of encrypted email messages, and 
websites, some of which were being hosted from locations in the tribal 
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areas of Pakistan.  This has made it even more important for agencies to 
develop and use electronic surveillance tools. (Gunaratna, p. 35) 
· Problems still persist on “names” of suspected terrorists in current watch 
lists (Diamond, 1 Jul 2002): 
· Variations in spelling of an Arab name. 
· Conflicting methods are used by agencies to translate and spell the 
same name. 
· Antiquated computer software applications at some agencies do 
not allow searches for approximate spelling of names. 
· Large volume searches result from common Arabic names, such as 
Muhammed, Shiek, Atef, Atta, al-Haji and al-Ghamdi. 
· Some names in databases are just nicknames and not family 
names. 
This problem could be addressed, however by using biometric templates 
(if available) as part of the watch-list database. 
Privacy watchers are monitoring all biometric and surveillance 
developments closely, concerned for possible abuses as government may seek to tap into 
private databases containing credit data, health information, travel records, and other 
personal data, along with video from private surveillance systems.  These concerns are 
being heightened by new FBI guidelines that will permit agents to more freely conduct 
surveillance at political rallies and religious gatherings, surf the Internet, and mine 
commercial databases for information (Miller, 13 Jun 2002).  However, in this new war 
all tools are needed since the old rules provided terrorist with a “competitive advantage.”  
As Dr. John Arquilla, Associate Professor for the Department of Defense Analysis at 
Naval Postgraduate School has stated, “our adversaries have learned to ‘ride the rails’ of 
our advanced technology, and our free ways, to strike us.” (Arquilla, 4 Apr 2002).  It is 
now time for us to make it more difficult for them to maneuver, plan, and execute further 
attacks by implementing advanced surveillance and biometric tools.  As al Qaeda 
continues to seek new alliances with other extremist groups in order to create “super 
cells,” our biggest challenge is and will continue to be targeting information flows.  It is 
paramount to continue to listen to communications to acquire intelligence and warnings.  
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Rouge states may be reaching out to terrorist networks (Arquilla, p. 352).  These rouge 
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VI. PRIVACY, SOCIETAL ISSUES, AND EMERGING 
LEGISLATION 
A. THE HARD NEW REALITIES 
The research presented in this chapter will speak to the evolving social 
discussions, initiatives, and legislation concerning employment of surveillance, biometric 
recognition and other tracking/profiling technologies.  Though the privacy hardliners 
have been crying foul for some time about “Big Brother” eroding our civil liberties, we 
are increasingly beginning to see that ubiquitous surveillance and biometric technologies 
may very well be the answer to actually protecting and preserving our rights—the right to 
safety and security in a growingly hostile world.  September 11th completely changed the 
way we view the world.  One of the findings is that people are far less concerned about 
what the private sector is doing with information and far more concerned about what the 
government is doing to keep them safe (Delio, 8 Nov 2001).  The following Harris Poll 
taken in late September 2001, Table 6.1, reflects public sentiment that law enforcement’s 
use of surveillance is finding more acceptance even as it affects some civil liberties. 
There should not be any doubt among the general population that, even before the 
terrorist attacks of 9-11, we have been subjected to surveillance in public places in our 
daily lives.  Surveillance has become a necessary presence in a society whose population 
is increasing—and with it, the rise of crime, and other unlawful activities.  One can argue 
that the monitoring of citizens is a necessary invasion of privacy for the sake of safety 
and preservation of good order in society.  Though we are not under constant surveillance 
yet in public, people can anticipate the day where every area of public life from work, to 
shopping, to commuting and leisure activities may be under surveillance.  It is a natural 
reaction for people to feel that their civil liberties are being threatened.  The CEO of Sun 
Microsystems, Scott McNealy, told reporters in 1999, “You already have zero privacy.  
Get over it” (Amato, p. 60).  By mere observation, we have to assume he is correct.  The 
numerous cameras in operation today monitor financial business areas, ATMs, 
department stores, parking lots, buildings, access points, highways, railways, and 
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bridges—one can think of a myriad of places a camera may be watching.  And those are 
just the cameras that you can see.   
 
 
Table 6.1. Harris Poll on Surveillance Use in Law Enforcement. (From: Sullivan, 14 
Nov 2001). 
 
There is no finer example today of a society under surveillance than the United 
Kingdom, which has nearly 2.5 million closed circuit television (CCTV) cameras 
installed; more per capita than any other nation (Big Brother, 13 Aug 2001).  Never in 
history has any nation pursued ubiquitous surveillance to such an extent as the UK.  
Closed circuit cameras dot the nation like a spider web of watchful eyes, keeping 
vigilance over an active populous.  The growth has been so profound that the network has 
been dubbed as “the fifth utility” —joining gas, water, electric and telephone (Amato, p. 
59).  This public surveillance project began in 1986 on an industrial estate near the town 
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of King's Lynn, approximately 100 kilometers north of London.  Prior to the installation 
of three video cameras, a total of 58 crimes had been reported on the estate.  None was 
reported over the next two years.  The U.K. Home Office, the government department 
responsible for internal affairs in England and Wales, is starting construction of what 
promises to be the world’s biggest road and vehicle surveillance network, a 
comprehensive system of cameras, vehicle and driver databases, and microwave and 
phone-based communications links that will be able to identify and track the movements 
of vehicles nearly nationwide (Amato, p. 59).  In 1999, 500 British towns and cities had 
public CCTV systems installed, up from 74 in 1996 (Graham, Issue 3, 2000).  Britain is 
thick with surveillance infrastructure; it has become a ubiquitous network that is all too 
often taken for granted (Graham, Issue 3, 2000).  The trend for monitoring and 
surveillance is only increasing, especially in light of new world concerns in combating 
terrorism and preventing the use of weapons of mass destruction.  So it is natural to see 
statistics that reflect people being willing to sacrifice some of there privacy in trade for 
more safety and security.  You only need to be a victim of crime or a personal attack once 
to see the benefits of prevention, detection, and early notification, which surveillance can 
bring.  British CCTV surveillance is now quickly spreading from main towns and cities 
to smaller and more remote rural areas, primarily because of citizen concerns of crime 
overspill from the more populous urban areas (Graham, Issue 3, 2000).  Another catalyst 
for the spread of surveillance has been the natural linkage between CCTV, television 
news, and reality TV programming. Programs such as “America's Dumbest Criminals,” 
“Caught on Tape,” and “Police Stop!” have created “near entertainment” as the public is 
witness to individuals caught in the act of a crime (Graham, Issue 3, 2000).  The social 
and psychological commentary is profound.  Viewers of such surveillance programs react 
by developing further anxieties about the risks of crime and subsequently are likely to 
support the expansion of surveillance networks, spiraling the urgency for more 
surveillance.  British sociologists are discovering that the more murders, terrorist acts, 
and other crimes are captured by CCTV, the greater the demand for surveillance in the 
society; a process sociologists call “normalization” (Graham, Issue 3, 2000). 
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As surveillance and biometrics technology becomes more sophisticated and 
evolves, we are now seeing the introduction of cross-checking of individuals’ video 
imagery against motor vehicle databases, licensed drivers databases, most wanted lists, 
and other law enforcement and business transaction databases.  The technology of 
biometrics in surveillance can distinguish faces, voices, irises, fingerprints, and other 
bodily identifiers.  Improved intelligent software working within the surveillance systems 
can infer possible intent and alert authorities of need be.  The message is a powerful 
one—the more surveillance in society, whether justified or not, the more potential there is 
to track and document everyone’s behavior.   
Hence, the systems that watch over us might be interpreted by some as an 
invasion of privacy, an infringement of civil liberties, or perhaps it may be called—the 
greatest invention to come for enabling law enforcement, keeping good public order, and 
improving safety.  Societal positions for, or against surveillance may differ depending on 
what side of the law you are on, or if you have something to hide, or if you merely 
disagree on principle.  One thing is for certain, surveillance is here to stay—terrorism and 
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) have solidified the arguments 
for surveillance as a necessity for the greater good of civilization.   
There is no question that surveillance technologies can also be misused like any 
other technology, and people can become victims of the very system that was designed to 
protect them.  Ethics, policy, law, and the will of the people are influencing the direction 
we are heading.  Hammers were not outlawed the first time a crime was committed with 
one, nor will we see surveillance technology depart the stage when someone uses it 
improperly.  That is why this technology is so controversial; we need standards, sound 
and balanced laws, and effective use policies to protect the rights of law-abiding people.  
We also need clear guidance to effectively use surveillance and biometric technology to 
detect illicit activities and apprehend criminal elements in society, while simultaneously 
keeping the process of surveillance unobtrusive and preserving the freedoms of a 
civilized nation.  This is a tall order, but like any endeavor, it must begin with the 
presentation of all sides of the argument in pursuit of a balanced middle ground.   
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B. PRESENT DAY PRIVACY LAW 
In a recent industry survey on electronic monitoring and surveillance, more than 
three-quarters of U.S. firms revealed that they monitor their employees’ phone calls, e-
mails, Internet activities, and computer files (AMA, 2002).  The expectation of privacy in 
public and in the workplace has dimensioned as government, law enforcement, and 
businesses battle to reduce crime, fraud, waste, and abuse.  Governments and businesses 
are justifiably concerned with maintaining productivity, reducing waste, preventing theft, 
espionage, and avoiding liability for the actions of employees.  The courts have more 
often favored the interests of business and government than the privacy rights of the 
general public, thus reflecting the reality of federal laws.  One of the few exceptions to 
this trend is the Employee Polygraph Protection Act of 1988, which bars polygraph 
testing except for certain cases of unique circumstances (Doyle, 1999).  Many scientists 
consider polygraph testing to be untrustworthy, yet it has been used as the basis for 
employee dismissal (Doyle, 1999). 
 
 
Figure 6.1. Privacy in the Workplace. (From: Doyle, 1999). 
 
Some states have taken it upon themselves to compensate for shortcomings in 
federal privacy law by enacting state laws that provide greater protection of rights.  
Although federal law takes precedence, employers are typically subject to both state and 
federal laws.  The map on Figure 6.1 shows states that ban various activities including 
paper-and-pencil honesty tests, which have not been scientifically validated (Doyle, 
1999).  No state gives strong privacy protection to workers using e-mail, voice mail, or 
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the telephone, nor does any state prohibit intrusive psychological testing (Doyle, 1999).  
The map illustrates that state laws provide only spotty overall support for worker privacy.  
Surprisingly, it also shows that worker protection from state laws is weak in the seven 
states stretching from New York to Missouri, where unions are strongest (Doyle, 1999).  
One might infer by this that Unions as well employers have desires for keeping the public 
work-pool clean of illicit conduct or activity.  The impact of illicit conduct on safety, 
morale, and the bottom line are too great to ignore. 
Surprisingly, the Constitution of the United States makes no assurances that 
people have an “absolute expectation” to privacy.  The Fourth Amendment of the 
Constitution, which addresses privacy in terms of search and seizure, gives support to law 
enforcement authorities when there is reasonable suspicion of criminal activity involving 
the individual or their property, or compelling government interest to examine the 
individual more closely.  Although each case is treated individually based on its own 
unique circumstances, under the guise of reasonable suspicion, the law heavily favors the 
authorities, the safety of law enforcement personnel, as well as good public order (Senate 
Document No. 106-27).  For example, an individual driving a car on a public road has no 
reasonable expectation of privacy while he is driving from one place to another.  The 
logic follows that when on public roads, people voluntarily convey to anyone who wants 
to look, the fact that they are traveling over a particular road, and when they exit and pull 
into a private driveway, they reveal publicly their final destination.  Hence, for the most 
part, law enforcement authorities are within the law to use video surveillance on public 
roads.  On the other hand, if video surveillance used by police has an infrared device with 
the capability to observe activities that a reasonable person might expect to not see from 
public view, Fourth Amendment concerns might surface (Nieto, June 1997).  
C. EMERGING LAW 
The laws to govern and manage surveillance and biometric technology are still 
evolving.  The use of this technology is more likely than not to be controversial, 
primarily because we are so sensitive as a nation accustomed to maintaining our freedom, 
privacy, and civil liberties.  America may have to turn to some of its more experienced 
international neighbors such as the UK, for guidance in implementation.  
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Our government’s initial responses to the terrorist attacks of September 11th were 
several pieces of legislation that provide sweeping powers for surveillance and 
information collecting authority.  The following are just a sampling of recent legislation 
related to development and deployment of technology solutions for improving security 
for the homeland: 
1. Committee on Homeland Security and Terrorism 
Senator Pat Roberts of Kansas sponsored the establishment of a Select Committee 
on Homeland Security and Terrorism.  This legislation provides the committee to make 
regular and periodic reports to the Senate on the nature and extent of the homeland 
security and antiterrorism activities of the various departments and agencies of the United 
States, and review the activities of the agencies or departments concerned with the 
detection, deterrence, and management of the consequences of terrorism and incidents of 
terrorism in the United States (ANSER, S.R.165, 2002). 
2. Department of National Homeland Security Act of 2001 
Senator Joseph Lieberman of Connecticut sponsored the Department of National 
Homeland Security Act of 2001.  This legislation provides for the establishment of the 
Department of National Homeland Security to (1) plan, coordinate, and integrate those 
United States Government activities relating to homeland security, including border 
security and emergency preparedness, and to act as a focal point regarding natural and 
manmade crises and emergency planning; (2) to work with State and local governments 
and executive agencies in protecting United States homeland security, and to support 
State officials through the use of regional offices around the Nation; (3) to provide 
overall planning guidance to executive agencies regarding United States homeland 
security; (4) to conduct exercise and training programs for employees of the Department 
and establish effective command and control procedures for the full range of potential 
contingencies regarding United States homeland security, including contingencies that 
require the substantial support of military assets (ANSER, S.1534, 2002). 
3. The Airport and Seaport Terrorism Prevention Act 
Senator John Edwards of North Carolina sponsored the Airport and Seaport 
Terrorism Prevention Act.  This legislation provides for consultation with the United 
States Coast Guard and the United States Customs Service, in providing grants for 
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seaport security infrastructure improvements for an eligible project at any United States 
seaport involved in international trade.  Eligible projects would be those involving 
construction, acquisition, or deployment of surveillance equipment and technology, 
including— (1) surveillance cameras with video feed to regional and national offices of 
the United States Customs Service that provide real-time information, observation, and 
situation status; (2) a pilot program for iris recognition or similar biometric technology 
for port workers with access to secure areas; (3) x-ray, ultrasound, and laser scanners to 
scan cargo containers; and (4) radiation monitors and other devices capable of detecting 
weapons of mass destruction, including chemical, biological, or similar substances 
(ANSER, S.1429, 2002).    
4. Aviation and Transportation Security Act 
Senator Ernest F. Hollings of South Carolina sponsored the Aviation and 
Transportation Security Act.  This legislation provides for (1) short-term assessment and 
long-term deployment of emerging security technologies and procedures to prevent 
access to secure airport areas by unauthorized persons; (2) review of the effectiveness of 
biometrics systems currently in use at several United States airports; (3) review of the 
effectiveness of increased surveillance at access points, (4) review of computer-assisted 
passenger prescreening systems for evaluating all passengers and their luggage, (5) 
additional appropriations for research and development of aviation security technology 
for FY 2002-2006; (6) acceleration of research, development, testing, and evaluation of 
explosives and weapons detection technology for checked baggage, carry-on baggage, 
cargo, catered materials, and duty-free items; (7) and acceleration of research, 
development, testing and evaluation of integrated systems of airport security 
enhancement, including quantitative methods of assessing security factors at airports 
selected for testing such systems (ANSER, S.1447, 2002). 
5. Uniting and Strengthening America Act (USA Patriot Act of 2001) 
Senator Tom Daschle of South Dakota sponsored the Uniting and Strengthening 
America Act (USA Patriot Act of 2001).  This legislation provides for strengthening 
America domestically against terrorism through (1) enhanced surveillance procedures 
and authority to intercept wire, oral, and electronic communications; (2) authority to 
share criminal investigative information; (3) increased information sharing for critical 
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infrastructure protection; (4) review of the integrated automated fingerprint identification 
system for points of entry and overseas consular posts; (5) improvements to US border 
protection; (6) removing obstacles to investigating terrorism; (7) improving intelligence; 
(8) and strengthening criminal laws on terrorism (ANSER, S.1510, 2002).   
6. The Port and Maritime Security Act of 2001 
Senator Ernest F. Hollings of South Carolina sponsored the Port and Maritime 
Security Act of 2001.  This legislation provides for better methods of communication 
amongst law enforcement officials responsible for seaport boundary, security, and trade 
issues.  It formulates guidance for the review of physical seaport security, recognizing the 
different character and nature of United States seaports.  Eligible projects would be those 
involving construction, acquisition, or deployment of surveillance equipment and 
technology, including— (1) equipment or facilities to be used for seaport security 
monitoring and recording; (2) security gates and fencing; (3) security-related lighting 
systems; (4) remote surveillance systems; (5) concealed video systems; or (6) other 
security infrastructure or equipment that contributes to the overall security of passengers, 
cargo, or crewmembers. (ANSER, S.1214, 2002).       
7. Chemical Security Act of 2001 
Senator Jon Corzine of New Jersey sponsored the Chemical Security Act of 2001.  
This legislation provides for help in protecting the public against the threat of chemical 
attacks, and accidental or criminal chemical release (ANSER, S.1602, 2002).    
8. State Bioterrorism Preparedness Act 
Senator Evan Bayh of Indiana sponsored the State Bioterrorism Preparedness Act.  
This legislation provides for enhancing domestic preparedness by developing a national 
bioterrorism surveillance and detection capacity, developing and distributing rapid and 
more reliable diagnostic capabilities and systems, developing a comprehensive strategy 
for assuring surge capacity for health care, streamlining national pharmaceutical 
stockpiling efforts, and increasing research and development for new pharmaceuticals, 
vaccines and antidotes are essential endeavors (ANSER, S.1520, 2002).    
9. Bioterrorism Preparedness Act of 2001 
Senator Bill Frist of Tennessee sponsored the Bioterrorism Preparedness Act of 
2001.  This legislation provides for the ability of the United States to (1) improve 
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surveillance, detection, and response activities to prepare for emergency response 
activities including biological threats or attacks; (2) carry out activities to improve 
communications and coordination efforts between healthcare and federal government 
entities, including activities to improve information technology and communications 
equipment available to health care and public health officials for use in responding to a 
biological threat or attack or other public health emergency and including early warning 
and surveillance networks that use advanced information technology to provide early 
detection of biological threats or attacks; (3) improve animal, plant and food product 
surveillance at domestic and international ports and customs; (4) enhance methods of 
protecting against the introduction of plant and animal disease organisms by terrorists; (5) 
implement a fully secure surveillance and response system that utilizes, or is capable of 
utilizing, field test devices capable of detecting biological threats to animals and plants 
and that electronically integrates the devices and the tests on a real- time basis into a 
comprehensive surveillance, incident management, and emergency response system; (6) 
implement a plan for coordinating the surveillance for zoonotic disease and human 
disease (ANSER, S.1715, 2002).   
D. LEGISLATION BALANCING PROGRESS VS CONSTRICTION 
Having legislation that supports the use of technology in fighting terrorism and 
crime is a necessary foundation to the long-term effort of keeping the world safe for 
future generations.  But laws are subject to interpretation when delicate circumstances 
present themselves.  Sometimes a court’s analysis of the Constitution and a technicality, 
for example, can render electronic surveillance seemingly useless for enforcing an 
apparently open and shut indictment—take the following case for example:  In June 
2001, a U.S. Supreme Court decision determined that in the absence of a search warrant, 
the government’s use of a thermal imaging device to monitor heat coming off the walls of 
a suspected marijuana grower’s private residence in Florence, Oregon, violated the 
Fourth Amendment prohibition against “unreasonable searches and seizures” (Amato, p. 
63).  The ruling could have far-reaching consequences for how new, more powerful 
surveillance technologies can be deployed, managed, and regulated, and how the 
sensitive databases are protected (Amato, p. 63).  As eluded previously, electronic 
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surveillance is a powerful technology with great law enforcement benefits, but it can 
backfire if not supported by carefully crafted protocol and legislation (Amato, p. 63).  
Several efforts are now under way to rein in surveillance technology through 
more responsible privacy legislation.  The Privacy Coalition, a nonpartisan collection of 
consumer, labor, and civil liberties groups, is trying to get lawmakers to commit to their 
“Privacy Pledge,” which contains a vow to develop independent oversight of public 
surveillance technology and limit the collection of personal data.  Several organizations, 
including the AFL-CIO, Communications Workers of America, 9to5, National 
Association of Working Women, and the United Auto Workers are supporting legislation 
to restrict electronic monitoring of employees (Amato, p. 63).   
In 2000, Congress unsuccessfully debated the Notice of Electronic Monitoring 
Act (H.R.4908), which would have required companies to notify employees if they were 
being watched - the bill died in committee.  Currently, Connecticut is the only state to 
require employers to tell employees if they are being monitored (Amato, p. 63).     
The very notion of privacy in public is sometimes at odds with certain realities.  
For example, when individuals go out in public, they look at other people, who in turn 
look at them, and everyone can see everything around them in visual range—normally 
people do not try and cover their faces in public to avoid being recognized.  So it is a 
small stretch to imagine a camera looking at people in public—and much like a living 
police officer, the camera can be programmed to alert for certain unusual sightings or 
events.  Suddenly, our expectation of privacy changes because we are talking about a 
camera and not merely another living human being looking at us.  The logic behind the 
phobia of surveillance cameras begins to melt away when you think about how boring 
most of our lives really are in public.  We walk, we shop, we commute, we work, we eat, 
we play in the world we live in—and how often do you see someone attempting to hide 
their face?  The truth reveals itself in the fact that we do not have an expectation of 
privacy when in public, so if there is a camera in the bank, or store, or parking lot, we 
generally don’t even notice, or mind.  Surveillance is becoming ubiquitous because we 
demand to be safe and orderly as a society.  The more violence we see, the more we want 
law enforcing eyes on scene to come to the rescue when needed, or to present the 
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recorded surveillance proof in a court of law if necessary.  The deployment of 
surveillance networks may slow down due to public opinion, but it is almost a certainty 
as we see the samples of its use around the world. 
Science fiction author and technology watcher, David Brin, writes in his 1998 
book “The Transparent Society” about society facing two versions of ubiquitous 
surveillance: one in which only the affluent and authoritative use and control the system 
to their own advantage; the second which depicts a more equitable future where even the 
watchers can also be watched (Amato, p. 63).  The second form of ubiquitous 
surveillance appears more equitable.  In the ubiquitous world, one can imagine an audit 
trail of every misdeed that can be held to the light of day.  For instance - rent a porn video 
and your wife knows it; but if she drives to your best buddy’s house four times a week 
while you’re at the office, you’ll know that also (Amato, p. 63).  The emerging world of 
ubiquitous surveillance will grow at a pace set by social and cultural comfort levels.  
Surveillance and biometric technology seems to be leaping ahead of our ability to govern 
its service unobtrusively in a society.  The will of the people will drive the policies, laws, 
and guidelines for this technology.  The issue of privacy as a commodity is being 
discussed in government today—should privacy be traded for safety and security in an 
ever increasingly hostile world?  The authors believe it is inevitable but very livable. 
E. EXAMPLES OF SURVEILLANCE IMPACT ON SOCIETY 
We have seen a glimpse of what ubiquitous surveillance offers, and the debate 
continues over how best to employ it, but here are some examples hard to refute: Take 
the case of the “computer-aided drowning detection and prevention” system that 
Boulogne, France-based Poseidon Technologies has installed in nine swimming pools in 
France, England, the Netherlands, and Canada (Amato, p. 62).  Overhead and in-pool 
cameras continuously monitors pool activity while feeding the signal to a central 
processor driven by “perception algorithm” software that can effectively spot when 
swimmers become still for more than a few seconds.  When an abnormal alert is detected, 
a red alarm light flashes at a poolside laptop workstation, alerting lifeguards via 
waterproof pagers (Amato, p. 62).  In November 2000, a Poseidon system at the Jean 
Blanchet Aquatic Center in Ancenis, Loire-Atlantique, France, alerted lifeguards in time 
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to rescue a swimmer on the verge of drowning (Amato, p. 62).  Surveillance devices for 
public safety are now growing rapidly in France; the country now even has public CCTV 
web cams in nuclear plants to reassure citizens that the work going on is safe and above 
board (Wakefield, 7 Feb 2002).   
The benefits of a sensor rich environment are just beginning.  Think of the 
cascade of mobile gadgets (cell phones, PDAs, watches, automotive navigation systems, 
etc.) which are being manufactured with Global Positioning System (GPS) transponders 
built- in, making it possible to pinpoint the signal carrier and rapidly responding to the aid 
of the individual (Amato, p. 62).  In the case of the automobile, an airbag could be 
designed to give off a transponder signal when it inflates during an accident and 
automatically call for assistance.  The safety benefits of consumer and public ubiquitous 
surveillance systems are very diverse, and have great potential for cost savings in human 
resource constrained organizations.   
In terms of crime deterrence power, the United Kingdom is still our best metric 
for analysis.  Of the world’s 25 million CCTV cameras in use today, 2.5 million are 
currently in use in the UK; even now, analysts are predicting a tenfold increase in CCTV 
in the UK over the next five years (Wakefield, 7 Feb 2002).  The average citizen in the 
UK presently is caught on CCTV cameras 300 times a day (Wakefield, 7 Feb 2002).  The 
impact on crime has been profound.  Recent British government reports cite closed circuit 
TV as a major reason for declining crime rates.  After these systems were put in place, 
the town of Berwick reported that burglaries fell by 69 percent; in Northampton, overall 
crime decreased by 57 percent; and in Glasgow, Scotland, crime slumped by 68 percent 
(Amato, p. 62).  Northampton additionally installed an Automatic Number Plate 
Recognition system, which resulted in 264 arrests and the recovery of 31 vehicles (BBC, 
21 Aug 2001).  When 11 cameras were installed in Darlington County, Durham, a 46 
percent drop in crime was reported (BBC, 21 Aug 2001).  In Somerset, when six cameras 
were installed in their town center, car thefts fell by more than 50 percent (BBC, 21 Aug 
2001).  Public reaction in the UK has been mixed however, but many continue to 
embrace the technology.  When strategically employed, the cameras can deter offenders, 
reducing crime, and increasing the feeling of safety among citizens while in public (BBC, 
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21 Aug 2001).  “I am prepared to exchange a small/negligible amount of privacy loss so I 
don’t have to be caught up in yet another bomb blast/bomb scare,” wrote one London 
resident (Amato, p. 62).  According to the UK’s Government Crime Reduction Office, 
law enforcement authorities are convinced of the benefits that CCTV has in reducing 
crime (Wakefield, 7 Feb 2002).  And it’s not just the crime prevention aspect CCTV that 
has the UK singing praise for surveillance, it also saves money by providing an increased 
number of guilty verdicts in courts through displaying irrefutable proof of the crime 
(Wakefield, 7 Feb 2002).   
Washington DC itself is now undergoing a dramatic surveillance transformation.  
The National Park Service will begin round-the-clock video surveillance at all major 
monuments on the district’s Mall area by October 2002.  The step up in surveillance 
technology is being met with challenge and protest from the American Civil Liberties 
Union (ACLU) groups who express concern that video monitoring might discourage 
lawful and peaceful demonstration on the Mall (Hsu, 22 Mar 2002).  Congressional 
concerns also have been voiced on the oversight, management, and standards for the 
ubiquitous surveillance initiatives in and around Washington.   
Conversely, surveillance and biometric technology in society could be misused if 
not carefully managed.  In the future, motor vehicles agencies will keep a database of 
drivers with their digital photographs (faceprints) in computer systems that can be 
networked into a nationwide database capable of tracking an individual’s movement in 
any geographic area.  If not protected, this database can be used for unauthorized 
demographic profiling and spamming in the same way that Internet cookies are used to 
build demographic profiles to target consumers.  On the upside, such a database could be 
used to enable facial recognition technology to quickly register and verify legitimacy of 
eligible voters, thus eliminating voter fraud.  The illusive issue is that of function creep 
(a.k.a., mission creep) —allowing a system to be misdirected for another purpose other 
than its original intent (Amato, p. 63).  Tight management of surveillance technology and 
good procedures can eliminate function creep and keep the system focused toward its 
intended beneficiaries. 
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When society thinks of the surveillance debate, the good points at times become 
overshadowed by Orwellian paranoia.  The privacy concerns are warranted, but they need 
to be weighed unemotionally against the overall benefit to the public, as well as with a 
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VII. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This thesis has represented a conglomeration of issues surrounding the evolving 
efforts on the path to homeland security and the potential uses of various surveillance and 
biometric technologies.  In the post-analysis, the  research reveals that technology’s 
surveillance response to the war on terrorism is a natural and predictable evolution for 
managing a world in conflict.  We live in a world where sensor-rich environments are 
becoming commonplace, so it is not a great leap of the imagination to read about 
surveillance and biometrics leading the way in the war on terrorism and criminal activity.  
The trend for society to move to these specialized technologies in order to seek improved 
safety and protection is a controversia l but necessary balance of privacy, resource 
investment, and process efficiency.  Technology is merely one part of the total 
overarching strategy for homeland security; the non-technical human factors and policy 
assessments must also be carefully considered as we trod down the road of a surveillance 
society.   
While we acknowledge that terrorism and criminal activity cannot be eliminated, 
technology can certainly aid in detecting, deterring, and markedly reducing the risk.  The 
newly organized Department of Homeland Security, with its supporting legislation and 
resources, will contribute to the emerging concepts for intelligent employment of 
surveillance and biometrics.  The challenges faced in implementing a balanced strategy 
for using these technologies seem almost endless, but they can be summarized generally 
into the following critical success factors that form a basis for the ubiquitous surveillance 
concept model and recommendations list for further study.  
B. CONCLUSIONS, CRITICAL SUCCESS FACTORS, AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Human Factors and Incentives for Cultural Change 
a. Information Sharing 
One of the more evident observations and critical success factors in the 
quest to enable any system is the ability for people to share information and work 
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together toward a common goal.  Sharing information and vision is crucial in our fight 
against terrorism.  This is the core to managing change in complex organizations.  
Changing the way governments work at all levels will be a monumental task.  Whether it 
is due to interagency rivalry or separation mandated by administrative protocols, old 
ways of doing business must be completely reevaluated and realigned toward the new 
strategic vision.  Procedural and psychological barriers to information sharing must not 
only be dismantled, but incentives need to be established for institutional reorganization 
that embraces exchange of information and collaboration as the normal order of doing 
business, not the exception.  Performance metrics for personnel and their departments 
need to be aligned with positive incentives for collaboration.  Federal, state, local 
government, and private sector agencies must work together to encourage alliances for 
information gathering and closing the intelligence gaps that have allowed previous 
terrorist and criminal plots to go undetected.  Creative solutions for changing cultural 
paradigms must be developed and implemented to enable information sharing 
domestically and internationally.  Most importantly, the very people who will be affected 
by these changes in protocol must also be the ones who participate in crafting the 
necessary new processes and subsequent implementation plans. 
b. Supporting Legislation, Standards and Enforcement 
The incentive to enact legislation ahead of technology implementation 
reflects society’s desire for maintaining order and fairness.  Agencies that become 
empowered by surveillance and biometrics technology must have the full backing of 
legislation to be effective.  Recent legislation such as the USA Patriot Act, Aviation and 
Transportation Security Act, Port and Maritime Security Act, and the Bioterrorism 
Preparedness Act represent only some of the many “change management” initiatives 
required for establishing policy and direction in addressing technology’s role in the war 
on terror.  Numerous other policies are emerging in the form of directives, executive 
orders, and international treaties.  More detailed direction should be tailored in the form 
of standards and operating procedures for how specific surveillance and biometric 
applications should be employed and managed throughout all levels of government.   
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These technologies justifiably capture the attention of civil liberties and 
privacy groups.  Placement of legal controls, guidance, and limitations on how 
surveillance and biometrics information will be implemented is paramount in 
safeguarding against potential abuses and unnecessary invasion of privacy.  Enforcement 
of these new laws and standards is as important in safeguarding the rights of law-abiding 
citizens as they are in detecting and capturing those who wish us harm.  Furthermore, 
enforcement of existing laws must be maximized with respect to our mission.  These 
issues primarily involve procedural policies and principles for society, yet they provide a 
significant baseline upon which subsequent technical solutions are built and supported. 
c. Addressing the Root Causes of Terrorism 
Addressing the fundamental catalysts that allow terrorism to flourish is 
often overlooked.  In this light, prevention has its greatest role.  Often our technological 
efforts are reactive to our present day situations and we fail to see the value in heading 
off the very symptoms that contribute to terrorism and criminal behavior in the first 
place.  Along with recognizing terrorists when they cross our borders, our surveillance 
efforts must simultaneously focus on the larger global issues that produce regional 
conflict and world instability: poverty, disease, dwindling natural resources, drug 
trafficking, religious fanaticism, and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.  
Predictive analysis calls for combining data points, drawing inferences on pieces of 
seemingly disparate information, and establishing early warning indicators that can 
provide opportunity to fend off disasters in the making.  This is where the technical lines 
of surveillance and biometrics blur with non-technical human factors that beg the 
question— “if technology cannot rid the world of terrorism, can we at least leverage 
technology to recognize and preempt conditions and events that contribute to terrorist or 
criminal activity?”  When considering this expanded analysis of the war on terrorism, one 
begins to see that the real battle is not fought in isolation within the walls of clearly 
defined boundaries of good versus evil but within the greater “system’s view” of a world 
condition, a “conflict state,” which must be contained, monitored and managed.  Hence, 
exploiting the role of surveillance and biometric technology for counter-terrorism is key 
to prevention.  For that reason, the concurrent and inescapable responsibility of 
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international diplomacy and cooperation in addressing underlying human factors is also 
an integral critical success factor that technology alone cannot win.  
d. The Will of the People and Implementation  
The specific question of how to implement a surveillance and biometrics-
based system upon an American culture so accustomed to personal freedoms is a difficult 
one to answer; yet, it is a pivotal critical success factor for the technology.  We are 
already under surveillance when in public—at banks, in department stores, on our 
roadways, and while in the workplace.  Thus, the war on terrorism and America’s 
homeland security initiatives have only expedited an inevitable surveillance society that 
had been predicted decades earlier by Orwellian prophecy.  The technology is ready, but 
is America and the international community ready?  The success factor here may 
ultimately be measured by the will of the people and the level to which peace- loving 
nations see value in subjecting their citizens to surveillance.  Terrorism is an international 
problem, and the efforts in arresting it must be global; consequently, international 
cooperation in implementing the concept of a ubiquitous surveillance grid is paramount.  
Countries must see the benefit in intelligent uses of surveillance and biometric 
technology; equally, they must understand that such technologies are capable of 
preserving the rights of law-abiding citizens.  While the greatest motivation for societies 
to establish a ubiquitous surveillance network may be the prevention of another 9-11, in 
the end, the financial and economic enticements may ultimately provide the most under-
appreciated incentives.  It is difficult to argue against creating a more fraud-resistant 
drivers license, a passport which uses secure biometric technology, or a passenger 
screening system which quickly and efficiently allows for the processing of millions of 
passengers a day—saving both time and money.  Surveillance and biometrics 
technologies offer great potential for process efficiencies in managing everything from 
critical infrastructure protection, to transportation networks, border control, licensing and 
entitlement controls, and fraud reduction.  The intelligence gathering value of this 
technology is extraordinary; however, implementation must be thoughtful, measured, and 
balanced to our objectives.  
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The fear of cultural change alone is a great psychological hurdle on the 
implementation path for intelligent use of surveillance and biometric technology, yet it is 
an artificial obstruction that can be overcome with the introduction of proper incentives.  
As a direct result of 9-11, the will of the majority has spoken and supported strategic 
implementation of surveillance and biometrics.  Americans are now seeing changes 
taking place as this technology slowly finds its way to improve identification card 
authentication, workplace access control, transportation hub passenger and cargo 
screening, monitoring of public places, and a myriad of other useful applications.  
Governmental reorganization has already begun, and the formation of the 
Department of Homeland Security is a necessary beginning in the cultural reshaping, 
which will pave the way toward the more technical issues of system integration and 
implementation.  The evolving implementation plan for surveillance and biometrics is 
ongoing and complex. It is worth noting that success in this arena also depends on 
acquiring the right people with sufficient technical and managerial skills to integrate 
everything from customs and immigration systems, to our most sophisticated intelligence 
gathering networks.   
2. Establishment of an Enterprise Architecture  
The dozens of agencies that make up America’s national security and intelligence 
gathering capability presently utilize an infrastructure, which is not optimized for 
surveillance information sharing.  They function under a variety of different operating 
system platforms and disparate databases that do not link to one another. 
The establishment of common, enterprise- level architecture is necessary and 
fundamental to support future surveillance integration and information sharing.  This 
enterprise concept would be the foundation of a ubiquitous surveillance network that 
allows agencies such as the Coast Guard, DoD, U.S. Customs, INS, Border Patrol, TSA, 
FBI, CIA, NSA, DOJ, FEMA, CDC, HHS, state DMVs, local law enforcement, and 
emergency responders to share collected information and data mine across a distributed 
network.  Enterprise architecture would also support local, regional, and national 
healthcare authorities for quickly sharing medical surveillance information and identify 
emerging biological or chemical threats early, providing faster response to population 
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centers.  The enterprise network would also include linkage to systems that monitor non-
human traffic such as postal traffic, cargo container shipments, and other commerce hubs 
for material goods.  The interoperability benefits of a single architecture are vast.  
Stovepipe and duplicate systems would be eliminated; the synergy of using a common 
network with collaborative tools would result in efficiencies of speed as well as cost 
savings.  Like a public utility grid, a properly designed surveillance network can be a 
resource on tap for its users.  It would allow connectivity to other existing intelligence 
information, creating a virtual knowledge portal for information sharing.  Even so, any 
proposed architecture for an enterprise ubiquitous surveillance system should be seen as a 
supplement to, not replacement for, good human factors in intelligence gathering and 
predictive analysis.  Humans are still the most valuable asset to any systems architecture. 
3. Establishment of Surveillance and Biometric Application Standards  
This critical success factor speaks to the application and database layers of 
surveillance and biometrics technology.  For this technology to be successfully integrated 
into an enterprise model, standards must be established for biometric authentication and 
data capture techniques.  If we expect to maintain integrity and interoperability in 
information, we must begin with providing clear and sanctioned formats for biometric 
devices and methods of encoding and decoding information.  These standards must also 
address physical and logical security concerns, digital encryption, and network design so 
the collected information is not intercepted, spoofed, or otherwise abused.  Databases and 
data dictionaries must also have standards for information naming conventions, formats, 
data types, and data field descriptions so information in one database can easily be related 
to another without the delay of complex translations.  The American National Standards 
Institute (ANSI) and National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) should work 
closely with each other as well as international standards agencies and technical 
committees for establishing and adopting data standards for an efficient and secure 
surveillance network. 
4. Operational Testing Beyond the Controlled Laboratory Environment 
Surveillance and biometric technologies are not perfect or foolproof, although 
they are steadily improving in accuracy and reliability.  Rigorous testing and careful 
match selection of technology-to-application is extremely important.  Chie f Information 
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Officers (CIO) and program managers must be wary of vendors pushing technologies that 
claim to be ready for real-world homeland security usage.  Surveillance and biometric 
technology programs should not fall victim to the false comfort provided by the successes 
of earlier, lab-controlled environments.  A lab setting may not consider some of the 
nuances that can greatly influence the performance of the technology in field conditions.  
Training, operator fatigue, boredom, lighting, temperature, distance, and other factors that 
cannot always be precisely replicated in a lab may adversely affect the performance of 
surveillance and biometric systems in real world situations.   
Project management milestones must include extensive operational field tests to 
exercise the technology in the environment for which it is designed.  In the case of a State 
DMV, for example, the agency may utilize biometrics along with proven smart card 
technology to replace newly issued driver’s licenses.  User feedback should be carefully 
examined during these proof-of-concept trials.  Such tests would provide valuable 
lessons- learned; small successes could then be capitalized and improved upon, and 
unforeseen problems resolved before being mirrored for nationwide or international 
implementation.  
5. Requirements Analysis 
The effectiveness of a surveillance and biometrics system is greatly enhanced by 
conducting thorough efforts in requirements analysis.  This can be a very complex and 
lengthy process but if done properly should result in an effective technology-to-
application match with a smooth implementation that is on budget and on schedule.  In 
contrast, a poor job in requirements analysis can lead to a problem-filled project that is 
over budget, behind schedule, and falls short in meeting the needs of its intended users.   
The homeland security strategy touches all areas of human and infrastructure 
protection activity.  Thus, defining the numerous requirements and priorities to be 
addressed will be crucial for the project managers.  This critical success factor is a special 
challenge since both the technology and requirements seem to be changing 
simultaneously.  It is truly a moving target.  Information technology managers must start 
with taking the idea of a ubiquitous surveillance system, which assumes a “system of 
systems,” and break it down into its more manageable and modularized components.  
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These components should include requirements for biometric identifiers in human 
authentication and sensors for chemical, biologic, or other agents.  Furthermore, it should 
address information databases, rules-based identifiers that alert or query action if one or 
more conditions exist, and linkage for information sharing with and among other systems.  
The analysis must consider training, ergonomics, and the procedural and process 
requirements of the system under study.  These subcomponents, if in compliance with 
standards and a common enterprise infrastructure, should be able to interface and 
exchange information in a larger surveillance grid as more entities are added to the 
network. 
The requirements analysis should also include vulnerabilities and risk assessments 
as well as functional analysis that reveal how an existing process currently operates.  The 
analysis should reveal information gaps as well as wasteful duplications in the system.  In 
addition, it should examine how the process could either be simplified or otherwise 
improved upon to address the security requirements, authentication requirements, or 
surveillance needs of the area in question.  However, layering technology and procedures 
does come at a price in terms of time, money, and convenience; so the process owners 
must determine a middle ground.  The security layering for satisfying these requirements 
may vary depending on whether one is talking about something as mild as security for 
public access to a community library or as sensitive as employee access control to a 
nuclear power plant.  The capabilities of various surveillance and biometrics technologies 
allow us to examine these potential applications with respect to requirements, cost, and 
efficiency and tailor the design to the security strategy we seek to fill.   
The requirements analysis must also examine which entities are responsible for 
collecting specific information and how this information should be organized, stored, 
archived, and shared.  The sources and methods for enrollment must also be addressed 
since the basis for biometric systems is to eventually compare profiles against collected 
information and make decisions based on events or condition states.  The ultimate goal is 
to have an integrated and highly organized “system of systems” by which hybrid links are 
able to quickly and securely share information about people, places, and things and draw 
inferences to detect or deter terrorist or criminal threats.  
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C. CONCEPT MODEL FOR UBIQUITOUS SURVEILLANCE AND 
BIOMETRICS GRID 
The concept for a ubiquitous surveillance and biometrics grid is intended to be 
broad and non-technical; however, it advocates a plausib le overview representation of 
how this resource might be modeled in the system’s view.  The previously mentioned 
critical success factors should be seen as a supplement to this model.  The specific 
examples of where and how surveillance and biometrics might be employed are too 
numerous to list completely, but we have suggested a handful of probable methods by 
which key sectors of society may leverage such technology for the future.  Figures 7.1 
and 7.2 provide a pyramid overview of the surveillance state and conflict state paradigm 
that we depict and strive to balance and manage. 
 
 
Figure 7.1. Ubiquitous Surveillance State Concept Pyramid. 
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Figure 7.2. World Conflict State Concept Pyramid. 
 
1. Sensor-Rich Environments 
For a ubiquitous surveillance system to exist, sensors must be put in place at 
strategic locations to gather information for initial enrollment, capture, monitoring, and 
comparative analysis purposes.  The type of sensors, their accuracy, capabilities, and 
locations are important factors in meeting the layered security objectives for what we are 
trying to protect or monitor.   
In the ubiquitous surveillance concept, sensors for biometrics would allow the 
creation of passports, driver’s licenses, visas, and other documents that could then be 
used to verify that the persons presenting are in fact biologically the individuals they 
claim to be.  A multitude of strategically placed surveillance capabilities would monitor, 
match, analyze, alert, and suggest varied courses of actions, interventions, and responses.  
The specialized sensors themselves would perform as a subset in the greater surveillance 
environment that we already acknowledge as existing in a conflict state—the goal being, 
to leverage surveillance and biometrics to balance between these two states (see Figure 
7.3).   
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World Conflict State Surveillance State
Societal Balance
 
Figure 7.3. Societal Balance. 
The following sector areas discuss scenarios for how these technologies could be 
used in our ubiquitous surveillance model: 
a. Aviation 
Passenger processing points in transportation hubs would have a 
combination of sensors that layer non- invasive facial-recognition capabilities with more 
invasive sensors such as fingerprint, hand and iris scanners, which authenticate passenger 
ident ities at embarkation.  These sensors would be connected to an enterprise 
infrastructure that checks passenger identities against distributed databases of wanted lists 
and alert conditions.  Full-body scanners would be able to detect any weapons or 
unauthorized items a person may be wearing.  Within the aircraft, discrete video cameras 
in the cabin would allow the aircrew to monitor passenger activity, permitting early 
warning, as well as documenting evidence of threatening behavior such as air rage or 
other actions that would jeopardize flight safety.  Trained plain-clothed air marshals 
would supplement the technology by monitoring for suspicious activity requiring 
attention.  Sensors capable of spotting weapons and trace amounts of chemical, 
biological, and other hazardous materials would scan baggage and air cargo.  
Surveillance cameras and environmental sensors in and around the airport facility would 
monitor for any suspicious activity. 
b.  Seaport/Maritime 
Sensors installed at seaports would include scanners for visual 
examination of cargo container contents.  International cooperation would establish 
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standardized scanning procedures and capabilities at all cargo embarkation points.  
Specialized sensors would also be installed to detect any chemical, biological, or nuclear 
materials present at embarkation and debarkation points.  The use of trained dogs and 
human inspectors would supplement surveillance of cargo for contents that may elude 
sensors, such as illegal drugs, explosives, or human cargo.  Surface and undersea sensors 
at harbors and piers would detect for any suspicious water activity such as unauthorized 
scuba divers or undersea craft. 
c.  Customs and Border Control  
Sensors installed at borders would include similar capabilities set forth in 
the aviation and seaport sectors.  Additionally, biometric scanners would automatically 
enroll visitors, compare individuals against a database of wanted lists, and validate the 
identities of individuals with existing biometric identification cards.  These smart borders 
would also include infrared, motion, night-vision sensors, and surveillance cameras that 
would monitor areas that are particularly vulnerable, alerting authorities to a compromise. 
d.  Sensitive Access to Critical Work Environment 
Sensors installed at access points in the workplace would aid in keeping 
unauthorized personnel out of sensitive areas while allowing authorized employees 
privilege-based entry to specified areas within facility walls.  Biometric supported secure 
smart cards would be the norm for access to all areas considered critical to national 
infrastructure.  Digital video surveillance in parking lots, entryways, and loading zones 
would capture traffic activity and allow intelligent software algorithms to alert authorities 
to any suspicious patterns or possible threat conditions.  This secure access would 
provide flexible levels of protection for environments where critical infrastructure is 
housed, such as energy, telecommunications, defense, healthcare, financial sectors, and 
transportation hubs.  These sensors would serve as authentication tools as well as audit 
trails for an individual’s movement through the physical environment as well as cyber 
environment.  Intelligent software agents would also monitor workplace system network 
traffic and Internet packets looking for conditions that may indicate unauthorized access 
or behaviors requiring further investigation.   
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A nationally approved biometrics-based identification card would serve as 
a replacement for the social security card and thereby establish a common proof of 
individual authentication and entitlements validation for citizens.  Digitally encrypted 
biometrics in combination with secure PINs would ensure that the combination of “who 
you are biologically” and “what you know” (PIN) produce a tamper-resistant 
authentication card. 
e.  Environmental, Agricultural, and Public Grounds Surveillance  
Sensors installed at strategic locations in the environment and agricultural 
centers would collect and analyze information from the air, water, and soil in order to 
monitor for chemical, biological, nuclear, or other agents that may require action by 
authorities.  Farm produce, animal, and food processing centers would likewise be 
configured with sensors that monitor for hazardous agents and alert to preset conditions.   
Strategically placed detection devices and video surveillance at public 
grounds would further ensure environments around our roadways, bridges, tunnels, 
recreation areas, school grounds, and key population centers are safe.  These video 
surveillance cameras would not only serve to alert to terrorist or criminal activity, but 
they would also provide for rapid response for other emergency situations such as vehicle 
accidents, pollution spills, forest fires, or any number of calamities.  
f.  Medical Surveillance  
Effective medical surveillance components would be comprised of 
intelligent medical networks that alert authorities to any signs of epidemiological and 
infectious disease outbreaks.  These networks would be capable of determining if the 
disease surveillance indicators are out of normal ranges for a particular area or season and 
would furthermore enable modeling and simulation to forecast possible spread patterns 
and containment strategies.  Local and regional medical centers would be linked with 
medical suppliers, pharmaceutical companies, and drug store databases to alert to any 
unusual orders for supplies or prescription and non-prescription drugs that may correlate 
with disease outbreaks.  All medical centers would be linked with Centers for Disease 
Control (CDC), Health and Human Services (HHS), National Institute of Health (NIH), 
and the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) to 
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collaborate, respond to, and counter any possible national health crisis.  The United States 
Department of Agriculture (USDA), Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service 
(APHIS) and U.S. Customs Service would also be integrated to the medical surveillance 
network to share any contributing animal, plant, or food related surveillance information 
that may affect disease control and management.  Furthermore, national medical 
networks would be connected with the World Health Organization (WHO) and 
International Red Cross to collaborate in response and management of disease outbreaks 
as well as subsequent humanitarian efforts.   
g.  Space-Based and Airborne Surveillance Vehicles  
Sensors in spaced-based satellites and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) 
would allow for surveillance of environmental conditions or other anomalies that warrant 
our attention.  Surveillance from space allows us to monitor changes in everything from 
meteorological and geographical conditions to movements of military weapons and 
personnel.  Advancements in thermal and hyperspectral imaging enable us to detect 
changes previously hidden to the naked eye.  UAVs would also be equipped with remote 
sensing devices to sniff for chemical, biological, or other hazardous agents, giving early 
warning of any dangers.  Surveillance use of Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles 
(UCAV) would also allow us to response with force to a threat condition in near real-time 
if required. 
2. Information Portals, Knowledge Bases and Collaborative 
Environments 
Albert Einstein once said “Not everything that counts can be counted, and not 
everything that can be counted counts.”  As we drown in a sea of potentially useful 
information, we seek only that which is truly relevant to our task.  Information portals 
and knowledge management are established concepts of information access and data 
management; hence, the notion of a single starting point for information searches and 
assembling mazes of data into meaningful resources is not new to Internet savvy users.  
Internet portals have been with us for years, and the time has come that an equivalent 
design be considered for Homeland Security information sharing.  By virtue of their 
function, ubiquitous surveillance and biometric technologies, collect, store, and compare 
information.  The off-the-shelf technologies that allow data warehousing, information 
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access, analysis, and knowledge management must be used to integrate and manage the 
volumes of data, which will populate the ubiquitous surveillance grid of the future.  
Through a common portal that is linked to a network of distributed data warehouses and 
decision support and analytical engines, agencies can more efficiently locate and analyze 
bits of information to see a larger picture of human behavior, materials movement, and 
threat conditions, which may warrant our intervention.  Sophisticated modeling and 
simulation programs  using knowledge bases of surveillance and biometric information 
would allow us to perform predictive analysis to better mitigate our vulne rabilities and 
strengthen our procedures where necessary.  Secure collaborative cyber environments 
would allow emergency responders, intelligence, and law enforcement authorities to 
work together across distances and exchange vital information. 
3. Global Standards  
The ubiquitous surveillance model relies heavily on standards for sharing and 
transporting large volumes of stored information in distributed databases.  These 
standards must not only address naming conventions, data compatibility issues, 
algorithms, protocols, and operating procedures, but also the transnational security issues 
of data privacy for surveillance and biometric information.  Standardized biometric 
identifiers could be digitally encrypted to provide security of the embedded information.  
Pier-to-pier standards could allow for powerful grid computing capabilities that would 
maximize computing power, eliminate stovepipe systems, and provide efficient access 
and data-mining across numerous databases.  Global standards would enable the synergy 
for analytical engines to model, simulate, and suggest probable courses of action to 
counter threat conditions and minimize vulnerabilities.  
D. FUTURE RESEARCH 
The breadth this thesis research has taken in trying to address the numerous issues 
of surveillance and biometrics in homeland security has both amazed and engaged the 
authors.  The challenges are complex, and the road ahead will be a long and controversial 
one for these technologies.  Unfortunately, we do not have the luxury of time; we must 
begin to use our proven technologies now toward the goals of homeland security and 
diligently work to improve them as we move ever forward.  The most important lesson 
learned from this study is that there is no single solution to winning the war on 
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terrorism—it will be both a challenge for technology as well as for human cooperation.  
We have found that although technical solutions exist and hold great promise to assist in 
the homeland security effort, success will ultimately be a function of complex human 
factors and unprecedented national and international cooperation.  Recommended areas 
for more in-depth study include but are not limited to the topics listed in Table 7.1.   
 
Recommended Areas for Further Thesis Study 
- aircraft onboard cabin video 
surveillance 
- artificial intelligence  
- cargo screening technologies 
- chemical, biological, and nuclear 
detection technologies  
- collaborative information sharing 
technologies  
- computer forensics 
- computer modeling and simulation 
- critical infrastructure protection 
- decision support systems 
- enterprise architecture 
- enterprise storage 
- foreign policy 
- fuzzy logic 
- globalization impact on world conflict 
- grid computing  
- human factors in IT implementation 
- impact of technology on privacy 
- inference and analytical engines  
- information warfare  
- infrastructure protection 
- international cooperation 
- knowledge management 
- managing change in complex 
organizations 
- management information bases 
- medical surveillance technologies 
- mobile robotic surveillance technology 
  multiagent systems  
- network security for surveillance  
- neural networks 
- predictive analysis 
- project management 
- smart card technology 
- terrorist networks 
- ubiquitous computing 
- wireless surveillance and mobile 
biometric devices 
 






This chapter provides a depiction for probable implementation areas within a 
ubiquitous surveillance and biometrics society.  The concept does not purport to be the 
solution for ending terrorism, but it is an enabler amid a collection of resources.  
Terrorism is but one of many symptoms of a world in conflict; and conflict must be 
managed.  The research has confirmed that although technology will play a pivotal role in 
homeland security, it is people who are the most important ingredients in leveraging its 
benefits.  People can produce synergy through technology by sharing information, 
establishing standards and procedures, providing proper training, and exercising good 
judgment.   
Our ability to cooperate domestically and internationally as neighbors of one 
world will be tested in the months and  years ahead, as we implement the initiatives 
required for making the world a safer place for civilization.  The areas this thesis covered 
during the research period are as broad as they are controversial.  Much study still needs 
to be done on the specific details of how best to plan and implement surveillance and 
biometrics initiatives.  There is great value in learning lessons from other countries that 
have had successes with respect to their own homeland security related efforts—the 
United Kingdom and Israel in particular.  The potential benefits of this technology 
surpass counter-terrorism aims; crime reduction, fraud reduction, improved transportation 
safety, better quality control in commerce, efficient immigration, and border management 
are just some of the advantages of intelligent surveillance and biometrics employment.   
Finally, as we listen to debates on civil liberties and privacy for and against this 
technology as surveillance incrementally makes its way into our everyday lives, we need 
to stop and ask ourselves—what price are we willing to pay to feel safe again?  It 
becomes a complex equation for consequence management.  One terrorist with one 
weapon of mass destruction can kill millions.  What price would you pay?  Society is 
forming its own answer now and the resulting environment should provide for a more 


































APPENDIX A.  CHRONOLOGY OF HOMELAND SECURITY, 
POST 11 SEPTEMBER 2001 (FROM WHITEHOUSE, JUN 2002) 
Sep 11, 2001: America attacked. 
Sep 11, 2001: Department of Defense begins combat air patrols over U.S. cities. 
Sep 11, 2001: Department of Transportation grounds all U.S. private aircraft. 
Sep 11, 2001: FEMA activates Federal Response Plan. 
Sep 11, 2001: U.S. Customs goes to Level 1 alert at all border ports of entry. 
Sep 11, 2001: HHS activates (for the first time ever) the National Disaster 
Medical System, dispatching more than 300 medical and mortuary 
personnel to the New York and Washington, D.C. areas, 
dispatching one of eight 12-hour emergency “push packages” of 
medical supplies, and putting 80 Disaster Medical Assistance 
Teams nationwide and 7,000 private sector medical professionals 
on deployment alert. 
Sep 11, 2001: Nuclear Regulatory Commission advises all nuclear power plants, 
non-power reactors, nuclear fuel facilities and gaseous diffusion 
plants go to the highest level of security. All complied. 
Sep 11, 2001: President orders federal disaster funding for New York. 
Sep 11, 2001: FEMA deploys National Urban Search and Rescue Response team. 
Sep 11, 2001: FEMA deploys US Army Corp of Engineers to assist debris 
removal. 
Sep 12, 2001: FEMA deploys emergency medical and mortuary teams to NY and 
Washington. 
Sep 12, 2001: FAA allows limited reopening of the nation’s commercial airspace 
system to allow flights that were diverted on September 11 to 
continue to their original destinations. 
Sep 13, 2001: President orders federal aid for Virginia. 
Sep 13, 2001: Departments of Justice and Treasury deploy Marshals, Border 
Patrol, and Customs officials to provide a larger police presence at 
airports as they reopen. 
Sep 14, 2001: President proclaims a national emergency (Proc. 7463). 
Sep 14, 2001: President orders ready reserves of armed forces to active duty. 
Sep 14, 2001: FBI Releases List of Nineteen Suspected Terrorists. 
Sep 17, 2001: Attorney General directs the establishment of 94 Anti-Terrorism 
Task Forces, one for each United States Attorney Office. 
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Sep 18, 2001: President signs authorization for Use of Military Force bill. 
Sep 18, 2001: President authorizes additional disaster funding for New York. 
Sep 20, 2001: President addresses Congress, announces creation of the Office of 
Homeland Security and appointment of Governor Tom Ridge as 
Director.  
Sep 21, 2001: HHS announces that more than $126 million (part of $5 billion the 
President released for disaster relief) is being provided 
immediately to support health services provided in the wake of the 
attacks. 
Sep 22, 2001: President signs airline transportation legislation, providing tools to 
assure the safety and immediate stability of our Nation's 
commercial airline system, and establish a process for 
compensating victims of the terrorist attacks. 
Sep 25, 2001: The first of approximately 7,200 National Guard troops begin 
augmenting security at 444 airports. 
Sep 27, 2001: The FBI releases photographs of 19 individuals believed to be the 
9/11 hijackers Sep Coast Guard immediately mobilized more than 
2,000 Reservists in the largest homeland defense and port secur ity 
operation since World War II. 
Oct 1, 2001: FEMA declares over $344 million committed to New York 
recovery so far. 
Oct 4, 2001: Robert Stevens dies of anthrax in Florida – first known victim of 
biological terrorism. 
Oct 8, 2001: President swears- in Governor Ridge as Assistant to the President 
for Homeland Security, and issues Executive Order creating OHS. 
Oct 9, 2001: President swears-in General (Retired) Wayne Downing as Director 
of the Office of Combating Terrorism, and issues Executive order 
creating OCT. 
Oct 10, 2001: President unveils "most wanted" terrorists. 
Oct 12, 2001: FAA restores general aviation in 15 major metropolitan areas. 
Oct 16, 2001: President issues Executive Order establishing the President's 
Critical Infrastructure Protection Board to coordinate and have 
cognizance of Federal efforts and programs that relate to protection 
of information systems. 
Oct 21, 2001: FAA restores general aviation in 12 more major metropolitan 
areas. 
Oct 22, 2001: President issues Executive Order for HHS to exercise certain 
contracting authority in connection with national defense 
functions. 
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Oct 23, 2001: U.S. Customs Service creates new Office of Anti-Terrorism. 
Oct 25, 2001: Department of Treasury launches Operation Greenquest, a new 
multi-agency financial enforcement initiative bringing the full 
scope of the government's financial expertise to bear against 
sources of terrorist funding. 
Oct 26, 2001: President signs the USA Patriot Act. 
Oct 29, 2001: President chairs first meeting of the Homeland Security Council. 
Issues Homeland Security Presidential Directive-1, establishing the 
organization and operation of the HSC, and HSPD-2, establishing 
the Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force and increasing 
immigration vigilance. 
Oct 30, 2001: FAA restricts all private aircraft flying over nuclear facilities. 
Nov 8, 2001: President announces that the Corporation for National and 
Community Service (CNCS) will support homeland security, 
mobilizing more than 20,000 Senior Corps and AmeriCorps 
participants. 
Nov 8, 2001: President Bush creates the Presidential Task Force on Citizen 
Preparedness in the War Against Terrorism to help prepare 
Americans in their homes, neighborhoods, schools, workplaces, 
places of worship, and public places from the potential 
consequences of terrorist attacks. 
Nov 15, 2001: FEMA announces Individual and Family Grant program for 
disaster assistance 
Nov 28, 2001: HHS awards contract to produce 155 million doses of smallpox 
vaccine by the end of 2002 to bring the total of doses in the 
nation's stockpile to 286 million, enough to protect every United 
States citizen. 
Nov 29, 2001: Attorney General Ashcroft announces Responsible Cooperators 
Program, which will provide immigration benefits to non-citizens 
who furnish information to help apprehend terrorists or to stop 
terrorist attacks. 
Dec 3, 2001: FBI implements first phase of headquarters reorganization. 
Dec 10, 2001: U.S. Customs launches “Operation Shield America” to prevent 
international terrorist organizations from obtaining sensitive U.S. 
technology, weapons, and other equipment. 
Dec 12, 2001: Governor Ridge and Canadian Foreign Minister John Manley sign 
a “smart border” declaration and action plan to improve security 
and efficiency of the Northern border. 
Dec 19, 2001: FAA restores general aviation in 30 major metropolitan areas. 
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Dec 28, 2001: President issues Executive Orders on succession in federal 
agencies. 
Jan 10, 2002: President signs $2.9 billion bioterrorism appropriations bill. 
Jan 11, 2002: FAA publishes new standards to protect cockpits from intrusion 
and small arms fire or fragmentation devices, such as grenades, 
requiring operators of more than 6,000 airplanes to install 
reinforced doors by April 9, 2003. 
Jan 17, 2002: President issues Executive Order authorizing the Secretary of 
Transportation to increase the number of Coast Guard service 
members on active duty. 
Jan 17, 2002: U.S. Customs announces Container Security Initiative. 
Jan 17-18, 2002: U.S. Border Patrol officials and other representatives of the INS 
meet with Native American leaders and law enforcement officials 
jointly strengthen security along the Southwest and Northern 
borders. 
Jan 17, 2002: FBI releases information, photographs, and FBI laboratory 
photographic retouches Jan 25 on six suspected terrorists. 
Jan 18, 2002: Department of Transportation meets mandate to submit plans for 
training security screeners and flight crews Jan 23 FBI announces 
new hiring initiative for FBI Special Agents. 
Jan 28, 2002: Congress confirms appointment of John W. Magaw as Under 
Secretary of Transportation for Security. 
Jan 30, 2002: President issues Executive Order establishing the USA Freedom 
Corps, encouraging all Americans to serve their country for the 
equivalent of at least 2 years (4,000 hours) over their lifetimes. 
Jan 31, 2002: HHS announces state allotments of $1.1 billion to help strengthen 
their capacity to respond to bioterrorism and other public health 
emergencies resulting from terrorism. 
Feb 3, 2002: United States Secret Service ensures security of Super Bowl 
XXXVI, a National Special Security Event. 
Feb 4, 2002: President submits the President’s Budget for FY 2003 to the 
Congress, directing $37.7 billion to homeland security, up from 
$19.5 billion in FY 2002. 
Feb 6, 2002: Attorney General Ashcroft announces rule change to Board of 
Immigration Appeals to eliminate backlog, prevent unwarranted 
delays, and improve the quality of board decision-making while 
ensuring that those in our immigration court system enjoy the full 
protections of due process. 
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Feb 8-24, 2002: United States Secret Service ensures security of the 2002 Winter 
Olympics, a National Special Security Event Feb 25 Soldiers of the 
U.S. Army National Guard begin to deploy to augment border 
Security. 
Feb 26, 2002: Nuclear Regulatory Commission orders all 104 commercial 
nuclear power plants to implement interim compensatory security 
measures, formalizing measures taken in response to NRC 
advisories since September 11, and imposing additional security 
enhancements because of on-going comprehensive security review. 
Mar 1, 2002: U.S. Customs Service announces action plan to ensure 
international air carrier compliance with regulations requiring 
passenger and crew information prior to arrival in the U.S. on 
flights from foreign locations. 
Mar 5, 2002: Attorney General Ashcroft announces National Security 
Coordination Council to ensure seamless coordination of all 
functions of the Department of Justice relating to national security, 
particularly efforts to combat terrorism. 
Mar 8, 2002: To date, the U.S. Coast Guard has conducted ove r 35,000 port 
security patrols and 3,500 air patrols; boarded over 10,000 vessels 
including over 2,000 “high interest vessels;” escorted 6,000 vessels 
in and out of ports including 2,000 escorted by Sea Marshalls; 
maintained over 124 security zones; and recalled 2,900 Reservists 
to active duty. 
Mar 12, 2002: President establishes the Homeland Security Advisory System 
(HSPD-3). 
Mar 19, 2002: President issues Executive Order establishing the President’s 
Homeland Security Advisory Council. 
Mar 22, 2002: Secretary of State Powell and Mexico Interior Minister Santiago 
Creel sign a “smart border” declaration and action plan to improve 
security and efficiency of the Southern border. 
Mar 25, 2002:  U.S. Customs officers begin partnership with Canadian Customs 
officers to inspect U.S.- bound cargo upon its first arrival in the 
ports of Montreal, Halifax, and Vancouver. 
Mar 25, 2002: Nuclear Regulatory Commission orders Honeywell International, 
Inc., a uranium conversion. facility in Illinois, to implement 
interim compensatory security measures. 
Mar 29, 2002: HHS announces it will obtain more than 75 million additional 
doses of smallpox vaccine from Aventis Pasteur Inc., provided the 
supply, stored in a secure location since 1972, and is proven safe 
and effective Apr 5.  NRC forms Office of Security to streamline 
security, safeguards, and incident response activities. 
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Apr 8, 2002: INS implements rule changes governing an alien's ability to begin 
a course of study the period of time visitors are permitted to remain 
in the United States. 
Apr 16, 2002: U.S. Customs launches the Customs-Trade Partnership Against 
Terrorism. 
Apr 22, 2002: FBI Director Mueller announces key management positions in the 
counterterrorism division. 
Apr 30, 2002: Transportation Security Administration announces successful 
implementation of Federal passenger screeners at Baltimore-
Washington airport. 
May 14, 2002: President Signs Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act. 
May 19, 2002: TSA issues 180-day progress report to Congress. 
May 22, 2002: CIA creates new position of Associate Director of Central 
Intelligence for Homeland Security, effective May 28. 
May 24, 2002: Nuclear Regulatory Commission orders decommissioning of 
commercial nuclear power plants with spent fuel stored in water-
filled pools and a spent nuclear fuel storage facility using pool 
storage to implement interim compensatory security measures for 
the current threat environment. 
May 29, 2002: Attorney General Ashcroft and FBI Director Mueller announce 
reorganization of the FBI to achieve top priority of counter-
terrorism and better coordination with the CIA. 
 
 
Source:  Whitehouse, June 2002. 
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APPENDIX B.  ORGANIZATION OF THE HOMELAND 
SECURITY DEPARTMENT 
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APPENDIX C.  MAJOR CABINET AND AGENCIES 
INVOLVED IN HOMELAND SECURITY BEFORE 
REORGANIZATION 
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APPENDIX D.  HOMELAND SECURITY JURISDICTION  
 






















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 191
APPENDIX E.  BIOMETRICS GLOSSARY 
Algorithm 
A sequence of instructions that tell a biometric system how to solve a particular 
problem. An algorithm will have a finite number of steps and is typically used by the 
biometric engine to compute whether a biometric sample and template are a match. 
American National Standards Institute (ANSI) 
Established in 1918, ANSI is a voluntary organization that creates standards for 
the computer industry. The FBI commissioned ANSI to create an image standard for the 
exchange of fingerprint data between AFIS systems. 
Application Programming Interface (API) 
A set of services or instructions used to standardize an application.  
Attempt 
The submission of a biometric sample to a biometric system for identification or 
verification. A biometric system may allow more than one attempt to identify or verify.  
Authentication 
The action of verifying information such as identity, ownership, or authorization. 
The preferred biometric term is verification. 
Authentication Routine  
A cryptographic process used to validate a user, card, terminal, or message 
contents. Also known as a handshake, the routine uses important data to create a code 
that can be verified in real time or batch mode. (see verification) 
Automated Fingerprint Identification System (AFIS) 
A specialized biometric system that compares a single finger image with a 
database of finger images. In law enforcement, AFIS is used to collect fingerprints from 
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criminal suspects and crime scenes. In civilian life, fingerprint scanners are used to 
identify employees, protect sensitive data, etc. 
Automatic ID/Auto ID 
An umbrella term for any biometric system or other security technology that uses 
automatic means to check identity. This applies to both one-to-one verification and one-
to-many identification. 
Behavioral Biometric 
A biometric that is characterized by a behavioral trait that is learned and acquired 
over time, rather than a physical or physiological characteristic. (contrast with physical 
biometric) 
Bifurcation 
A branch made by more than one finger image ridge. 
Binning 
Taking advantage of different fingerprint pattern classifications to reduce the 
number of comparisons that must be performed to find a match in an identification 
system. Enrolled fingerprints that can be classified with a high degree of confidence are 
assigned to "bins" corresponding to each classification. A submitted print that cannot be 
classified with high confidence must be matched against all the bins (the entire database), 
but prints that can be classified need only be matched against the corresponding bin or 
bins. 
Biometric 
A measurable, physical characteristic or personal behavioral trait used to 
recognize the identity, or verify the claimed identity, of an enrollee. 
Biometric Application Programming Interface (BAPI) 
This is an API that allows the programmer to develop applications for a broad 
range of virtual biometric devices (VBDs) without knowing the specific capabilities of 
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the device. The API is comprised of three distinct levels of functionality from high device 
abstraction to low (device specific) abstraction. 
Biometric System 
An automated system capable of capturing a biometric sample from an end user; 
extracting biometric data from that sample; comparing the biometric data with that 
contained in one or more reference templates; deciding how well they match; and 
indicating whether or not an identification or verification of identity has been achieved. 
Biometrics 
The automated technique of measuring a physical characteristic or personal trait 
of an individual and comparing that characteristic to a comprehensive database for 
purposes of identification. 
Block Cipher  
A symmetric cipher, which encrypts a message by breaking it down into blocks 
and encrypting each block. 
BPI 
Bits per inch, as on a magnetic stripe card. 
CAPI 
Cryptographic Application Programming Interface. 
CSP 
Cryptographic Service Provider. 
Capture  
The method of taking a biometric sample from the end user. 
Cipher 






A scheme for categorizing fingerprints according to their overall patterns. Some 
fingers do not fit into any of the classes, and some may have attributes of more than one 
class. (see binning)  
Coding 
Image processing software for extracting minutiae features from the image. 
Comparison 
The process of comparing a biometric sample with a previously stored reference 
template or templates. (see one-to-many and one-to-one) 
Cryptography 
The art and science of us ing mathematics to secure information and create a high 
degree of trust in the electronic realm. (see public key and private key) 
Cryptographic Key 
(see key and public key) 
Cryptosystem 
An encryption/decryption algorithm (cipher), together with all possible plaintexts, 
ciphertexts and keys. 
Data Encryption Standard (DES) 
Data Encryption Standard, a block cipher developed by IBM and the U.S. 
Government in the 1970s as an official standard. 
Decryption 
The inverse (reverse) of encryption. 
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Demographic Data  
Census information about an individual, such as name, address, gender, race, and 
year of birth. 
Digital Signature  
The encryption of a message digest with a private key. 
Direct Fingerprint Reader (DFR) 
A device capable of scanning finger images directly from an individual's fingers.  
Electronic Benefits Transfer (EBT) 
Electronic Benefits Transfer enables automatic benefits distribution. It is currently 
implemented in WIC and Food Stamps programs. 
Encryption 
The transformation of plaintext into an apparently less readable form (called 
ciphertext) through a mathematical process. The ciphertext may be read by anyone who 
has the key that decrypts (undoes the encryption of) the ciphertext. 
End User 
A person who interacts with a biometric system to enroll or have his /her identity 
checked. 
Enrollee 
A person who has a biometric reference template on file. 
Enrollment 
The process of collecting biometric samples from a person and the subsequent 
preparation and storage of biometric reference templates representing that person's 
identity. 
Enrollment Time 
The time a person must spend to have his/her biometric reference template 
successfully created.  
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Enrollment Station 
A workstation at which an individual's biometrics (fingerprint, voiceprint, etc.) 
and personal information (name, address, etc.) can be entered into a bioidentification 
system. 
Extraction 
The process of converting a captured biometric sample into biometric data so that 
it can be compared to a reference template. 
False Acceptance Rate (FAR) 
The probability that a biometric system will incorrectly identify an individual or 
will fail to reject an impostor. Also known as the Type II error rate. 
False Rejection Rate (FRR) 
The probability that a biometric system will fail to identify an enrollee, or verify 
the legitimate claimed identity of an enrollee. Also known as the Type I error rate. 
Fingerprint Identification Unit (FIU) 
A biometric system capable of capturing, storing, and comparing fingerprint data 
for the purposes of verifying an individual's identity. 
Fingerprint Template 
A description of all the detected minutiae in a fingerprint pattern. The template 
contains each minutia's x/y coordinate, slope, and type, thus summarizing the 
characteristics of the fingerprint for purposes of matching the fingerprint against 
candidates. 
Identification 
A one-to-many comparison of an individual's submitted biometric sample against 
the entire database of biometric reference templates to determine whether it matches any 
of the templates and, if so, the identity of the enrollee whose template was matched. The 
biometric system using the one-to-many approach is seeking to find an identity within a 
database, rather than verify a claimed identity. (contrast with verification) 
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Image Database 
The database that contains all fingerprint templates in the system. The image 
database can contain images of the fingerprints, as well as photograph and signature 
images. 
International Standards Organization (ISO) 
The major international standards-setting organization for cards of all types. 
Key 
A string of bits used widely in cryptography, allowing people to encrypt and 
decrypt data; a key can be used to perform other mathematical operations as well. Given 
a cipher, a key determines the mapping of the plaintext to the ciphertext. (see private key 
and public key) 
Key Management 
The various processes that deal with the creation, distribution, authentication, and 
storage of keys. 
Live Capture  
The process of capturing a biometric sample by an interaction between an end 
user and a biometric system. 
Match/Matching 
The process of comparing a biometric sample against a previously stored template 
and scoring the level of similarity. An accept or reject decision is then based upon 
whether this score exceeds the given threshold. 
Minutiae 
Points corresponding to the ridge endings, deltas, and bifurcations of a finger 





The database that contains all fingerprint templates in the system. The minutiae 
database is contained within the image database. 
Non-repudiation 
A property of a cryptosystem. Non-repudiation cryptosystems are those in which 
the users cannot deny actions they performed.  
One-to-Many 
Fingerprint search that compares the minutiae from a candidate fingerprint image 
against the fingerprint minutiae database to determine whether the candidate exists in the 
database. (synonym for identification.) 
One-to-One 
Fingerprint search that compares the minutiae from an individual's live fingerprint 
image against fingerprint minutiae stored on a card or in a specific database record to 
determine whether or not the individual is who he or she claims to be. (synonym for 
verification.) 
Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) 
A biometric organization (manufacturer) that assembles a complete biometric  
system from parts, or assembles a biometric module for integration into a complete 
biometric system. 
Password Bank 
A database for storing username, password, and other personal information, to be 
released upon verification of an individual's identity. 
Personal Identification Number (PIN) 
A security method whereby a (usually) four-digit number is entered by an 




A biometric that is characterized by a physical characteristic rather than a 
behavioral trait. (contrast with behavioral biometric)  
Plaintext 
The data to be encrypted. 
Private Key 
In public-key cryptography, this key is the secret key. It is primarily used for 
decryption but is also used for encryption with digital signatures.  
Public Key 
In public-key cryptography, this key is made public to all. It is primarily used for 
encryption but can be used for verifying signatures.  
Public Key Cryptography 
Cryptography based on methods involving a public key and a priva te key. 
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) 
PKIs are designed to solve the key management problem. (see key management) 
Password List (PWL)  
A database for storing username, password, and other personal information, to be 
released upon verification of an individual's identity. 
Recognition 
The preferred term is identification. 
Reference Template  
Data that represents the biometric measurement of an enrollee used by a biometric 





Process of registering biometric data with a Fingerprint Identification Unit (FIU) 
or other biometric system. 
Rejection/False Rejection  
When a biometric system fails to identify an enrollee or fails to verify the 
legitimate claimed identity of an enrollee. Also known as a Type I error.  
Response Time/Processing Time  
The time period required by a biometric system to return a decision on 
identification or verification of a biometric sample. 
Smart Card 
A card-shaped portable data carrier that contains one or more integrated circuits 
for data storage and processing. A typical smart card chip includes a microprocessor or 
CPU, ROM (for storing operating instructions), RAM (for storing data during 
processing), and EPROM (or EEPROM) memory for nonvolatile storage of information. 
Software Developer's Kit (SDK) 
A programming package that enables a programmer to develop applications for a 
specific platform. Typically, an SDK includes one or more APIs, programming tools, and 
documentation. 
Threshold 
The acceptance or rejection of biometric data is dependent on the match score 
falling above or below the threshold. The threshold is adjustable so that the biometric 
system can be more or less strict, depending on the requirements of any given biometric 
application. 
Type I Error 
The failure of a fingerprint identification system when it does not match a 
candidate fingerprint pattern with its mating fingerprint pattern (in other words, a failure 
to make a match that should have been made). 
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Type II Error  
The failure of a fingerprint identification system when it matches a candidate 
fingerprint pattern with a non-mating fingerprint pattern (in other words, making a match 
that should not have been made) 
Validation 
The process of demonstrating that the system under consideration meets in all 
respects the specification of that system. 
Verification 
A comparison of two sets of biometrics to determine if they are from the same 
individual; or, in fraud prevention applications, a one-to-one comparison of a live finger 
and a previously enrolled record to ensure that the applicant is who he/she claims to be. 
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APPENDIX F.  BIOMETRIC PRODUCTS AND 
APPLICATIONS 
Company Products  
IrisScan Inc., U.S.A. · IrisScan 2020 
· System 2000 EAC 
· System 2100 
Sensar, U.S.A. · IrisIdent System 
Panasonic, U.S.A. · Authenticam 
 
Table F.1. Iris Scanning Products. (After: Polemi, p. 24). 
  
Company Products  
PrintScan International, U.S.A. · WinFing 3.1 
Startek, Tiawan · FingerCheck 
Identix, U.S.A. · TouchPrint 600 
· TouchPrint 2000 Live Scan System 
Sony, Japan · FIU-710 “Puppy” Fingerprint ID unit 
Precise Biometrics, U.S.A. · SC-100, MC-100, A-100  
· BioKeyboard 100,  
· BioAccess MC, BioAccess Mifare 
FingerScan, Australia  · FingerScan 
FingerMatrix, U.S.A. · FingerScanner 
Bioscrypt, Canada · V-Pass, V-Flex, V-Prox, V-Smart 
· MV 1200, Core 
AuthenTec, Inc., U.S.A. · EntrePad AES3500 
Biocentric Solutions, Inc., U.S.A. · BioSentry 
BioEnable Technologies, India  · BioEnable FRT 
BioPay, LLC, U.S.A. · BioPay Check Cashing System 
Bioscrypt, Inc., U.S.A. · V-Smart 
Cansec Systems Ltd., U.S.A. · Zodiac Fingerprint Reader 
DitigalPersona, Inc., U.S.A. · U.are.U Pro 
Fujitsu Microelectronics America, Inc., 
U.S.A. 
· MBF300 Sweep Sensor 
Global Biometric Corporation · ID Plus Token 
IDynta Systems, Inc., U.S.A. · BioLink Products 
NEC Technologies, Inc., U.S.A. · TouchPass 
Printrak (Motorola), U.S.A. · Omnitrak 8.0 AFIS/Palmprint 
Identification Technology 
Raytheon, U.S.A. · IDENT 
Visionics, U.S.A. · FingerPrinter CMS 
SENSE Holdings, Inc., U.S.A. · BioClock 
 
Table F.2. Fingerprint Recognition Products. (After: Polemi, p. 23 and BiometriTech, 
26 Mar 2002). 
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Company Products  
Computer Data Systems, U.S.A · Hand Geometry Readers 
Recognition Systems, U.S.A. · HandPunch 
· ID3D HandKey 
· Hand Geometry Readers 
BioMet Partners, U.S.A. · Digi-2 
Biometric Security Systems, U.K · BioDentity System 
Biometrics, Inc, U.S.A. · FastPass II 
Talos Technology Inc, U.S.A. · PG-2001 
IDentiCard, U.S.A. · Hand Geometry Reader 
 





Company Products  
Dectel Security Systems, U.K. · Facial Data Base Systems 
Forensic Security Services, U.K. · Thermace 
· VIAS 
Technology Recognition Systems · FR1000 
Facial Reco Associates · Sherlock Face Recognition 
Identicator, U.S.A. · Facial Search System 
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, 
U.S.A. 
· KEN 
National University of Singapore · FACEit 
George Mason University · ARGUS 
MIT Artificial Intelligence Laboratory · Face Pass 
UMIST · FACE-SOM 
University of Essex · Facial Recognition Software 
Dextel Security Systems, UK · Dextel Crime Net 
Identification Technologies International 
Inc., U.S.A 
· One on One Facial Recognition Systems 
ZN Security, Germany, Germany · ZN-Face 
NeuroMetric Vision Systems · MufMaster 
AcSys Biometrics Corporation, Canada · AcSys FRS Entry 
· Acsys FRS Logon IT  
· AcSys FRS CoLo 
BioDentity Systems Corporation, Canada · SecureIDent  
BioID America, Inc., U.S.A. · Single Sign-on 
Cognitec AG, U.S.A. · Face VACS-Logon 
GraphCo Technologies, Inc., U.S.A. · Facetrac 
Identico Systems, U.S.A. · True ID 
ImageWare Systems, Inc., U.S.A. · Face ID 
Imagis Technologies, Inc., Canada · ID-2000 
Neuridynamics Limited, U.K. · Tridentity 3 Dimensional Face Recognition 
Photo Vision, Inc., U.S.A. · QuadHDTV Video Image Sensor 
Visionics, U.S.A. · FaceIt  (Figure 5.15.) 
Viisage Technology, Inc., U.S.A. · FaceFINDER (Figure 5.16.) 
· Face EXPLORER 
· FacePASS, FacePIN, FaceTOOLS 
Symtron Technology, U.S.A. · FaceOn Logon System 
· FaceOn Surveillance System 
 







Company Products  
ABS, Germany · VOCAL 
· VOCAL SCW1 
· VOCAL ZKE 
T-NETIX, U.S.A. · PIN-LOCK, voice verification 
system 
Bell Security, U.K. · Caller Verification System 
Speakez, U.S.A. · Tele-MAtic 
Domain Dynamic Limite, UK · TESPAR/FANN 
Anovea Authentication Technology, Inc., U.S.A. · Anovea Speaker Authentication 
System 
BioID America, Inc., U.S.A. · BioID 3.0 
Buytel (VoiceVault), Ireland · Voice Vault Services 
InterVoice-Brite, Inc., U.S.A. · Speech Access 
Keyware, U.S.A. · Centralized Authentication 
Software (CAS) 
Nuance Communications, U.S.A. · Nuance Verifier 3.0 
OTG, Canada · HELP YOURSELF/SecurPBX 
Persay Ltd., U.S.A. · Orpheus 
Sonic Foundry, Inc., U.S.A. · Unified Security View 
SpeechWorks International, Inc., U.S.A. · SpeechSecure 
SpeakEZ, U.S.A. · Voice Print Speaker Verification 
SDK 
Veritel Corporation · VoiceCheck 
VeriVoice, Inc., U.S.A. · VeriVoice Security Lock (SL) 
Vocent Solutions, Inc., U.S.A. · Voice Secure Suite 
 
Table F.5. Voice Recognition Products. (After: Polemi, p. 29 and BiometriTech, 1 
Mar 2002). 
 
Company Products  
Communication Intelligence Corp., U.S.A · Signature Verification Software 
Gadix, U.S.A. · Cyber-SIGN 
Quintet, U.S.A. · Electronic Signature Verification 
System   
British Technology Group, U.K. · Rolls Royce Signature Verification 
PenOp Inc., U.S.A. · Signature Analyzer 
AEA Technology, U.K. · Countermatch 
cadix International, Japan · ID-007 
IBM. U.S.A. · IBM Transaction Security System 
Checkmate Electronice, U.S.A. · Sign/On 
 





BioPassword Security Systems, U.K. · BioPassword 
Electronic Signature Lock Corporation, 
U.S.A. 
· Electronic Signature Lock 
M&T Technologies, U.S.A.  · Keystroke Analyzer 
TNO-FEL, Netherlands · Keystroke Analyzer 
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APPENDIX G.  BIOMETRIC APPLICATIONS 
· Correction Facilities · Health Records Management 
· Department of Motor Vehicles · Secure Records Management 
· Computer Login Validation · Internet Automated Banking 
· Corporate Domain Logon · Credit Card Authorization 
· ATMs · Portal Entry Control 
· Nuclear Power  Station Security · Electronic Commerce Security 
 
Table G.1. Iris Scanning Applications. (From: Polemi, p. 24). 
 
· Physical Access Control · Banking 
· Government Agencies · Information Security 
· Medical & Insurance Industry · Police Department 
· High Power Reactor Stations · Immigration and Naturalization 
Services 
· Airport Traffic Security · Welfare & Unemployment 
Benefit Recipients 
· Identification of Missing 
Children 
· Database management systems 
· Computer access or transaction 
control 
· Computer Database Security 
Control 
 
Table G.2. Fingerprint Recognition Applications. (From: Polemi, p. 23). 
 
· Airport Traffic · Banking 
· Immigration and Naturalization 
Services 
· Employee Verification  
· Time and Attendance · Super Markets 
· Hospitals/Medical Security · Drug Stores 
· Stock rooms/Equipment Storage · Computer Room Access 
· Power Stations · Welfare 
· Casinos (access to money 
rooms) 





Table G.3. Hand Geometry Applications. (From: Polemi, p. 26) 
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· Banking · Credit Card Companies 
· Airport Security · Security of Internet 
· Welfare Agencies · Buildings Security 
· Computer Facilities · Drivers Licenses 
· Telephone Companies · Voter Registration Processes 
· Hospitals/ Health Care 
Institutions 
· Social Security Systems 
· Police Authorities · Vehicle Safety 
 
Table G.4. Facial Recognition Applications. (From: Polemi, p. 25). 
 
· Anti theft systems for vehicles 
and doors 
· Telephone Networks 
· PC and computer network 
access control 
· Passport control 
· Door entrance systems · Prison Payphones 
· Hospitals (access to nursery) · Pharmacy 
· Benefit Payments · Aerospace company 
· Equipment to authorize chip 
and magnetic key cards 
· Fraud Control in prisons and 
correction facilities 
· Universities (access to 
laboratories, computer centers, 
student unions) 
· Air Force in air communications 
(identify pilots) 
· Enforcement of bail · Non custodial activities 
 
Table G.5. Voice Recognition Applications. (From: Polemi, p. 28). 
 
· Banking · Internal Revenue Service 
· Post Office · Social Medicare 
· Home Shopping · Welfare 
 
Table G.6. Handwriting/Signature Recognition Applications. (From: Polemi, p. 30). 
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